



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS TO PAKISTAN**

by

Naveed Safdar

December 2004

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**INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS TO PAKISTAN**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
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## **ABSTRACT**

Ethnicity, sectarianism and economic instability are fundamental variables of internal security threats to Pakistan. Religious extremism has created an unenviable image of Pakistan in the eyes of the rest of the world and has affected the country adversely. At the same time inter-provincial grievances could potentially cause serious damage to the federation. Despite recent economic recovery and sound macro policies, the absence of genuine socio-economic development has provided ethno-sectarian elements and regional forces grounds to exploit and weaken Pakistan internally.

This paper argues that ethno-sectarian problems are major security threats to Pakistan and will remain a huge impediment to the goals of economic prosperity. Interdependence of these multifaceted threats and their overall impact on internal security is the focus of this analysis. Pakistan needs to address these national security threats and find a viable solution in a reasonable timeframe to find its rightful place in the community of modern nations. The immediate requirement is to introduce political, economic and education reforms and take bold initiatives to obviate present and future threats. This paper recommends three-pronged strategy to counter ethno-sectarian threats to Pakistan: halt then reverse present trends, enforce rule of law, and lastly introduce fresh incentives for socio-economic development.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Impact of globalization, complex economic interdependence and events after 9/11 have brought a major shift in security perceptions in Pakistan. Internal security concerns caused by resurgence of extremism, ethnic polarization, socio-economic problems, and political instability, have assumed far greater importance than external security threats to Pakistan. Though India continues to pose serious military challenge, which compounds Pakistan's security, however, Pakistan's immediate threat grows from within, i.e., from its internal security problems.

There is little disagreement on the seriousness of internal security threats in Pakistan. However, opinion differs in regards to understanding which type of threat is most serious. A large number of security thinkers consider sectarianism and growing jihadi culture is the most serious threat to the country. President Pervez Musharraf also said the "only threat is sectarian and religious terrorism, which is eating us like termites, and it is Islam and the Muslim Ummah (community) which is paying the high cost. We all have to fight against it."<sup>1</sup> However, some scholars and political leaders consider ethnicity and national integration to be most serious threat to Pakistan, also referred to as 'provincialism' or 'regionalism'. In the last decade, nationalistic movements such as the Balochi, Sindhi and Mohajir, have been increasing restive and posing threats to the integrity of the state. Recognizing this threat, President Musharraf regarded inter-provincial harmony as one key area for focus after taking over in October 1999.<sup>2</sup> Another school of thought strongly feels that economic collapse can lead to the disintegration of Pakistan. Cited examples are: the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, some crumbling African states like Congo, Somalia and Ethiopia, and more recently, Afghanistan, are often given to illustrate this new threat phenomenon. It is extremely difficult to prioritize which threat is the most dangerous. The real challenge however, is how to handle these threats, minimize their negative impact, and how to take the country out of these quagmires?

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<sup>1</sup> President Musharraf told a thousand armed forces' top brass, provincial officials and foreign diplomats at navy dockyards in Arabian Sea port city Karachi, in December 2003. For details see: *Pakistan: Threat is internal*, at web-site [http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,,2-10-1462\\_1458842,00.html](http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,,2-10-1462_1458842,00.html). March 2004.

<sup>2</sup> Musharraf speech October 17, 1999. See The Dawn newspaper.

Religious extremism with a sharp rise in jihadi culture, ethnic diversity, economic instability are the fundamental variables which have a downward spiral effect on the stability and peace within the country and in the region as well. All these variables pose a certain degree of serious threat in one form or the other. Each variable needs to be analyzed critically to determine their impact on Pakistan's internal security. I argue that ethno-sectarian problems are major security threats to integrity of Pakistan and will remain a huge impediment to the goals of economic prosperity. There is a need to understand the interdependence of these multifaceted threats to the country and take a holistic view in order to formulate viable strategies for the future. Any strategy that does not critically address all the security threats may prove to be counter productive in the long term. Professor Robert Looney rightly argues that "strategy of macro economic stability is the best thing the country can do in the short term". However, he stresses that "the country must address its internal terrorism problems if it is to get high sustainable amount of foreign investment."<sup>3</sup> Looney's statement clearly establishes a relationship between internal security threats and economy. Therefore, this thesis will analyze the ethno-sectarian threats to Pakistan and examine their influence on economy. Other contributing factors to the state of affairs in Pakistan are lack of democratization and bad governance. Their combined affect has compounded the ethno-sectarian problems and economy. Given the scope of this thesis, later factors are not being analyzed threadbare but only referred to in the chapters. However, the negative impact of breakdown of fundamental security institutions has been discussed separately in Chapter V as intervening variable to critically analyze its role in handling internal security threats.

Pakistan needs to address these national security threats and find a viable solution, in a reasonable timeframe, to find its rightful place in the community of modern nations. The rise of the jihadi culture has created an unenviable image of Pakistan in the eyes of the rest of the world and has affected the country adversely. At the same time inter-provincial grievances could potentially cause serious damage to the federation. The ethnic and regional polarization has emerged as major motivation for potential breeding ground for terrorism. In the early 1960s, theorists of modernization proposed that "with

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<sup>3</sup> Looney, Robert, *Pakistan: Failed Economic Take-Offs and Terrorism*, draft paper received from Professor Robert Looney.

accelerated mobility and economic interdependence ethnic differences would eventually disappear.”<sup>4</sup> But in the case of Pakistan, the situation remained highly charged from the outset. Here ethnic difference became “instrument for competition over scarce resources”<sup>5</sup> Ethnic diversity, scarce resources and struggle for survival have been the key factors that led to the numerous ethnic violence, law and order situation in the country. The absence of genuine socio-economic development has provided ground to ethno-sectarian elements and regional forces to exploit the situation. In the future, pressing issues related to over population, absence of basic civic amenities and lack of education would pose serious challenges, especially in the province of Sindh and Balochistan. This thesis concludes that for a peaceful Pakistan, there is a need to eradicate any sense of alienation and obtain egalitarianism in the country as whole by establishing writ of the government, by achieving democratization, decentralization, accountability, and wider consensus on vital issues of national importance. The immediate requirement is to introduce political, economic and education initiatives in line with the challenges of future. Finally this paper recommends a three pronged strategy to fight out extremisms and militants. The first prong suggests means to halt and then reverse the growing trend of religious intolerance. The second prong proposes methods to enforce the rule of law. The last prong recommends measures to consolidate the gains by introducing incentives and dividends of economic prosperity.

This thesis has been divided into six chapters. After this chapter of introduction, Chapter II discusses the ethnicity challenges posed to Pakistan’s internal security. Chapter III analyses the impact of growing Jihadi culture and its negative implication for the future viability of Pakistan. Chapter IV focuses on interdependence between economy and ethno-sectarian problems. Chapter V will briefly analyze the causes of weakness in security institutions, i.e., police, paramilitary, and judiciary, in handling internal security threats to the country. The last chapter suggests a strategy and gives recommendations. Chapter II summary is mentioned below.

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<sup>4</sup> Iftikhar H. Malik, *State an Civil Society in Pakistan*, St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1997, pp. 174 and 178.

<sup>5</sup> This term has been used by number of Pakistani scholars and Western scholar as well. Steve Cohen is the person who actually referred to this term many a times.

Chapter II deals with ‘ethnic challenges in Pakistan. This has been the most serious threat to Pakistan since its birth. In Pakistani official terms it is also referred to as ‘provincialism’ or ‘regionalism’. Pakistan, as yet, is evolving nation. Each province in Pakistan has its own culture, language, and history and it drives ethnocentric pride in it. The main question is whether the ethnic problems in Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP could lead to disintegration of Pakistan. This assertion is exaggerated. One problem identified by the research is the feeling amongst these provinces, of the Punjabis domination in Pakistan. In this regard the separation of East Pakistan has been analyzed to draw its parallel with recent nationalistic movements. I argue that that separation of East Pakistan does not invalidate the “Two-Nation Theory” which was the basis of Pakistan’s creation but the event was a product of peculiar set of circumstances such as political failure, geographical cleavage, exploitation, and intervention by India. Nevertheless, East Pakistan did set precedence for sub-national movements, wherein it validates the use violence as instrument of policy to alleviate grievances and deprivations. This chapter identifies that basic resentment on important issues: water distribution, royalty on natural resources, lack of equal representation at the center, use of force by the army and security agencies, uneven socio-economic development of provinces- compounds and cause serious problems for the unity of the nation. Lately, inter-provincial water crises and scarcity of resources has had serious ramifications for integration and economic future of Pakistan. While the present government is trying hard to neutralize these threats, the problem of fair distribution of resources, socio-economic development and role of provincial government remains unresolved.

Chapter III shifts focus to growing threats of sectarianism and jihadi culture to the internal security of Pakistan. Different sectarian groups and their affiliations with militant groups are discussed at length. Pakistan came into existence as a moderate and modern nation state under the vision of Jinnah- the father of the nation. But downward trend in last 25 years warrants an explanation to the causes. A deliberate effort is made to explain the root causes for the rise of jihad syndrome in Pakistan. It also questions the poor education system and the role of madrassahs in fueling religious extremism and providing recruits to jihadi militant groups. Over a period of time, Pakistan became the hub of fundamentalists, which affected the moderate fabric of Pakistani society. Trained and

motivated militants, having experienced Afghan and Kashmir jihad, are available to various groups/sects. These fanatic groups with considerable access to unaccounted arms/ammunition are also exploited by opposing political parties. Iranian and Saudi Arabia, whose financial/material support to these organizations have been recorded; allegedly support some of these groups. Hostile neighboring countries have also exploited sectarianism in the last two decades for their own interests. The study proves that religious intolerance, sectarian problems and rise of religious extremism and militant groups are significant factors responsible for increased unrest and law and order problems in Pakistan. Sectarian threats feed on the failed education system in Pakistan and allow religious clerics to interpret Islam in the manner that exploits unemployed and raw youth.

This chapter also discusses specific problems currently in tribal areas where use of force in tribal area is a necessity but not a sufficient condition. Excessively relying upon military force alone is not answer to all the threats. Being an ideological Muslim state, Pakistan must allow sufficient freedom to religio-political parties without allowing them to use violent means or indulge in practices contrary to the policy of state. Any extremist group that uses violent means must be confronted with a strong application of force with clear ends in sight. Leadership must convey resolve and use of all appropriate state instruments to eliminate all such threats.

The focus of Chapter IV is on the economy. It highlights the effects of ethnic tensions and sectarian violence on the economy. The impact of fundamental variables, like environmental scarcity and lack of human resource development, on economy and internal security, will also be discussed. Tensions between security imperatives and economic development are not confronted by Pakistan alone. But given Pakistan's peculiar set of problems, this debate is significant. Proponents of security first argue that security guarantees economic development. According to them, security is a precondition of development and for achieving successful outcomes in the other reconstruction pillars.<sup>6</sup> Conversely, the supporters of economy first approach rely on economic development, which will in turn ensure credible national security. This school of thought believes it is erroneous to qualify security purely in terms of physical security or

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<sup>6</sup> *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, Security strategy paper presented at Thessaloniki summit.

attainable through military means. This approach argues that “economic development” is the most effective mean to attain security.<sup>7</sup> My main argument is that these two variables are interdependent. Professor Robert McNab, while explaining the linkage between economy and security in Afghanistan, states that “demilitarization of Afghan society cannot be achieved unless suitable reintegration opportunities are available to former militias. If the economy remains stagnant and no employment is forthcoming the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration will collapse”.<sup>8</sup> Though Pakistan’s problems are not akin to Afghanistan, the problem and solution holds true for reintegrating jihadi/sectarian militants in Pakistan as well.

In Pakistan, the provinces have been fighting over the distribution of financial resources, over the share of water, and over the claim of natural resources. This alone has led to sectarian and ethnic polarization with attendant negative impact on Pakistan’s economy. Pakistan has embarked on major projects of national importance. However, province agendas and bitter differences have forced these mega projects into non-start and have placed our country’s future prosperity into question. In recent years, the country has experienced critical water shortages both for irrigation and for drinking purposes. This has serious repercussion for Pakistan’s future viability and economy. Man-made dams may become inoperative in 10-15 years time because of silting and worst is no new dams are being built.<sup>9</sup> At present, the storage capacity of our major reservoir has already declined to 12.6 million-acre feet (MAF), which is hardly 20 percent of our potential storage capacity of 65.4 MAF.<sup>10</sup> Inter-provincial disharmony on critical issues of national importance can ruin the future. Already deteriorating law and order situation in the country has forced foreign investor to shy away from Pakistan. In fiscal year 2003-2004,

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<sup>7</sup> Mirza, M. Nasrullah, *External Security and the Issue of Development in Pakistan*, available on [www.acdis.uiuc.edu/homepage\\_docs/pubs\\_docs/S&P\\_docs/S7P](http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/homepage_docs/pubs_docs/S&P_docs/S7P). March 2004.

<sup>8</sup> McNab Robert, Naval Postgraduate School, *Economics of Development for Security Building*, Lecture notes on Economic of Security building, April 17, 2004.

<sup>9</sup> Henning, Job, *Pakistan’s Future and US Policy Options, Regional Issues-Energy and Water Crisis*, Centre of Strategic and International Studies, September 24, 2002, p.5. Available on <http://www.csis.org/saprog/020924PKfuture.pdf>, 14 Jun 2004.

<sup>10</sup> M. H. Naqvi, S. M Alam, *Water Scenario and Pakistan*, March 19, 2003, p. 6. Available on internet site: [www.pakistaneconomist.com/database1/cover/c2003-25.asp](http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/database1/cover/c2003-25.asp). 14 June 2004.

foreign direct investment (FDI) dropped by 12 percent<sup>11</sup>, i.e., \$586.8 million during nine months (July-March), compared with \$664.7 million of the same period last year<sup>12</sup>. Strikes in view of sectarian killing have hurt Pakistan immensely in terms of economic losses. According to a study by the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a single day's strike results in losses amounting to Rs1.18 billion in terms of GDP, besides Rs154 million indirect tax revenue loss to the national kitty.<sup>13</sup> How can we invest more in education or improve the capacity of state institutions if economically these plans are unsustainable? This chapter discusses wide variety of viewpoints on the subject and concludes that economic development and internal security are interdependent on each other and should be addressed simultaneously for future stability of Pakistan.

Chapter V researches into the flaws and weaknesses of the law enforcing agencies in Pakistan whose inability to enforce rule of law in the country has compounded the above mentioned problems manifold. With ethnic conflicts, sectarian violence and crime rate on the rise, the failing law enforcing institutions, i.e., police and judiciary, have aggravated domestic problems. Sectarian killings, ethnic tensions between groups and provinces are on rise. The series of events points to the reality that state institutions of Pakistan have failed to play its vital role in dissolving these threats and establishing the writ of the government. Police is the main law-enforcing agency in the country, which is supported by paramilitary troops to maintain the order. However, present law and order situation of the country is reflection of its performance and effectiveness. The sectarian and jihad militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are equipped with modern weapons and too highly trained for the ill-equipped police force to be able to counter them. The inefficiency and breakdown of civil institutions have dragged in military in running these institutions. This direct intervention has a downward spiral

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<sup>11</sup> Kiani, Khaleeq, *Foreign Investment falls by 12pc*, The Dawn, April 20, 2004.

<sup>12</sup> The Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the United Kingdom declined by a mammoth 65 per cent to \$75.7 million against \$202.7 million of the same period last year. The FDI from the UAE, which is Pakistan's third largest investment partners after the US and the UK, also reduced by 52 per cent to \$54.1 million against \$112.7 million of the corresponding period last year. FDI from Saudi Arabia came down by more than 90 per cent to \$3.2 million compared with \$32.6 million of the same period last year. Investment from other countries also dropped to \$77 million against last year's \$114.5 million. FDI from France, Hong Kong, Japan, Canada, and Australia reduced during the same period.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

effect on already sensitive civil-military relations in Pakistan. The answer to all the problem lies in strengthening state institutions which are capable of establishing writ of government.

Chapter VI lays out broad conclusions and recommendations of this study. The existing provinces are highly multi-ethnic in nature creating a situation similar to a tug-of-war for power among different ethnic groups. Besides, increase in population growth has increased the struggle for survival and created lots of administrative and social problems. Fair income distribution and development in all provinces will help reduce tension between provinces. The government should increase the development fund for Balochistan, which has remained underdeveloped and deprived for a long time. Socio-economic packages to upgrade some well deserving areas/communities would reduce political exploitation.

Pakistan must confront jihadi culture squarely, since it has transformed into a movement that can cause immense damage to the state of Pakistan. Pakistan's political, institutional, economic and social decay will have to revive and accelerate before the radical groups gain enough traction to emerge as an independent political force undoing the writ of government within state. There is a need to formulate a strategy to deal with the threat. Out rightly confronting jihadi organizations could result in a backlash which could get out of control. Preferably, the strategy should be to: keep a strong check on their activities, cut their support by engaging masses, bring the frustrated youth in the main stream by giving them incentives, and show them the outlet through economic prosperity.



## **II. ETHNIC CHALLENGES IN PAKISTAN**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Ethnicity has been the most serious challenge to Pakistan's integrity since its birth. In Pakistani official terms it is also referred to as 'provincialism' or 'regionalism'. Pakistan, as yet, is evolving nation. Each province in Pakistan has its own culture, language, and history and it drives ethnocentric pride in it. Pakistan is a multi-ethnic country, where different ethnic groups are fighting for their identification and rights, since its inception. The element of 'mine' and 'yours' is more dominating over the factor 'our'. In past, provincial imbalance, political failure, ethnic rise and insurgency, had cost the loss of its eastern wing. A similar kind of unrest is prevailing in the remaining Pakistan even today. The ethnic conflicts within regions and inter-provincial grievances have created an alarming situation. Law and order situation in Sindh and insurgencies in Balochistan raises various questions like: The main question is whether the ethnic problems in Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP could lead to disintegration of Pakistan. What are the reasons for the ethnic unrest? How the power struggle between different factions has become an internal security problem? Is the ethnic uprising a sign of disintegration? Is the history, 1971, going to repeat it?

In this chapter, I argue that that separation of East Pakistan does not invalidate the "Two-Nation Theory" which was the basis of Pakistan's creation but the event was a product of peculiar set of circumstances such as political failure, geographical cleavage and exploitation and intervention by India. Nevertheless, East Pakistan did set precedence for sub-national movements wherein it validates use violence as instrument of policy to alleviate grievances and deprivations.

This chapter will initially define the term 'Ethnicity' and discuss the ethnic nature of Pakistan. Later; will throw some light on causes of separation of East Pakistan, ethnic issues in Sindh and Balochistan and will present issues responsible for inter provincial disharmony. Last portion of this chapter will analyze the present situation in Balochistan and Sindh and draw its parallel with East Pakistan case.

## B. WHAT IS ETHNICITY

The term ‘ethnicity’ is usually used to define a group of persons sharing a common cultural heritage. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the resurrection of ethnic movements across the globe has forced many political analysts to look at it more closely.<sup>14</sup> Out of 132 countries in 1992, there were only a dozen which could be considered homogeneous; 25 had a single ethnic group accounting for 90 percent of total population while another 25 countries had an ethnic majority of 75 percent. Thirty-one countries had a single ethnic group accounting for 50 percent to 75 percent of total population whereas in 39 countries no single group exceeded half the total population. In a few European and Latin American cases, one single ethnic group would count for 75 percent of total population.<sup>15</sup>

Indeed the greatest challenge to the “New World Order” comes from ethnicity that has largely replaced ideology as the major threshold of political activism.<sup>16</sup> After the end of the Cold War, there was a lot of disorientation and many options were open. Multi-literalism, international liberalism, democratic peace, a new era of democracy of human rights, of political freedom, and participation is some of the terms and ideas that came up in the spirit of hope. But in the end, the real driving force became the issue of “ethnicity” and “ethnic conflict”. Multi-ethnicity has become a socio-political phenomenon in most civil societies. In the present century, inter-ethnic cleavages, competition, and conflict seem to have acquired a higher intensity. As a result, ethnic mobilization poses various challenges to many developing as well as developed countries. Ethnicization of politics and politicization of ethnicity eventually diffuses the mutual tolerance and sharpens ethnic consciousness among various communities.<sup>17</sup> There is a deep relation between ethnicity and terrorism, as both of them are swiftly used to

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<sup>14</sup> A number of scholars had been suggesting that the ethnic within the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe could eventually disintegrate the Communist bloc as such. US Senator Daniel P. Moynihan reaffirmed his early statements on ethnic volatility in his Cyril Foster Lecture on the subject at Oxford on 29<sup>th</sup> November 1991. Also see Iftikhar H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan*, St. Martin’s Press Inc. 1997, p. 172.

<sup>15</sup> For further details, see Myron Weiner, ‘Peoples and States in the New World Order,’ *Third World Quarterly*, XIII (2), 1992, p. 320.

<sup>16</sup> President Bush, in a speech at the US Naval Academy, Annapolis, emphasized this great shift in global politics. See *The Boston Globe*, 15 April 1991.

<sup>17</sup> P. R. Rajeswari, *Ethnicity, Its Causes and Possible Solutions: The Case of Sri Lanka*.

cover a multitude of events and contexts, rightly or wrongly. Similarly to “terrorism”, “ethnicity” is a concept that lives from its proclaimed idea.<sup>18</sup>

### **1. Ethnic Nature of Pakistan**

Demand for a separate homeland by the Muslims of India was based on the ‘two-nation theory’. But when it emerged, it was a state with the ethnic cocktail of Sindhis, Punjabis, Balochistan, Pakhtoons, Bengalis and refugees from India. Pakistan falls into the category of what Clifford Geertz calls “old societies and new states”.<sup>19</sup> Language and cultural factors are often not supportive of the growth of single nationalism in these new states, and great many of which have “illogical” boundaries cutting across tribes and nationality groups or which contain within themselves “sub-national” groups whose leaders aspire to lead an independent nation state. The social group cleavages in multicultural states are both horizontal (i.e., ethnic, religious, linguistic, tribal) and vertical (i.e., class, caste and sectarian). The most immediate loyalties of the vast majority of people in these states go to units other than the nation state.<sup>20</sup> The most serious threat to Pakistan since it’s birth has been from the ethnic front, which in official terms referred to as ‘provincialism’ or ‘regionalism’. History is not unifying factor in Pakistan. Each province has its own culture, language, and history.

### **2. Separatist Movements**

There have been sporadic separatist movements and ethnic riots in different regions of the country since its creation. Of Pakistan’s five major ethnic groups, all except Punjab have experienced volatile separatist movements. There was Sarieki movement in Punjab but it was not so violent. The oldest separatist movements are Pushtunistan and Balochi movements. Pushtun separatism picked up in 1950s with backing of Afghan government.<sup>21</sup> The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and Pakistan government’s programs to include Pushtoons into the instrument of state- the Army and civil services -has weakened the Pushtunistan Movement. It is also to be noted that today

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<sup>18</sup> Dr. Carsten Wieland, *The Paradigm of Ethnicity vs. the Paradigm of terrorism: Are 11/9 and 9/11 two sides of the Same Coin?* Paper presented on Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Lincoln University, UK, April 6-8, 2004, p. 2.

<sup>19</sup> Geertz, *Old Societies*. Also see: Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*, Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 5.

<sup>20</sup> Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*, Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 3.

<sup>21</sup> Anthony Hyman, *Pakistan: Towards a Modern Muslim State?* Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990, p. 16.

NWFP economy has become closely integrated with that of Punjab.<sup>22</sup> But in present day scenario the Balochi, Sindhi and Mohajir movements are quite active and poses serious threat to the integrity of the state. In past Bangali Separatist Movement that resulted in separation of East Pakistan triggered ethnic discrepancies and frustration among different groups- leading to ethnic riots in the remaining Pakistan. To further worsen the situation, heavy influx of arms due to Afghan war militarized the ethnic politics in 1980s.

### **C. BANGLADESH-AN ETHNICITY CASE**

As elsewhere in South Asia, linguistic and geographic factors in Pakistan have continued to play a significant role in ethnic identification. Pakistan was and is a multi-lingual, multi cultural and essentially plural society. Selection of the official language of the state was one of the divisive issues that Pakistan faced in its early days of creation. As more than half of the population spoke Bengali, the East Pakistanis felt that Bengali (Bangla) should have been given the status of national language. But instead, Urdu, due to it's historic background in sub-continent was designated the national language for the linguistically heterogeneous new-born state. West Pakistanis accepted the decision without hesitation, but East Pakistanis considered it as an affront and an unfair imposition. Their provincial sentiment, which was organized under the banner of religion in the pre-Partition struggle, was now marshaled under the banner of language, which they insisted was the basis of their cultural identity. The central government underestimated the East Pakistanis' opposition to Urdu, and even when aware of it was reluctant to annul the decision on grounds of prestige. Persuasion as well as force was used to suppress East Pakistani's opposition, but resentment instead of being quelled mushroomed.<sup>23</sup> On February 21st, 1952, a demonstration was carried out in Dhaka.<sup>24</sup> in which students demanded equal status for Bangla. The police reacted by firing on the

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<sup>22</sup> Rodney W. Jones, *The Prospects for State Failure in Pakistan: Ethnic, Regional, and Sectarian Fissures*, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 1, 2001, p. 3.

<sup>23</sup> A. Tayyeb, *Pakistan: A Political Geography*, Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 180.

<sup>24</sup> Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Pakistan was imposed in 1952, banning public meetings and processions.

crowd and three students were killed. That day is now celebrated every year as a Memorial Day<sup>25</sup> and a Shaheed Minar stand there to commemorate the martyrs of the language movement.<sup>26</sup>

From the very beginning of Pakistan's development the growing tension between the political leaders of the West and East Wings was evident. The first Marshal Law, in 1958 and numerical domination of Punjabis in Army further aggravated the Bengali alienation. Sentiments of Bengali nationalism, but not yet separatism, became widespread. Many Bengalis came to feel their Eastern Wing of Pakistan was being unfairly exploited for the benefit of non-Bengali rulers, and that they are victims of a neo-colonial relationship to the West Wing elite which dominated the country. They felt slighted, their language, their culture and their dignity despised. They felt themselves to be second-rate citizens in their own land. Rumors that the income from the jute they produce was being siphoned off to the West, to feed the mainly West Pakistan army and civil service, gained circulation. There was no love lost between the two provinces by the 1960's.

Table 1.1 Military Elite in Pakistan, July 1955 -Number of Officers

SERVICE	EAST PAKISTAN	WEST PAKISTAN
Army	14	894
Navy	7	593
Air Force	60	640

**Source:** Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure In National Integration*, Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 25.

Table 1.2 Situations of Central Government Services in 1955-56

	From West Pakistan	From East Pakistan
Secretaries	19	0
Joint secretaries	38	3
Deputy secretaries	123	10
Under secretaries	510	38

**Source:** A. Tayyeb, *Pakistan: A Political Geography*, Oxford University Press, 1966, p .181.

<sup>25</sup> Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*, Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 44.

<sup>26</sup> *Bangladesh: A Country Study*, 1989, p. 22.

By 1970, out of twenty secretaries of the government of Pakistan, only three acting secretaries were East Pakistanis. The figure for military was even worse: only one of the senior thirty-five generals was East-Pakistani. Yet, in the first decades after partition, East Pakistan had a favorable trade balance while West Pakistan ran a deficit.

Before 1965 East Pakistan earned about 60 percent of Pakistan's foreign currency but received less than 30 percent of imports.<sup>27</sup> There was also a mark difference in developmental expenditure in two wings. Bengali jute exports supplied most of the country's foreign exchange, yet this was devoted to industrial development in West Pakistan.<sup>28</sup>

Table 1.3 Development Expenditures in East and West Pakistan, 1959-70

	1960-1965		1965-70	
	EAST	WEST	EAST	WEST
	rupees in millions	rupees in millions)	rupees in millions)	Rupees in millions
Public sector	6,700	10,800	11,300	13,700
Private sector	3,000	10,700	5,500	16,000
Total	9,000	21,500	16,800	29,700
Percentage of total	31	69	36	64

**Source:** Pakistan, Planning Commission, An Outline of the Fourth Five Year Plan, 1970-75, p. 26

General elections of 1970 were the final blow on the Bengali nationalists. See Table 1.4 for result of general elections 1970. Despite the fact that Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's Awami League won the majority seats, Punjabi-dominated army and bureaucrats of the West wing refused to hand over the power.

This political failure increased grievances and resulted in mass killings and civil war. In March 1971 Pakistani's used army to crush its Bengali civilian population, looting, raping and murdering. That was the turning point. It inflamed the ethnic movement for independence.<sup>29</sup> Indian army exploited the situation and sought the

<sup>27</sup> Akbar S. Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity*, Routledge: Tylor & Francis Group, 1997 reprinted in 2000, 2001, p. 237.

<sup>28</sup> Anthony Hyman, *Pakistan: Towards a Modern Muslim State?*, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990, p. 4.

<sup>29</sup> Akbar S. Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity*, Routledge: Tylor & Francis Group, 1997 reprinted in 2000, 2001, p. 237.

opportunity for its intervention, the end product of which was the disintegration of the two wings of Pakistan in 1971-72.

Table 1.4 Results of National Assembly Elections of December 1970

	East Pakistan	West Pakistan	Total
Awami League	160	-	160
Pakistan People Party	-	81	81
PML	-	18	18
Jamaat-I-Islami	-	4	4
Others	2	35	37
Total Seats	162	138	300

**Source:** Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan: The Continuing Search for Nationhood*, Westview Press, 1991, p. 58

The creation of Bangladesh had proved that the integrative power of Islam had failed to overcome ethnic nationalism. This does not mean that Islam did not possess any integrative power, but in the face of contradictory forces (ethnic versus national) it was rendered almost powerless.<sup>30</sup>

Varied countries like India, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, or the United States, embody variations in terms of economic development and underdevelopment, yet in Pakistan, with its peculiar geographic location and a national consciousness still in the embryonic stage, economic unevenness accentuated language and region-based separatism. Thus, at one level it is simplistic to suggest that the inter-wing divide was symptomatic of an internal colonialism or a necessary result of exploitation of one province by another.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Asaf Hussain, *Ethnicity, National Identity and Praetorianism: The Case of Pakistan*, Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 10 (Oct., 1976), 918-930.

<sup>31</sup> Iftikhar H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan*, St. Martin's Press, 1997, p. 15.

Table 1.5 Demographic Differences between East and West Pakistan

	TOTAL POPULATION (MILLIONS)		POPULATION DENSITY (PERSON/SQ. MILE)		URBANIZATION (PERCENTAGE)		LITERACY (PERCENTAGE)	
	1951	1961	1951	1961	1951	1961	1951	1961
East Pakistan	41.9	50.8	701	922	4.3	5.2	21.1	21.5
West Pakistan	33.7	42.9	1091	138	17.8	22.5	16.4	16.3

**Source:** Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure In National Integration, Columbia University Press, 1972, p .10.

#### D. ETHNICITY IN SINDH

During British Raj, Sindh was under the traditional influence of sardars, pirs and syeds. These Feudal elites dominated the Sindhi politics until the creation of Pakistan; when millions of migrants fled from India to the newborn state, Pakistan. Karachi was made the capital of this new state. Being a port city and new capital, Karachi had lots of avenues for new comers. Thus, Sindh became a source of attraction for the migrants, especially coming from the United Provinces, Rajistan and other Hindu majority areas of northern India.

##### 1. Sindhi's Resentment against Non-Sindhis

Karachi was officially made the capital of Pakistan on 22<sup>nd</sup> May 1948, when constituent assembly decided that it would be separated from Sindh to become a federally administered area.

This decision fuelled the anger of Sindhis towards Mohajirs<sup>32</sup>as separation of Karachi from Sindh, by becoming the capital city and influx of non-Sindhis completely outnumbered the native Sindhi community in Sindh. By 1951, the year of Pakistan's first census, refugees accounted for 57 percent of Karachi's population, 65 percent of Hyderabad's and 55 percent of Sukkur's.<sup>33</sup> 1961 the census showed a population of 2.048 million, of whom 838,499 had migrated from India.

<sup>32</sup> Laurent GAYER (lecturer in international relations theory At Sciences Po, Paris), *A Divided City: Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Karachi, Pakistan*, May 2003.

<sup>33</sup> Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood*, West view Press, 1999, p. 28.



Table 1.6 Population Divided Linguistically

Urdu speaking	1,101,776
Punjabi speaking	260,747
Sindhi speaking	174,823
Gujerati speaking	152,471

**Source:** Herbert Feldman, *The End and The Beginning, Pakistan 1969-1971*, Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 56.

In short span of time these Mohajirs<sup>34</sup>, being better educated and motivated as compared to local Sindhis, took hold of bureaucracy and education system in Sindh. Sindhis started feeling like “American Indians” in their own province. G.M. Syed expressed his sentiments on this decision by these words:

‘Mr. Jinnah dismembered Sindh by cutting off Karachi, its leading city from it and handed it over to the central administration of Liaquat Ali Khan as its head, for colonization of the city by Mohajirs.’<sup>35</sup>

Table 1.7 Ethnic Percentages in Sindh, 1981

	TOTAL	URBAN	RURAL
Mohajir	24.1	54.4	2.2
Sindhis	55.7	20.0	81.5
Punjabis	10.6	14.0	8.2
Pushtoons	3.6	7.9	0.5
Balochis	6.0	3.7	7.6

**Source:** Iftikhar H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan*, St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1997, p. 202.

Most contentious of all has been allocation of land left by emigrating Hindus to Mohajir refugees rather than to the landless Sindhi peasants. After partition a large number of Punjabis settled themselves in rural Sindh for agricultural purpose. The process of Punjabi-Mohajir settlement was stimulated very suddenly in 1950s and 1960s when land commanded by Kotri Barrage and Guddu Barrage allotted to civil servants and military personnel.<sup>36</sup>

The consolidation of a new power elite and the importance of urban sector to the exclusion of the large number of indigenous Sindhis, whipped up strong feelings of

<sup>34</sup> Term used for migrants from India.

<sup>35</sup> Bannett Jones, *Pakistan*, Yale University press, 2002, p. 114. Also see: G. M. Syed, *A Case for Sindhu Desh*, Sorath Publication, Bombay, 1985, p. 11.

<sup>36</sup> Herbert Feldman, *The End and the Beginning, Pakistan 1969-1971*, Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 56.

*Sindhi* identity. Tahir Amin considers the founder of ethno-nationalism to be G.M. Syed, who gave it a socialist framework in 1953 by establishing Sindhi Awami Mahaz, a coalition of four parties. The Sindh Hari Committee, founded by Jatoi, was a communist organization within the Mahaz and its founder coined the term Jeeye Sindh (Long live Sindh) in opposition to two key institutions of the state: the army and the bureaucracy.<sup>37</sup> On June 1972, Jeeye Sindh Mahaz under the leadership of G.M. Syed demanded provincial autonomy, adoption of Sindhi as the national and official language and one-fourth share in all civil and military services, along with the repatriation of allotted land to the Sindhis. In 1975 G.M. Syed tried to explain away the support he, and other Sindhi politicians, had given to the creation of Pakistan:

Some of us who all the time remained conscious of the national distinctness of the people of Sindh and of significant past history, participated in the movement for Pakistan solely for the purpose of ensuring thereby political independence, economic prosperity and cultural advancement of Sindh. We remained convinced throughout of the validity of the teaching of our great political thinkers who considered the Sindhi people a separate nation.

The two-nation theory he said had been a ‘trap’ designed to establish: ‘Mohajir-Punjabi exploitative hegemony over the Muslim majority provinces.’ The Sindhi nationalists had joined the Pakistan movement, he maintained, because they believed the Lahore Resolution would result in Sindhi independence and not ‘the accident of history and freak of nature’ that became Pakistan.<sup>38</sup>

Combined with demographic and economic statistics, linguistic controversy played an important role in ethnic mobilization. Sindhis took the state decision of making Urdu the national language as a threat to their ethnic identity.<sup>39</sup> Some of the Mohajirs’ policy initiatives were highly provocative. In 1957, the University of Karachi forbade students from answering questions in Sindhi. In the face of such discrimination, it is hardly surprising that the Sindhis sense of resentment was acute.<sup>40</sup> Sindhis were under-represented in the army and had a marginal role in Sindh administration compared to

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<sup>37</sup> Iftikhar H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan*, St. Martin’s Press. Inc., 1997, p. 221.

<sup>38</sup> Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan*, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 115.

<sup>39</sup> Iftikhar H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan*, St. Martin’s Press, p. 20, p. 203 and p. 222.

<sup>40</sup> Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan*, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 115 Also see: Rehman, *Language and politics*, p. 114.

Punjabis and Mohajirs. Bhutto, in order to console Sindhis, passed the Sindhi Language Bill in the Sindh provincial assembly, making Sindhi the provincial language. The teaching promotion and use of Sindhi language bill became a law in July 1972.<sup>41</sup> The proponents of Urdu reacted violently. Several people were killed and many wounded in Karachi. Many more casualties occurred in Hyderabad, where rival political factions fought each other as well as police force. The execution of Zulifqar Ali Bhutto, and the use of extensive military power in 1983 during the MRD struggle in Sindh, brought the alienation of Sindhis to climax.<sup>42</sup>

Ethnic politics took a nasty turn in the mid-1980s. The influx of arms into Pakistan as a consequence of the war in Afghanistan provided weapons to militant groups on all sides: Sindhis, Mohajirs and Pashtoons.<sup>43</sup> It was the time when Pakistan was under the longest period of martial law in its history. The new generation of ethnic leaders, especially in urban Sindh, became progressively more militant and with easy access to arms, the ethnic strife became increasingly explosive in the absence of political platforms and bargaining process.

## **2. Mohajirs**

It is a case of ethnicity-in-making, whereby people belonging to all parts of India, except Punjab, including: south, southwest, north, and northwest India, adopted a new identity of Mohajirs.<sup>44</sup> The Mohajirs, who accounted for one-fifth of the population of Sindh, were the most privileged class of the newly formed state for the first two decades. Being better educated, they dominated the bureaucracy and the liberal professions. Mohajirs also dominated Pakistan because of the personalities of two topmost leaders, M. A. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. But after the assassination of Liaquat Ali in 1951, Mohajirs lost ground to Punjabis. In 10 years, those who regarded themselves as the makers of Pakistan, had began to recede to the background.<sup>45</sup> After the ethnic revolt in East Pakistan, Mohajirs felt threatened by Sindhi nationalism. The feelings of alienation

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<sup>41</sup> Christophe Jaffrelot, *Pakistan, Nationalism without a Nation*, 2002, pp. 22, 23.

<sup>42</sup> Iftikhar H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan*, St. Martin Press, p. 220.

<sup>43</sup> Raju G. C. Thomas, *South Asian Security in 1990s*, Adelphi paper 278, July 1993, p. 28. Also see Armed Conflict Report 2003-Pakistan, p. 7.

<sup>44</sup> Mohammad Waseem, *Politics of Identity in Pakistan: Patterns of National and Ethnic Discourse*, St. Anthony College, Oxford, p. 8.

<sup>45</sup> Christophe Jaffrelot, *Pakistan; Nationalism without a Nation*, Zed Books Ltd., 2002, pp. 17, 18.

and separate identity among Mohajirs occurred as a result of five important events in Pakistan's history:

- 1964's presidential elections.
- Implementation of quota system in favor of native Sindhis, during Z. A. Bhutto's rule.
- 1972 language riots.
- Growing Punjabi domination in bureaucracy and military during Zia's regime.
- Post-1985 ethnic clashes between Mohajir and non-Mohajir communities in Karachi.

These events reflected social, economic, political, and cultural issues, affected the Mohajirs of urban Sindh and thus, triggered their demand for identification as a fifth ethnic group in Pakistan. To safeguard their rights in Sindh, they organized themselves into a political organization called Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM).

The Mohajir search for identity reached its climax during 1986-1988 when the MQM launched a crusade through regular ideological meetings. Most important, Mohajirs reacted to the upsurge of nationalist forces in rural Sindh, Baluchistan, Punjab and the NWFP. They thought that their survival was at stake and decided to follow the path of other ethnic forces.<sup>46</sup> Since then the major cities of Sindh, like Karachi and Hyderabad, have witnessed many incidents of ethnic-based violence.

### **3. Violence in Sindh**

Karachi had played a key role in Afghan Jihad during 1980s, as it was the main port of entry for arms destined to the mujahideen, half of which never reached their destination.<sup>47</sup> The influx of arms and accompanied by the demographic and economic changes, that took place in Pakistan in general and Sindh in particular,<sup>48</sup> are the main

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<sup>46</sup> Moonis Ahmar, *Ethnicity and State Power in Pakistan: The Karachi Crises*, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 10 (October 1996), currently published by University of California Press, pp. 1032, 1038.

<sup>47</sup> Laurent Gayer, *A Divided City, "Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Karachi, Pakistan*. Paper presented at the first Pakistan Seminar organized by IIAS and ISIM, Amsterdam, March 24, 2003.

<sup>48</sup> Arif Hassan, *A Generation Comes of Age*, The Herald, October 1987, pp. 52-53.

causes of ethnic violence in Sindh. First there were clashes between the Mohajirs and Sindhis. Then the Mohajirs and the Pathans fought, and hundreds were killed in those riots.<sup>49</sup>

The first ethnic riot occurred in Karachi in April 1985 between Mohajir and Pathan communities. This was sparked by the uncivilized behavior of Pathan transporters against Mohajir commuters in Karachi. Then two important events in Hyderabad deepened the Mohajir-Sindhi polarization. The first event occurred in September 1988, when 250 people, mainly Mohajirs, were killed by the firing of Jayee Sindh activists on unarmed people in Hyderabad. The second incident also occurred in Hyderabad in May 1990, a demonstration led by Mohajir women and children were brutally crushed by the predominantly Sindhi police, killing more than 60 demonstrators. The killings led to a backlash in Karachi and killing of 40 Sindhis by MQM members. Increased tension between Sindhi- Mohajir factions led to a large scale cross migration of Mohajirs and Sindhis to their own predominant ethnic areas. Since then Mohajirs have been advocating the division of Sindh province in two separate provinces, urban and rural respectively.<sup>50</sup>

In the course of fighting for their rights MQM, not only confronted with other ethnic groups, but also clashed with Pakistan's security forces. The incident of torturing two army officers in 1991 by MQM activists, Major Kaleem and his colleague, is an example of the growing menace of MQM in urban Sindh. The use of rocket launchers against security forces and guerrilla war situation prevailed in Karachi and Hyderabad during the peak of MQM agitation.

The MQM launched an armed uprising in 1993 after the city government was dismissed, and brought Karachi to its knees, leaving more than 5,000 people dead and crippling the economy of Pakistan's main commercial center<sup>51</sup> In Sindh open gun battles between MQM, Sindhi landlord lashkars (private militias) and the army are daily occurrences. The MQM has begun to press for the separation of Karachi from the rest of the province.

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<sup>49</sup> Ali Asghar, *The Problematique of Nation-Building in South Asia: The Case of Pakistan*, Secular Perspective, March 16-31, 2000, p. 5.

<sup>50</sup> Moonis Ahmar, *Ethnicity and State Power in Pakistan: The Karachi Crises*, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 10(October 1996), currently published by University of California Press, pp. 1033 and 1034.

<sup>51</sup> John Stackhouse, *Karachi Pays High Price For Peace*, Globe and Mail, October 26, 1996.

Violence threatens to paralyze the capital, even though the army has had a direct responsibility for its administration since June 1992. In 1994, a plan announced to replace military presence with police and rangers failed to ease tensions.<sup>52</sup> The state failure to overcome influx of arms and ethnic tension is what led to social problems. Table 1.8 shows the drastic increase in crime rate in Karachi during the period 1990-1994.

Table 1.8 Trends in Violent Crimes in Karachi 1990-94

Nature of Crimes	Year				
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
Murder	584	466	387	365	1,113
Attempted Murder	1,035	814	672	646	1,069
Serious injury	501	372	414	465	502
Kidnapping	572	352	373	345	276
Armed Robberies	2,557	2,483	2,211	2,191	1,464
Vehicles snatching at gun point	676	524	965	1,060	1,177

**Source:** Methab Karim, Deaths Due To Violence In Karachi, Pakistan: Patterns, Differentials and their Impact on the community, p. 3.

Karachi's law and order situation further deteriorated in 1995 and more than 2,000 people, including 242 police officers, died in nightly street battles. In March 1995, international attention was drawn to Karachi, when unknown assailants assassinated two United States diplomats. The United States declared Karachi a danger zone and number of foreign countries advised their nationals to stay away from the city. The fruitless talks between the government and MQM began in July but soon reached a stalemate. The head of the MQM team negotiating with the government, Ajmal Dehlavi, told a group of journalists in July 1995 that "“should the government-MQM talks fail, his party would be forced to demand a separate province.... [and this] would ultimately end in the division of Sindh...as the new province will be carved out from the present province of Sindh.”<sup>53</sup>

The frequent armed clashes and work stoppages in Karachi have caused massive damage to the infrastructure of that city and to the economy of Pakistan. A research paper

<sup>52</sup> Oxford Analytica, *Karachi Killings Point To Deeper Strife*, Globe and Mail, December 5, 1994.

<sup>53</sup> “Demand for Separate Province If Talks Fail,” Dawn, July 10, 1995. Also see Monnis Ahmar, *Ethnicity and State Power in Pakistan: Karachi Crisis*, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 10, October 1996, p. 1043.

commissioned by Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) revealed that “a working day lost by strike in Karachi cost 1.3 billion rupees (\$ 38 million) and in 1995 a total of 34 working days were lost as a result of strikes called by the MQM.”<sup>54</sup>

In the period of six months, from July 1995-January 1996, as many as 70 police encounters took place in Karachi, in which over 120 MQM activists got killed. Karachi became the bleeding wound of Pakistan. Clashes between rival political groups, the MQM, and police, including extra-judicial killings, and a police campaign that jailed hundreds of MQM members, extended the conflict in 1996. Benazir government is held responsible for these extra-judicial killings. “With firm backing from Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s federal government, police and paramilitary forces launched a harsh, some say brutal, campaign that has crippled the MQM. The Karachi crackdown set off a new wave of police intimidation, extortion and unsanctioned killings by officers-extra-judicial killings-that could threaten to again sink the city into ethnic bloodshed.

In 1998 clashes between MQM and a break- away faction increased the level of violence in Karachi. Hundreds of people died in the reprisal killings between two militant factions of MQM. In November 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declared a state of emergency and once again the army was called in the province of Sindh to crush violence.

Since the coup of October 1999, the Pakistani Government is under the control of the military, but the volatility of Sindh still persists. “There have been several attacks on foreign targets in Sindh including: ...suicides attack on a navy bus in Karachi in May 2003 which killed 14 people. ...A car bomb at US consulate in Karachi in June, which killed 12 people.” [BBC News, September 24, 2002]

## **E. PROBLEMS IN BALOCHISTAN**

Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest province, equal in size to Italy, having the smallest population. Its population comprises of native Balochis and southern Pashtoons. Northwestern Balochistan is mainly populated by Pashtoons, who have gained in political

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<sup>54</sup> Monnis Ahmar, *Ethnicity and State Power in Pakistan: Karachi Crisis*, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 10, October 1996, p. 1035.

influence as their numbers has increased, by Afghan refugees, especially in the capital city of Quetta. The Baloch group of tribes is further divided on the basis of language, Balochi and Brahui.

The Balochis are further divided into four sub-groups: Marris, Bugtis, Bizonjos, and Mongals. Baloch society has been characterized as “feudal militarism” The struggle of power between the chiefs of various tribes has been explosive. Incidents of tribes feuding and fighting each other with heavy weapons prove that the provincial government has totally failed to impose its writ in these rebel-infested areas.<sup>55</sup> During the years 2002-2003, to establish his writ and authority in the area Nawab Akbar Bugti launched a savage campaign of victimization against other tribes. Twenty-nine rocket attacks took place against the gas fields, installations and pipelines in Balochistan, i.e., areas of Dera Bugti, Goth Mazari, Kohlu and Marri.

There had been occasional separatist movements in Balochistan since independence. In August 1947, soon after the creation of Pakistan, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan declared Kalat’s independence.<sup>56</sup> Pakistani historians portray Mir Ahmad Yar Khan as an isolated and recalcitrant individual who ungraciously failed to bow to the inevitable.<sup>57</sup> It was not before April 1948, 225 days after independence, that Khan of Kalat signed an agreement of accession, but his brother responded violently. Having based himself in Afghanistan, he launched a guerrilla campaign against Pakistani forces. By June 1948, the army prevailed, and both Kalat and the rest of Balochistan were secured as parts of Pakistan.

Ten years later, the Baloch objection to “One Unit” led to another violent confrontation, involving hundreds of men on both sides. Ethnic identity maintenance laid the ground for tribal insurgencies in which “acts of lawlessness” singularly targeted “non Baloch personnel.”<sup>58</sup> Sons of the feudal lords and merchants who were aspired towards bureaucratic jobs pressurized many non-Baloch administrators to vacate their jobs.

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<sup>55</sup> *The Dawn*, January 31, 2003.

<sup>56</sup> Kalat was the largest and most powerful of four Princely States located in Balochistan.

<sup>57</sup> See, for example, Lt. Colonel Syed Iqbal Ahmad, *Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance*, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 1992.

<sup>58</sup> Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on Baluchistan*, Islamabad: printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, October 19, 1974, p. 16.



But in 1970s, the relations between Balochistan and central government deteriorated to a serious extent when Zulifqar Ali Bhutto dismissed the Balochistan government by accusing it of separatism. In retaliation, Baloch nationalists mounted actions against the Pakistan army. Moved by his own whims and encouraged by an over-vigilant Shah of Iran, Bhutto engaged the armed forces in a futile exercise, which only increased ill-feeling among the Balochis and other concerned Pakistanis. Many of the Baloch went into exile or engaged in guerrilla activities.<sup>59</sup> In 1973-77 about 5,300 Balochis and 3,300 soldiers were killed.<sup>60</sup>

It was under General Zia ul-Haq that the armed forces were recalled to barracks and the province returned to peace. However, with the presence of well-armed Afghan refugees and Iranian dissidents, inter-tribal and inter-sectarian tensions have increased in Balochistan. Gunrunning and drug trafficking, as well as human traffic in political exiles across the three borders created serious divisions within traditional Balochi socio-economic values.<sup>61</sup> Relations with the centre have always been low. The present government is making an utmost effort to establish good relations and grant them what is possible. However, Balochistan has always made an effort to exploit the centre on one account or the other.

#### **F. INTER-PROVINCIAL DISHARMONY**

As Karl Marx stated, the ruling ideas of any epoch are the ideas of the ruling class.<sup>62</sup> Since demographically, Punjab is the biggest province of Pakistan, and Punjabis occupied strategic positions in country's bureaucratic and military sub-systems, their ruling ideas determined national policy making at the highest levels. They manipulated political, economic and social policies in such a way that their power was maximized. Such Punjabi "colonialism" was quickly exploited by non-Punjabi ethnic political elites and this led to the "us" and "them" syndrome, which became symptomatic of ethnic

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<sup>59</sup> Iftikhar H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan*, St. Martin Press, Inc., 1997, p. 17.

<sup>60</sup> Phadis, *Ethnicity*, op. cit., p. 183; Harrison, op. cit., p. 274. Also see: Christophe Jaffrelot, *Pakistan, Nationalism without a Nation*, 2002, p. 29.

<sup>61</sup> Iftikhar H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan*, St. Martin Press, Inc., 1997, p. 17.

<sup>62</sup> Karl Marx, "On Class," in C. S. Hall, ed., *Structured Social Inequality*, London: The Macmillan Co., 1969, p.21. Also see: Asaf Hussain, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 16, No. 10, Currently published by University of California Press, October 1976, p. 926.

nationalism.<sup>63</sup> The imbalance between the Punjab and other provinces has been a major source of ethnic problems. Containing roughly two thirds of the population, providing the bulk of Pakistan's armed forces, and possessing the most productive agricultural land, the Punjab has loomed large in the eyes of other provinces. This preponderance has triggered resentment that has assumed an ethnic character, since provincial boundaries in the main correspond to the country's major ethnic divisions.<sup>64</sup>

The Pakistani army was always, and remains, Punjabi-dominated periods of military rule have generally seen a growth of Punjabi influence. Although there are no official figures, it is estimated that 65 percent of officers and 70 percent of other ranks are Punjabis. That compares with the province's 56 percent share of the population. Pakhtoons from NWFP, with 16 percent of the population, constitute an estimated 22 percent of officers and 25 percent of other ranks. Sindhis and Balochis have always been severely under-represented.<sup>65</sup> To ensure the representation of all provinces in military the Constitution of 1973 specifies that "the State shall enable people from all parts of Pakistan to participate in armed forces of Pakistan." Despite the constitutional provision, imbalances remained in the representatives of the armed forces. Stephen Philip Cohen, in "Security Decision- Making in Pakistan" written in 1980, states that:

75 percent of all ex-servicemen came from only three districts in the Punjab and two adjacent districts in NWFP, so the army as a whole is still unrepresentative.

The authorities were aware of the dangers of an unrepresentative military force, but in Cohen's words:

Since the army is volunteer, there is little that can be done to dragoon in reluctant or uninterested ethnic groups.<sup>66</sup>

Nationalist Sindhis portray Punjab as a "villain", grabbing the shares of other provinces. In an interview to the Dawn newspaper on June 3, 2003, Sindh National Front

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<sup>63</sup> Asaf Hussain, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 16, No. 10, Currently published by University of California Press., October 1976, pp. 926, 927.

<sup>64</sup> Dennis Kux, *Pakistan: Flawed Not Failed State*, Headline Series No. 322 Foreign Policy Association, Summer 2001, pp. 30, 31.

<sup>65</sup> Bannett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, Yale University Press 2002, p. 116.

<sup>66</sup> *Pakistan: A Country Study*, area hand book series edited by Richard F. Nyrop, October 1983, p. 271.

Chief Mumtaz Bhutto expressed his grievances against Punjabi hegemony very openly. In an answer to a question about Punjab's demand of resource distribution on the basis of population he stated that:

it is very unjust and a very damaging attitude adopted by Punjab. They did not allow a Bengali majority,<sup>67</sup> and it is extraordinary that we had minority rule. And that is what destroyed Pakistan. But they have not learnt their lessons. Now they have used their clout and strength in the armed forces... and there had always been dictatorship, control and hegemony of Punjab in this country.

On water issues between Sindh and Punjab, he said:

...this water issue is very, very serious matter.... Fifty percent of the land in Sindh is barren. So to make Punjab prosperous at the cost of rest of the Pakistan is going to have adverse impact. You can't get away with this.... Historically the Indus water has been the property of Sindh.... 16 or 17 barrages have been built in Punjab since the creation of Pakistan, and they totally control the entire flow of water downstream.... They are not going to leave any thing for Sindh.<sup>68</sup>

Mohajirs despite all their differences with Sindhis are more loyal to Sindh than rest of Pakistan. And when it comes to Sindh versus Rest of Pakistan, they stand up against federal decisions to favor. Recently alignment of MQM with Sindhis is a sign of new storms in ethnic politics of Pakistan. In a Seminar on Positioning Pakistan in "War against Terrorism", Mr. Anwar of MQM announced:

Annexation of 17 villages of Sindh to the province of Punjab by the colonialists and expansionists Establishment will not be tolerated. If, expansionism of Punjab continues, I swear, Mohajirs and Sindhis will have no alternative but to seek the right of self-determination. Kalabagh Dam will never be built.... I call upon the Establishment of Punjab that if a single village of Gothki were annexed to Punjab then the people of Sindh would not like to live with Pakistan.<sup>69</sup>

The issue of allocation of water to provinces is also very sensitive. The smaller provinces, especially Sindh and NWFP, accuse Punjab to consume the bulk of country's

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<sup>67</sup> Before separation of East Pakistan, Punjab was asking for the distribution of resources on the basis of parity.

<sup>68</sup> The Dawn, Dialogue with Mumtaz Bhutto, June 3, 2003.

<sup>69</sup> Speech given by Mr. Anwar on the behalf of Mr. Altaf Hussein (founder of MQM), at Seminar on Positioning Pakistan in "War Against Terrorism," Organizers: World Sindhi Congress & Baloch Voice (Sindhi Baloch forum), 2 December 2001, p.1. Also See [www.balochvoice.com/SBF/Seminar\\_MQM\\_2\\_12\\_01.html](http://www.balochvoice.com/SBF/Seminar_MQM_2_12_01.html). 13 July 2004.

water. Construction of the Kalabagh Dam, which according to central government is essential for boosting country's power generation and water storage capacity, has become an emotional issue in both NWFP and Sindh.<sup>70</sup> Successive governments since General Zia's military regime have tried to resolve the deadlock over the Kalabagh dam. But any such effort by the central government is cited by ethnic parties as an example of Pakistan's central authorities ignoring the interests of non-Punjabis. This issue will be discussed at length in the fourth chapter

Speaking at the 'Meet the Press' program of the Peshawar Press Club, Senator Asfandiyar Wali Khan, President ANP, alleged that the center always treated the smaller provinces as subservient to Punjab. He added, "Punjab is Pakistan and Pakistan is Punjab. Such a situation will spell disaster for the country. The 1971 dismemberment of the country was caused due to differences between the center and the provinces and today the situation is the same." He also demanded the transfer of hydro profit to NWFP from the federal consolidated fund.<sup>71</sup>

The issue of royalties from natural resources is important to the smaller provinces. Balochistan produces natural gas, Sindh is country's largest producer of oil, and the NWFP is the site of major hydroelectric projects. The federal government collects these royalties and only a part of these are passed on to the provinces. But the provinces, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan, do not agree with the system of distribution of royalties. Challenging the royalty distribution formula Sindh argue that it does not receive royalties commensurate with its 62 percent share in country's oil production.<sup>72</sup> The royalty of natural gas to Balochistan is only 10 percent of revenue rest goes to the federal government.

Many of the specific grievances of Balochis are related to the exploitation of their natural resources. The Sui gas field in Balochistan, which provides 60 percent<sup>73</sup> of Pakistan's total needs, was not made available to Quetta until after Punjab and Karachi. A

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<sup>70</sup> People of NWFP fear that it would cause flood and soil erosion in NWFP. Sindhis complain that the Kalabagh dam would decrease water flow downstream resulting in increased saline inflow from the sea.

<sup>71</sup> See *DAWN-National*, August 17, 2004.

<sup>72</sup> Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan's Internal Divisions*, December 01, 2003, p. 17.

<sup>73</sup> Bennett Jones, *Pakistan, Eye of the Storm*, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 135.

statement<sup>74</sup> of main tribal chief, Nawab Akbar Bugti, is an indication of deep-rooted ethnic resentment. He stated: “Balochistan belongs to the Baloch people and not to outsiders. We own the natural resources, but these are being exploited for the benefit of others. We will not allow others to steal our wealth. Your sensitive installations will remain insecure, because you have pilfered, what belongs to our people.” Such sentiments are also shown by actions of other tribal chiefs. In August 2000, Marri tribesmen used rocket-propelled grenades and landmines to prevent transportation of coal to other parts of the country.<sup>75</sup>

## **G. CONCLUSION**

Historically, even before partition, there was no unitary India. It was divided into regions based on history, language and culture. Each region had its own culture and shows natural pride in its own history and accomplishments. The policy of early national elites of one state, one government, one economy, one language, and one culture had cost us the loss of East Pakistan. There is a dire need to recognize the ethnic and cultural diversity. Most importantly of all are the language issues, as they have been the divisive force throughout Pakistan’s history. Along with Urdu, the regional languages must be encouraged and accepted. Cultural aspects are more dominating and real driving force in binding people together. Cultural discrimination will add fuel to existing ethnic tensions. The need of the hour is to understand the diverse cultural-ethnic realities.

Despite a provision in the 1973 Constitution, the imbalance in representation in military persists. Punjabi domination in military and civil services has created a sense of insecurity amongst other ethnic groups who take it as a form of colonialism and feel it as a threat to their cultural traditions. The interplay of territory, language, and cultural homogeneity, cemented together through a sense of political alienation, in the state structure rooted in specific prerogatives, formulated various communitarian responses in Pakistan.<sup>76</sup> To worsen the situation, few politicians to further their ambitions for leadership exploit these ethnic differences. Today’s picture of Punjabi domination is a reflection of hegemony of West Pakistan over its eastern half. The case of separation of

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<sup>74</sup> *The Dawn*, January 27, 2004.

<sup>75</sup> Bennett Jones, *Pakistan, Eye of the Storm*, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 135.

<sup>76</sup> Iftikhar H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan*, St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1997, p. 23.

East Pakistan should be taken as a lesson. Consequences of the frustrations caused by the domination of one ethnic group, and hostility between regions of remaining Pakistan, should be taken seriously as a major threat to its security and integrity.

It is important to clarify here that separation of East Pakistan does not invalidate “Two-Nation Theory”, as projected by Indian scholars. It was, in fact, a product of a peculiar set of circumstances that included: intervention and exploitation by India, ethnic problems, political failure, and geographical cleavage. They needed to be neutralized through economic planning and social development.

In the case of Karachi, when compared to separation of East Pakistan, is quite different. In Bangladesh, the Bangalis were in majority, while Karachi is a cosmopolitan city. The demographic reality is that there are more Balochis in the city of Karachi alone, than in the entire province of Balochistan. Most of the blue-collar jobs in Karachi are occupied by Pashtuns and their number in the city is ever increasing, despite all efforts of Sindhis and MQM activists to drive them away. As far as Punjabis are concerned; Karachi has already become sixth largest Punjabi city. Therefore, the demand of Mohajirs for a separate Mohajir State, as it was in late 1980s, carries no weight. However, their demand for division of Sindh province, since the 1990s, is a danger for the solidarity of Pakistan. Materialization of such a plan would further alleviate the law and order situation for the reason that, Mohajirs are the most privileged of all ethnic groups in urban Sindh. The very idea of being outnumbered, outrun, and dominated by MQM raises strong reservations among other ethnic communities. Social, economic and demographic factors are also responsible for the violence in Sindh.

Ethnic diversity, scarce resources and struggle for survival have been the key factors for initiating ethnic violence, creating law and order situation in the country. For example, in 1947 there were 400,000 residents in the city of Karachi: by the late 1980s that number increased to 6 millions.<sup>77</sup> Now it is flooded by more than 10 million people. It has all the problems a big city of developing country could have.

Issue of royalties, division of share amongst provinces, controversy over developmental plans, language issues, and above all the relation of Balochistan province with federal government, is a danger to the prosperity and solidarity of Pakistan.

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<sup>77</sup> Bennet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 123.

Musharraf's government is trying to bring to an end to the sense of alienation among various factions, but it appears that the ethnic/nationalist leaders have their personal vested interests in keeping the ethnic fronts open.

For a peaceful Pakistan there is a need to eradicate any sense of alienation and obtain egalitarianism in the country as a whole, by rendering efforts towards achieving democratization, decentralization, accountability and a wider consensus at all levels.

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### III. SECTARIANISM AND JIHADI CULTURE

#### A. INTRODUCTION

Pakistan came into existence as a moderate and modern nation state under the vision of Jinnah - the father of the nation. But a downward trend, in the past 25 years, warrants an explanation to the causes. President Pervez Musharraf said the “only threat is sectarian and religious terrorism which is eating us like termites and it is Islam and the Muslim Ummah (community) which is paying the high cost. We all have to fight against it.”<sup>78</sup> Pakistan has a very important strategic position in South Asia. In past decades, to encounter geo-political situations of South Asia, the sectarian differences have been exploited and sentiments for jihad were aroused. Once out of the bottle, this genie has become a menace and a serious threat to internal security of Pakistan.

This chapter makes a deliberate effort to explain the root causes for the rise of jihad syndrome in Pakistan. It also questions the poor education system and role of madrassahs in fueling religious extremism and providing recruits to jihadi militant groups. Over a period of time, Pakistan became the hub of fundamentalists, which affected the moderate fabric of Pakistani society. This chapter will also analyze reasons for mushrooming of various madrassahs all over the country and highlights some of their structural and functional features. Here, I will also explain the reasons why a large number of young men are interested in recruiting themselves to wage jihad, how with the passage of time, these religious educational institutions have transformed into the dens of militants and played its role in fueling religious extremism in Pakistan. How, over time, the jihadi culture has become a threat to the internal security of Pakistan. What were prominent jihadi organizations operating in the country and how far the present government has succeeded in confronting the problem? Finally, the paper will deliberate and analyze critically the internal and external dynamics of sectarian problems and jihadi culture in Pakistan and what is the overall assessment in view of recent operation in Tribal Areas

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<sup>78</sup> President Musharraf told a thousand armed forces' top brass, provincial officials and foreign diplomats at navy dockyards in Arabian Sea port city Karachi, in December 2003. For details see: *Pakistan: Threat is internal*, at web-site [http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,,2-10-1462\\_1458842,00.html](http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,,2-10-1462_1458842,00.html). February 2004.

## **B. SECTARIAN PROBLEMS**

### **1. Historical Perspective of Pakistan Tilting Towards Extremism**

Islam in Pakistan, is highly diverse in its interpretations and modes of beliefs. Pakistan's population is approximately 77 percent Sunni and 22 percent Shia. Some 3 percent are non-Muslims. These include small Hindu, Christian, and Parsi minorities. This number also includes the Ahmadi community, which consider themselves Muslim, but is declared non-Islamic by the state.<sup>79</sup>

The two-nation theory is the basis of Pakistan's foundation. Islam and Islamic values are deeply embedded in the two-nation theory. Interpretation of the two-nation theory by secular Pakistanis and radical groups is a major point of contention today. Many scholars express that the masses had an element of extremism but never had Islamic infrastructure to promote their cause. Today they have both. How Pakistan has been transformed over the years is a long debate by itself and cannot be covered in this chapter. Pakistan came into being as an Islamic country, however, Islam never played a significant role in governing the country.<sup>80</sup> Jinnah's speech of 11 August 1947, clearly rejected Islamic primacy in Pakistan governance, stating, "Religion would have nothing to do with the business of state". He wanted to see Pakistan a moderate, secular, and forward-looking country.<sup>81</sup>

At the time of creation of Pakistan, Deobandis organized into Jamiat Ulema-I-Islami (JUI) under the Amir Mufti Mahmud. The JUI contested the 1964-5 elections partially on the grounds that the 2 March 1961 Family Laws was "un-Islamic".<sup>82</sup> During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, the JUI mobilized a campaign for financing the defense of Pakistan as well as organize Jihad conference. These two events laid the foundation for expanded role of Islamic parties in Pakistan politics and defense. JUI announced its manifesto on 20 January 1970. Features of manifesto included: providing the country

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<sup>79</sup> Mandavi Mehta and Ambassador Teresita C. Schaffer, *Islam in Pakistan: Unity and Contradictions*. A Report from the CSIS Project: Pakistan's Future and US Policy Options, October 7, 2002, p. 9. Also see CIA World Factbook.

<sup>80</sup> Khan, Feroz, notes taken during class lecture on transformation of Pakistan from Jinnah to Musharraf, February 24, 2004.

<sup>81</sup> Pirzada, Sayyid A.S. *The politics of the Jamiat Ulema-I- Islam Pakistan 1971-1977*, Oxford university press, 2000, p. 19.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

with an Islamic constitution; enforcement of compulsory congressional prayers; closure of anti-Islam missionary institutions; provision of equal housing and job opportunities, reforming the financial institutions; abolition of interest; nationalization of major industries and improving the working conditions of workers; conferring the property rights of tenants, confiscation of large estates and their redistribution among deserving cultivators; free dispensation of justice, separation of judiciary from executive; freedom of the press and an independent non-aligned foreign policy.<sup>83</sup> These agendas clearly define a set course of action and taking the country more towards religion. But even at this stage, the government, politicians, masses and major institutions were not poised towards islamization of the country leaders followed secular policies without antagonizing the religious extremist.

The State first exploited the radical and violent Islamic groups in 1970-1971 in East Pakistan. These groups weakened Pakistan's international position. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the first state leader to promote Islamization as a cover for his own autocracies. <sup>84</sup> Jihad initiated its ascendancy to primacy in the Islamic schools of Pakistan during the period of General Zia ul Haq and was fully actualized during Afghan jihad. The religio-political parties were quick to take advantage of the situation when Zia took over Pakistan and was looking for legitimization of his rule. Introduction of "Shariat Law" is one of the major events in the history of Pakistan tilting towards extremism. Shariat faculties were opened in universities and schools. The grand jihadi cause during Afghan war and disintegration of Soviet Union tilted the whole balance in the favor of jihadi organizations. Victory in Afghan war gave impetus to jihadi cause. United States, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and all Muslim countries were behind these organizations to provide them moral and material support.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>84</sup> Cohen, Philip Stephen, *The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan*, the Washington Quarterly, Summer 2003, p. 15.

<sup>85</sup> Jessica Stern, *Pakistan's Jihad Culture*, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, p. 11.

## 2. Active Sectarian Organizations

There are total of 35 political and religious groups/Islamists parties with considerable potential for destabilizing Pakistan.<sup>86</sup> Table 2.1 shows orientation and characteristics of Sunni political parties of Pakistan. In succeeding paragraphs, only those active organizations that could pose threat to the government or the state will be discussed.

Table 2.1 Sunni Political Parties In Pakistan: Orientation and Characteristics

	<b>Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP)</b>	<b>Jamaat-i-Islami(JI)</b>	<b>Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam</b>	<b>Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Ahle Hadith</b>
<b>School</b>	Barelvi	Modernist	Deobandi	Wahabi
<b>Orthodoxy</b>	Syncretic, folk-oriented	Intellectual Puritanism	Strictly orthodox	Theocratic, ultra-orthodox
<b>Ideology</b>	Pragmatic-nationalist	Reformist-nationalist	Islamic hard-line	Militant nationalist
<b>On Shias</b>	Variable, opportunistic	Negative but pragmatic	Extremely hostile	Extremely hostile
<b>On Kashmir</b>	Mainstream	Militant	Fiercely militant	Fiercely militant
<b>On Afghanistan</b>	Pro-Taliban	Pro-Taliban	Sponsor of Taliban	Jihadi
<b>Saudi Links</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes(intimate)
<b>Iraqi Links</b>	Yes	?	Yes	?
<b>Geographical Strengths</b>	Karachi and Punjab	Urban Punjab and Sindh	Urban Punjab, Karachi, NWFP	Urban Punjab
<b>Social bases</b>	Urdu speakers in Sindh Rural/small towns Punjabis	Urban educated middle classes	Pathans, Punjabis, lower classes and bazarris	-
<b>Membership Size</b>	Substantial but declining	Small, urban, disciplined	Substantial	Relatively small
<b>Top Leaders</b>	MIn Shah Ahmed Norani MIn Abdus Sattar Niazi	Qazi Hussain Ahmed	MIn Fazlur Rehman MIn Sami-ul-Haq	Allam Ahsan Ilali Zahir
<b>Armed Militias</b>	Apparently none	Hizb-ul-Mujahiddin	Sipah-i-Sahaba Lashkar-i-Jhangvi Harkat-ul-Mujahiddin Jaesh-i-Muhammad	Lashkar-i-Tayyaba

**Source:** Rodney W Jones, The Prospects of State Failure in Pakistan: Ethnic, Regional and Sectarian Fissure summary, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Policy Architect International, May 1, 2001

<sup>86</sup> *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments, Internal Affairs: Pakistan*, January 26, 2004, p. 9. See: <http://www4.janes.com>.

- **Jammat-e-Islami (JI):** This is the oldest and most organized politico-religious party.<sup>87</sup> JI favors a return to a strict parliamentary system.<sup>88</sup> JI does have Madrassahs but they are not the source of the Taliban. JI is an international organization and there is a JI in every major South Asian State. It is accused of sponsoring militant groups in Kashmir (Hizb-ul-Mujahiddin and Al-Badar).<sup>89</sup> JI has support of masses and is respected by majority of population.
- **Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI):** The larger Deobandi sect includes JUI.<sup>90</sup> It has strong support in the NWFP and Balochistan. Split into two factions, the JUI run an extensive network of Madrassahs and has links with the remnants of the Taliban.<sup>91</sup>
- **Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan:** Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) is a radical group from majority Sunni sect of Islam. It was founded in 1984 as a reaction to the Iranian revolution and increased Shia militancy in Pakistan. Both Saudi Arabia and Iraq supported the SSP.<sup>92</sup> It was sponsored by JUI, Maulana Fazlur Rahman faction.<sup>93</sup> The SSP has militant potential and has formed Lashkar-e-Jhangvi to counter the activities of Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan. The members of this group have received military training during the Afghan jihad. Recent incidents of attacks on Shias and 'Imambargahs' indicate a fair degree of professionalism. The militant/armed potential of the SSP poses a great security threat. Recently the SSP has branched out into many smaller terrorist groups. President Musharraf banned the organization in January 2002.
- **Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (MIP):** A hard-line offshoot of JUI, the MIP (formerly SSP), straddles the divide between politics, sectarian rabble rousing and anti-Shia terrorism. The party was banned in November 2003.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments, *Internal Affairs: Pakistan*, January 26, 2004, p. 9. See: <http://www4.janes.com>. 15 February 2004.

<sup>88</sup> Stephen Philip Cohen, *The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan*, The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2003), p. 9.

<sup>89</sup>Source: Rodney W Jones, *The Prospects of State Failure in Pakistan: Ethnic, Regional and Sectarian Fissure Summary*, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Policy Architect International, May 1, 2001, p. 13.

<sup>90</sup> Stephen Philip Cohen, *The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan*, The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2003), p. 9.

<sup>91</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments, *Internal Affairs: Pakistan*, January 26, 2004, p. 10. See: <http://www4.janes.com>. 15 February 2004.

<sup>92</sup> Jessica Stern, *Pakistan's Jihadi Culture*, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, Volume 79, Number 6), p. 6.

<sup>93</sup> Rodney W. Jones, *The Prospects of State Failure in Pakistan: Ethnic, Regional and Sectarian Fissure Summary*, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Policy Architect International, May 1, 2001, p. 14.

<sup>94</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments, *Internal Affairs: Pakistan*, January 26, 2004, p. 10. See: <http://www4.janes.com>. 15 February 2004.

- **Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP):** Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP) came into being in 1979, when the late President Zia Ul Haq took radical steps to establish an institutional framework for Islamization. The organization has matching militant potential and is waging an open war with the SSP. The members of this group have received military training at home and abroad. It was banned in November 2003.<sup>95</sup>
- **Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi(TNSM):** The TNSM (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law) is a tribally based Deobandi party active in NWFP.<sup>96</sup> It has a large following mostly drawn from religious madrassahs in Malakland Division and adjoining areas. Their uprising against FATA regulations and in favor of enforcement of Shariah in 1994 was quelled in an armed operation. The authorities had, however, partially defused the situation through the promulgation of a Shariah package. Radical elements including some absconders to Afghanistan have still not reconciled to the package and pose a latent threat to peace in the area.
- **Markaz Dawa Wal Irshad:** The Dawa Wal Irshad works to propagate an austere “purified” version of Islam and has set up schools across the country for this purpose.<sup>97</sup> Since its inception, the Markaz has grown at an incredible rate. The founders of the Markaz claim that it was set up for the two primary missions of Islam, which is *preaching* and *jihad*. Many Pakistani businessmen are known to support the Markaz generously.<sup>98</sup> Being an Ahl-e-Hadith militant organization based at Muridke, it is operating countrywide with an avowed aim to enforce Islam and prepare youth for jihad. It has links with some of the Arab countries, sends youths mostly of their Madrassahs to Afghanistan for armed training. Its freedom fighter wing is known as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba.
- **Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT):** The group’s ideas resemble those of the Salafi, a puritanical minority sect in Pakistan that is close to the Saudi brand Wahhabi Islam.<sup>99</sup> It has managed to attract thousands of committed young men by using its organizational network including schools, social service groups, and religious publications, to stir up anger against the so called injustices meted to Kashmiri Muslims. This created a passion for jihad. The Lashkar holds its annual congregation at Muridke every year, attracting thousands of new followers, many of whom go to fight in Kashmir.<sup>100</sup> LeT was also on the United State list of terrorist

<sup>95</sup> Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments, *Internal Affairs: Pakistan*, January 26, 2004, p. 11. See: <http://www4.janes.com>. 15 February 2004

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., p. 11. Also see: <http://www4.janes.com>.

<sup>97</sup> Zaigham Khan, “Allah’s Armies,” *The Herald Annual*, January 1998, p. 124.

<sup>98</sup> Zaigham Khan, “From Strength to Strength,” *The Herald Annual*, January 1998, p. 125.

<sup>99</sup> International Crisis Group Asia Report, *Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan’s Failure to Tackle Extremism*, January 16, 2004, p. 11.

<sup>100</sup> Zaffar Abbas, “A Who’s Who of Kashmir Militancy,” *The Herald*, August 2000, p. 30.

organizations.<sup>101</sup> President Pervez Musharraf banned the organization on 12 January 2002 during his historic speech.

- **Jaish-e-Mohammad:** Maulana Masood Azhar, a former member of the Harkatul Mujahideen, announced the formation of this group within days of his arrival in Pakistan<sup>102</sup>, on 4th February 2000.<sup>103</sup> This group has attracted a large number of supporters and activists from Harkatul Mujahideen, and even took over some of the physical infrastructure of the organization.<sup>104</sup> The group seems to have the support of a large number of Deobandi madrassahs in Pakistan. This organization was also banned on 12 January 2002.
- **Harkatul Mujahideen (HuM):** It was formed in 1998.<sup>105</sup> Harkatul Mujahideen is believed to be under the influence of both the factions of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-Islam of Maulana Samiul Haq and Maulana Fazlur Rehman. The organization had such strong links with the Taliban that Harkat activists are known as the Pakistani Taliban. The Harkatul Mujahideen recruited young men from all the provinces of Pakistan and from both sides of the Line of Control of Kashmir. A large number of its recruits were students from Madrassahs. The Harkat also ran a number of guerilla training facilities inside Pakistan, at least one of which was reported to be on a hilltop above Batrasi, a forest village near Mansehra.<sup>106</sup> It is also amongst the banned organizations in November 2003.<sup>107</sup>

### 3. Sectarian Violence

The problem of sectarian violence is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan. It existed in the culture of the sub-continent for many centuries in one form or the other, but certainly not with this intensity. Relations between religious sects, as between races, ethnic groups and religions are potentially divisive. One irresponsible move against any

<sup>101</sup> Stephen Philip Cohen, *The Jihadist Threat To Pakistan*, The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2003), p. 10.

<sup>102</sup> Azhar was arrested on February 10, 1994 and released in December 1999, in exchange for passengers of hijacked Indian Airlines Flight IC-814. See: Santhanam Sreedhar, *Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir*, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis New Delhi, SAGE Publications India, 2003, p. 119.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid. Also see: Zaffar Abbas, "A Who's Who of Kashmir Militancy," The Herald, August 2000, p. 30.

<sup>104</sup> Zaigham Khan, "Militants Verses the Military," The Herald, May 2000, p. 52.

<sup>105</sup> After Harkat-ul-Ansar was termed a terrorist organization by the US, to avoid the repercussion of US ban the group was recast as the Harkat-ul-Mujahiddin. See: Rodney W Jones, *The Prospects of State Failure in Pakistan: Ethnic, Regional and Sectarian Fissure* summary, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Policy Architect International, May 1, 2001, p. 12.

<sup>106</sup> Ilyas Khan, "The Road to Holy Terror," The Herald, January 2000, p. 121.

<sup>107</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments, *Internal Affairs: Pakistan*, January 26, 2004, p. 11. See: <http://www4.janes.com>. 15 February 2004

particular group can easily ignite emotions and shatter relative peace and harmony.<sup>108</sup> Pakistan, over a period of time, has become the hub of fundamentalists, which poses a major threat, fraught with grave consequences. Trained and motivated militants, having experienced Afghan and Kashmir jihad, are available to various groups/sects. These fanatic groups are also exploited by opposing political parties to their advantage, which is adding to internal security problems. The influx of arms/ammunition and the alleged Iranian, and Saudi financial/material support to these organizations have accentuated the malaise.

The growing intolerance in Pakistan society is reflected in the statistics of sectarian strife in recent years.<sup>109</sup> Between 1989 and July 2003, 1,468 persons have been killed and 3,370 others injured in some 1,813 sectarian incidents in Pakistan, according to the Institute for Conflict Management database.<sup>110</sup> According to another source; in 1997 alone, more than 3000 people were killed in outbreaks of sectarian violence.<sup>111</sup>

The nature of sectarian violence in Pakistan has changed over the time. Until mid of 1990s, most of the killings occurred in Punjab. Although by the end of 1990s, there were an increased number of incidents in Karachi, NWFP, and Balochistan.<sup>112</sup> For the statistics see Table 2.2. In 2001, Karachi had highest number of sectarian incidents, FATA was second highest, and Dera Ismail Khan ranked third highest in sectarian tension.<sup>113</sup> In recent years, over a 100 doctors and lawyers were victims of targeted sectarian terrorism in Karachi, apart from places of worship and foreign installations.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> Professor M. Akbar, *Pakistan: Sectarian Challenges*, South Asia Citizen Wire, July 30, 2003.

<sup>109</sup> “Thousands of Sunni and Shia Muslims have been killed in Pakistan over the past two decades in sectarian violence fuelled by extremist outfits of the two Muslim sects,” [IRIN, July 17, 2003]. Also see: Armed Conflicts Report 2003-Pakistan, Updated January 2004, p. 4.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>111</sup> Sairah Irshad Khan and Muna Khan, “Among the Believers,” News line, February 1998, p. 24.

<sup>112</sup> Bannet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 23.

<sup>113</sup> “The highest number of terrorist attacks was recorded in Karachi where in 33 incidents, 54 persons were killed. The second highest remained FATA; where 61 persons were killed in seven incidents of sectarian violence. Dera Ismail Khan remained third [highest] where 10 people were killed and 19 injured in 6 terrorist attacks. 14 people were killed and 8 injured in 5 attacks in Lahore, 4 killed and 3 injured in 3 incidents in Multan, 4 killed in 2 at Mailsy.” [Pak News, August 21, 2001].

<sup>114</sup> Mushahid Hussain, *Is There any Way To Contain Pakistan's Sectarian Monster*. The writer is a former Minister of Information and is currently a member of Pakistan's Upper House, the Senate. He can be contacted at mhussain@gulfnews.com.



Table 2.2      Sectarian Violence, 1989-2001

YEAR	PUNJAB	PAKISTAN
1989	10	10
1990	32	32
1991	47	47
1992	44	58
1993	38	39
1994	73	73
1995	58	59
1996	86	86
1997	90	193
1998	75	157
1999	53	86
2000	29	149
2001	65	261

**Source:** Bannet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 24.

In 2003, sectarian violence claimed at least 100 lives<sup>115</sup>, with Shia Muslim civilians accounting for most of the casualties. The worst such case was the July 2003 bombing of a Shia mosque in Quetta<sup>116</sup>, which resulted in 60 deaths. Militants employed guerrilla tactics, such as bombing and drive by shooting.

Since Pakistan joined the US coalition against terrorism, anti-Christian and anti-Western terrorist acts have increased in Pakistan.<sup>117</sup> The massacre of 18 Pakistani Christians in a church attack in Bahawalpur in October 2001 was Pakistan's worst incident against a minority group.<sup>118</sup> In January 2002, Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, was kidnapped and later murdered in Karachi. In March 2002, a grenade attack on a Protestant church in Islamabad killed five, including a US embassy employee and her

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<sup>115</sup> "Sectarian violence and tensions continued to be a serious problem throughout the country...At least 100 persons were killed in sectarian violence during the year, most carried out by unidentified gunmen." [US State Department of State, Country Reports on the Human Rights Practices-2003, February 25, 2004]

<sup>116</sup> Mushahid Hussain: *Is There Any Way To Contain Pakistan's Sectarian Monster?*, 09-07-2003.

<sup>117</sup> "At least 36 people have been killed and about 100 injured in several violent attacks this year against Christian and western targets.... Police in Karachi have arrested dozens of alleged Muslim extremists in connection with recent attacks on Christian targets." BBC News, September 29, 2002. Also see: Armed Conflicts Report 2003-Pakistan, Updated January 2004, p. 4.

<sup>118</sup> Mandavi Mehta and Ambassador Teresita C. Schaffer, *Islam in Pakistan: Unity and Contradictions*. A Report from the CSIS Project: Pakistan's Future and US Policy Options, October 7, 2002, p. 13.

daughter. In spring of 2002, a car bomb attack on Western targets, including a U.S. consulate in Karachi, killed 29 people, among them - 11 French military technicians.<sup>119</sup>

### **C. MADRASSAHS IN PAKISTAN**

#### **1. Conceptual Aspect of Madrassah**

It is important to understand the difference between the terms Koranic and Madrassah education. The Koranic school or *Maktab* is a place where Muslim children go to read and recite the Koran only. Koranic schools can function in the mosque, under a tree, in the house of the Koran teacher or under an open sky. The term Madrassah is usually used for a bit more organized institutions with classrooms and teachers for different levels. In addition, whereas a Koranic school is usually a place for lower level of religious education (the recitation and pronunciation of the Koran), Madrassah is where more in-depth religious education is provided.<sup>120</sup>

The structure and operational procedures of the Madrassahs vary from region to region. In West Africa, most of the Islamic learning takes place in Maktab or Koranic schools. There are only a few madrassahs in West Africa where students obtain detailed Islamic education. In the Arab world, the governments who control the curriculum and ensure that some secular subjects are taught in these institutions finance most madrassahs. In Indonesia and Malaysia, governments follow more or less the same pattern as the Arab world. In the South Asia region, a large number of madrassas, although financed by special boards of religious education that operate under the Ministry of Religious Affairs, are free to acquire other funds from private donors. Whereby, most madrassahs in Pakistan teach only religious subjects.

Before colonialism, madrassahs have been concentrating on imparting pure Islamic education without prejudiced attitude and without exerting any influence in politics of sub-continent. These madrassahs went through a radical shift in ideology under the British rule. With colonialism came a new modern system of education that sought to replace the role of madrassahs in any type of development. In the new schools,

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<sup>119</sup> K. Alan Kronstadt, *Pakistan-US Relations*, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, The Library of Congress, Updated August 11, 2004, p. 6.

<sup>120</sup> Uzma Anzar, *A Brief History of Madrassas with Comments on Curricula and Current Pedagogical Practices*, March 2003, Uzma Anzar in her thesis for Ph.D., in Islamic education, dilates upon various concept of Islamic education since 1005 AD. She has traced out history of Islamic education in almost all Islamic countries.

only those elites were invited to obtain admission that could be used to run the machinery of colonialism. This resulted in a dichotomy of education system – secular education for the elite and religious education for the poor. This new educational system was perceived as a threat to the Islamic identity of the Muslims. The madrassahs system in India took upon itself the task of opposing the cultural and educational hegemony of the British.

Today there are five major Islamic schools of thought in Pakistan: Deobandi, Bareilvi, Ahle-Hadith/Wahhabi, Salafi, and Shia. Each sect has its madrassahs in which they teach their own version of Islam. The two main sects of Sunni Islam - Deobandi and Bareilvi- dominate the madrassahs system in Pakistan. The religious, doctrinal differences of these schools are irreconcilable.<sup>121</sup> As the American scholar Vali Nasr explains, largely theological differences between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims have been transformed into full-fledged political conflict, with broad ramifications for law and order, social cohesion, and government authority.<sup>122</sup> The impotent Pakistani government has essentially allowed Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi'a Iran to fight a proxy war on Pakistani soil, with devastating consequences for the Pakistani people.<sup>123</sup>

Like in many other developing countries of the world, education is not mandatory in Pakistan. Only 40 percent of Pakistanis are literate and many rural areas lack public schools. The madrassah system today provides a vital social service by providing free education to the poor children. Nonetheless there are certain madrassahs, which apart from providing free education also provide free food, housing and clothing.<sup>124</sup> The reality is that, these madrassahs took up the vacuum left by Pakistani state failed education system, as Pakistan only spends mere 2 percent of its GNP on education.<sup>125</sup> Thus, rise of

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<sup>121</sup> International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: Madrassahs, Extremism and Military*, ICG No. 36, Islamabad/Brussels, July 29, 2002, p. 1.

<sup>122</sup> American Scholar Vali Nasr of Naval postgraduate school explained this concept in one of the lecture to his students. The context of this statement have also been reflected by P. W. Singer, and John M. Oline in their article: *Ensuring a system of Education not Jihad*, Analysis paper #14, 14 Nov 2001. Also see: Jessica Stern, *Pakistan's Jihad Culture*, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, Volume 79, No 6, p. 6.

<sup>123</sup> Jessica Stern, "*Pakistan's Jihad Culture*", Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, Volume 79, No 6, p. 6.

<sup>124</sup> Internet Site, <http://ikashmir.org>. (Rise of Jehadi Culture in Pakistan). Seen June 7, 2004.

<sup>125</sup> Mandavi Metha and Teresita C. Schaffer, *Islam in Pakistan: Unity and Contradictions*, A report from the CSIS project, Pakistan's future and US policy Options, October 7, 2002, p. 16.

this tendency can be rightly attributed to the extremely poor educational infra structure and ever less spending from the budget on this very important aspect of national development.

But the problem of madrassah education has two distinct aspects- the first is the quality of education in equipping the students with basic tools to earn a living, and second is the relationship between certain madrassahs and radical militant groups them to fight internationally, or in sectarian struggles. These are two distinct problems with different solutions.<sup>126</sup> It is important to note here that nothing in the institution of madrassahs is inherently prone to militancy. Though it is hard to get concrete data but most estimates indicates that only 10-15 percent of Pakistani madrassahs are affiliated with radical militant groups.<sup>127</sup>

## **2. Mushrooming of Madrassahs and Their Functioning System**

From a very modest number madrassahs started mushrooming in 1980s, when President Zia agreed to help US with training mujahideen in their fight against the USSR in Afghanistan. The United States and Saudi Arabia funneled some \$3.5 billion into Afghanistan and Pakistan during the Afghan war.<sup>128</sup> Madrassahs rapidly proliferated throughout Pakistan, most notably in Afghan refugee camps in NWFP and Balochistan where future Taliban leaders were trained.<sup>129</sup>

In the last 20 years, Pakistan has witnessed an amazing increase in number of these madrassahs. Nearly 20,000 madrassahs, according to Islamabad's Interior Ministry, operate in Pakistan.<sup>130</sup> Looney also mentions similar number of madrassas in his article.<sup>131</sup> However, Jessica Stern in her article says that there are around 40,000 to

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<sup>126</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., p. 17. Also see: PW> Singer, *Pakistan's Madrassahs; Ensuring a System of Education Not Jihad*, Analysis Paper # 4, The Brooking Institution, November 2001.

<sup>128</sup> Jessica Stern, *Pakistan's Jihad Culture*, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000 (Volume 79, Number 6), p. 4.

<sup>129</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments, *Internal Affairs, Pakistan*, January 26, 2004, p. 26.

<sup>130</sup> "The Taliban Lesson," "The Dawn," December 1, 2001, p. 7.

<sup>131</sup> Looney, Robert, *Reforming Pakistan's educational system; The Challenge of Madrassas*, Naval Postgraduate school Volume 28, number 3, Fall 2003, p. 260.

50,000 madrassahs in Pakistan.<sup>132</sup> In a TV interview with CNN in 2001, General Musharraf said there were 7000 or 8000 madrassahs in Pakistan, and between 600,000 and 700,000 students attending them.<sup>133</sup> Survey of Deeni Madaris of Punjab and students enrolled in them is shown in Appendix A and B.

- **Financing System:** Initially many madrassahs were financed by Zakat, giving the government at least a modicum of control. But now, more and more religious schools are funded privately by wealthy Pakistani industrialists at home or abroad, by private and government-funded non-governmental organizations in the Persian Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, and by Iran. Saudi Arabia has been supporting madrassahs associated to Sunni factions while Iran had been supporting Shias faction. This financing from Saudi Arabia and Iran was also meant to spread their own ideologies. In addition, most of the organizations have placed collection fund boxes at numerous shops all around the country. One of the major and significant sources of fund raising is through the high donations by most of the Pakistanis on Eid-ul-Azha (a holiday festival), once a year. These are subsequently auctioned, raising tens of millions of rupees. Notwithstanding the above, for most of the jihadi organizations, huge generous donations are anonymous, which are sent directly to their bank accounts. Top leaders of militant groups are financially stronger than many leading industrialists of Pakistan. Poor and unemployed youth is attracted to jihadi culture in view of a short cut approach to make more money than average Pakistani. Arab jihadis are usually from well-off families and thus become a source of funding for their Pakistani hosts.<sup>134</sup> It is important to mention here that the biggest source of financing is external.<sup>135</sup>
- **Curriculum:** The syllabi of these schools included the learning of the Holy Quran by heart, Tajweed, Tafseer, Fiqah, Shariah, Ahadith, Philosophy, Mathematics, Astronomy, and Tabligh.<sup>136</sup> However, there are many madrassahs that offer only religious instructions, ignoring math, science, and other secular subjects important for functioning in modern society. The teachers too are bereft of liberal education and they transfer their own limited vision and narrow-mindedness to their pupils.<sup>137</sup> It is pertinent to mention here that in order to cover this deficiency, the

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<sup>132</sup> Jessica Stern, *Pakistan's Jihad Culture*, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000 (Volume 79, Number 6), p. 3.

<sup>133</sup> Bennett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 32.

<sup>134</sup> Looney, Robert, *Reforming Pakistan's educational system; The Challenge of Madrassahs*, Naval Postgraduate school Volume 28, number 3, Fall 2003, p. 267.

<sup>135</sup> International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: Madrassahs, Extremism and the Military*, ICG Asia Report No. 36, Islamabad/Brussels, July 25, 2002, p. 24.

<sup>136</sup> Lt Gen (R) Kamal Matinuddin, *The Taliban Phenomenon*, Karachi: Oxford, 1999, p. 15.

<sup>137</sup> "Curbing Sectarian Militancy," "The Dawn," February 24, 1997.

government of Pakistan on 18 August 2001, in a quantum leap forward, promulgated Pakistan Madrassah Education (Establishment and affiliation of Model Deeni Madaris) Board Ordinance, 2001. It extends to the whole of Pakistan. The board's constitution consists of heavyweights holding elite positions in religious and educational hierarchy of the state organizations.<sup>138</sup> The main task of the board is to promote specialized Islamic education, bridge the existing gulf between general and madrassahs education, improve curriculum, and standardize it. In addition, to establish model madrassahs and model social Uloom, regulate, and approve conditions for affiliation of existing madrassahs.

- **Recruitment:** The mode of recruitment is completely voluntarily. Recruitment teams go to each and every corner of the city, especially rural areas, to preach and spread the message of jihad. Jaish-e-Mohammad activists use to visit government schools and asked children to devote one month of their summer vacations to military training.<sup>139</sup> Different publications make the ground for developing an awareness of jihad. In addition, if anyone from the town or village has achieved "martyrdom", his funeral would be attended by a large number of people from all adjacent places. Parents of these martyrs are well respected and also receive financial assistance from these jihadi organizations. The event inspires many others to volunteer themselves or their sons for jihad. Graffiti on the walls has become a very normal thing especially in NWFP and interior Sindh. The graffiti is also an indicator of a mindset in society and surely help attracting people to join this noble cause.

### **3. Role of Madrassahs in Propagating Religious Extremism**

The major cause of sectarian violence and other associated problems in the country is the interpretation of Islam by various scholars. These scholars invest in madrassahs to promote and spread their own philosophy of waging jihad against non-Muslims and against other Muslims sects to whom they consider as Kafir. A recent survey of religious educational institutions revealed that only 60 percent of the students in Deobandi and 49 percent in Barelevi madrassahs expressed readiness to accept the existence of other sects. For the students of these schools, jihad against members of other sects is as much a religious duty as jihad against non-Muslims.<sup>140</sup> Pakistani madrassah students from these militant schools have become the primary soldiers in the internal sectarian conflicts that have reached increasing levels of violence. Rather than acting as

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<sup>138</sup> "Taming the Madaris," "The Nation," 2 September 2001.

<sup>139</sup> Azmat Abbas, "Catching Them Young," The Herald, February 2002, p. 35.

<sup>140</sup> International Crisis Group, *Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan Failure to Tackle Extremism*, ICG Asia Report No. 73, Islamabad/Brussels, January 16, 2004, p. 11.

religious centers of cooperation, the leaders of various schools have issued verdicts against other groups, giving an imprimatur to violence.<sup>141</sup> For example, within NWFP, Sind, and Balochistan, their statements have played a key role in turning localized shia-sunni disputes into a real threat to the nation as a whole.

Some extremist madrassahs propagate a culture of violence and preach jihad with the aim to recruit and train the individuals who can later take part in the holy war against the enemies of Islam. Those who study these curricula for ten to fifteen years (the most formative period of their lives) cannot be expected to behave in any other way.<sup>142</sup> These new schools so-called madrassahs, tend to teach a more extreme version of Islam than what had been propagated before. Madrassahs target a lower class of society, unemployed youth, and refugees to brainwash their mind and train them for militant activities within and outside the country.

An added concern is that the student pool in many of these radical madrassahs is made up of foreigners. As much as 10-50 percent of the students in certain madrassahs are from abroad, coming from regions at war such as Afghanistan, Chechnya, and the Philippines. These students return with new influence and a changed outlook, which worsen the levels of violence. This second generation of conflict leaders tends to be more aggressive in their tactics and less willing to compromise or negotiate.<sup>143</sup>

As people become both more reliant upon and even integrated within private social service systems provided by these groups, their reasons for loyalty to the state are diminished. Such new, parallel institutions also provide a means to mobilize against the state and pressure or disrupt its policies. For example, the madrassahs provide a common pool of protesters, the thousands of students themselves, who are brought out to oppose the Pakistani government on almost any issue, ranging from support for the US to new taxes on small businesses.

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<sup>141</sup> P. W. Singer, and John M. Olin, *Pakistan's Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education not Jihad*, Analysis paper #14, November 14, 2001.

<sup>142</sup> "Islam, Pakistan and Muslims," "The News," February 2, 2001.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., "The News," February 2, 2001.

## **D. JIHADI CULTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON PAKISTAN**

### **1. Rise of Jihadi Culture in Pakistan**

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 sent shock waves throughout the world. It changed the power equation in the region. Washington registered a major shakeup in area vital to their interest. China perceived the invasion as another step towards its encirclement by the Soviet Union. Russian aircrafts at Shindand, only 480 km from the Gulf, had altered those geo-strategic environments in South Central Asia overnight. The Saudis were equally alarmed; scared because of the Soviet threat to their oil supplies. Pakistan faced a highly dangerous situation, sandwiched between two enemies – India on the east and the Soviet troops knocking on the Western border.<sup>144</sup> President Zia and his foreign office were in a real dilemma. The situation was even grave for the Americans, who during the ongoing Cold War, wanted to defeat the Russians at all fronts. Expansion of Soviets towards this region was viewed with great concern. The American strategists then masterminded enticing Pakistan to help them by fighting a holy war (Jihad) along with the Afghan military groups.

President Zia decided to support jihad as conceived by the United States. In addition, what made Zia an even more eager partner of the US for the Afghan jihad was the nuclear program as it had worsened his relations with Washington.<sup>145</sup> He badly needed such an opportunity to legitimate his government and overcome the internal problems. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan thus provided the initial impetus for call of jihad by Pakistan.

Geo-strategic compulsions and economic interests brought Pakistan, USA, Saudi Arabia, and China on a common platform to support the Afghan Mujahideen. It was United States in particular who extended political, economic, and military assistance to Pakistan during this entire war. American interests can well be understood by the fact that, George Bush, then Vice President of the United States, joined Mujahideen in the

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<sup>144</sup> Aftermath of Afghan War, "The News," Pakistan, August 17, 2000.

<sup>145</sup> John K. Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism*, (London: Pluto Press, 1999), p. 52.



religiously emotional slogan – Allah-o-Akbar on visit to the Pakistan border.<sup>146</sup> It is against this backdrop that Pakistan had to execute the military strategy for the jihad.

Pakistan raised the voice for jihad against communist infidels, which was readily responded by the Afghan refugees, who were mostly settled in camps along the Pakistan-Afghan border and brethren from other Muslim countries as well. It is prudent to mention here that since this war was portrayed as Islam's war on the atheistic Soviet Communists, the militant aspect of jihad became popular within the Pakistani society.<sup>147</sup> During this war, enough people were converted to the cause, the jihad developed a momentum of its own. The Soviet withdrawal and the defeat of communist forces in Afghanistan in 1989 failed to signal the end of the jihad. Jihadis from all over the world, who were so intelligently guided and directed against Soviet armies, were left without proper leadership. Loaded with the intensity of confidence after defeating Soviets, they moved to other parts of the world to pursue jihad. It is prudent to highlight here that Qazi Hussain Ahmed, Chief of Jamaat-e-Islami, very rightly said that, "The Afghan war was the mother of all jihads."<sup>148</sup> If his claim is viewed analytically, he is right as that proved a springboard for jihad and the jihadi culture as well which slowly and gradually moved into Pakistan and was heartily accepted by large segment of our society.

Meanwhile the Kashmiris, cornered for more than 50 years decided to fight it out, thus opening a new venue for the battle hardened jihadis. Identifying Kashmir as a place to be liberated in order to bring end to the atrocities by Indian forces, the jihadis engaged themselves to wage jihad against Indians. These two consecutive struggles have acted as catalyst for ever-growing number of madrassahs, which have been instrumental in producing a mindset in the society, i.e., ready to wage jihad. This resulted into a phenomenon, namely jihadi culture, throughout the country. Today, every major madrassah and jihadi political party use media publications to spread the message of jihad. For details see Appendix C.

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<sup>146</sup> O N Mehrotra, "*Madrassa in Pakistan*," Strategic Analysis, February 2000, p .1882.

<sup>147</sup> M. Ehsan Ahrari, "*China, Pakistan and the Taliban Syndrome*," Current Affairs Digest, March 2001, Book 79, p. 24.

<sup>148</sup> Zaigham Khan, "*Inside the mind of the Holy Warrior*," The Herald, July 1999, p. 42.

Before 11 September 2001, Pakistan had a number of militant groups active in Kashmir loosely linked under the banner *United Jihad Council* (UJC), formed in the early 1990s. Some foreign elements were also involved in strengthening the UJC. It is comprised of:<sup>149</sup>

- Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM),
- Jesh-e-Muhammadi (JeM),
- Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT),
- Hizbul-Mujahideen (HM),
- Al Badar.
- Harkat ul-Ansar (HUA) (It had previously acted as umbrella organization, but after the formation of JeM an estimated three-quarters of its members joined the new group)
- **Allied Groups:** Small groups attached to HuM and HUA included Convey of Mercy, Al Hadid, Muslim Brotherhood and Al Faran. HuM and HUA, due to their close links with Al-Qaeda network, had contacts with other radical Islamist organizations including the Armed Islamic Group (GIA); Egyptian Islamic Jihad; Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU); Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC); Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; Al-Itihad al-Islamiya (AIAI); Islamic Army of Aden/Islamist army of Aden and Abyan; Uighur separatist and radical Palestinian groups.<sup>150</sup>

Jihadi culture has two distinct ideological myths. These myths operate at different levels. At *international level*, these jihadi organizations promote anti Western sentiments and call for jihad against the West. The motivating ideological force is that Muslims in Pakistan cannot remain indifferent to the sufferings of their brethren in the occupied land or elsewhere. It is in this backdrop, the sacred cause of jihad is booming in Pakistan and promoted by these jihadi organizations. These organizations are providing impetus to the ongoing struggle in Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia or Afghanistan. Many of these organizations have links all over the world. They have their own militant groups to wage jihad against the enemies of Islam and against those who belong to different school of thoughts. At a domestic level, these groups try to promote their own extremist version

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<sup>149</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments, *Security and Foreign Forces- Pakistan*, 4 November 2003, p. 4 -5. Also see: [http://www4.janes.com/emeta/Denial?url=/subscribe/sentinel/doc\\_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/se&denial\\_reason=none](http://www4.janes.com/emeta/Denial?url=/subscribe/sentinel/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/se&denial_reason=none) 15 February 2004

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

of Islam and create a state within state. The militants groups of these organizations are a constant source of trouble for law and order.

## 2. Jihadi Culture Threat

- **Jihadi Formations of Islamist Party:** The co-option of Islamist parties as jihadi arms of Pakistan army in Afghanistan sent out a clear signal that waging jihad was a legitimate political activity. All sorts of jihadi formations sprouted out of the existing Islamist parties.<sup>151</sup> This has resulted in transforming jihad into the sectarian differences, thus turning it into social and political conflict, which had dangerous implications for civil society and governmental authority in Pakistan. Appendix D shows the map of Islamic militant groups in Pakistan.
- **Militant Madrassah:** The role of madrassahs in providing the manpower to sustain the sectarian conflict and as an institution for reproducing the ideology in which such conflicts has its moorings, is a serious threat to the stability of the state. The spread of militant /jihadi madrassahs have increased the rate of sectarian strife and violence in the country. There is a close link between some Islamist parties and Jihadi organizations. Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) runs a large number of madrassahs all over Pakistan and is considered to be the parent organization for the sectarian outfits like, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.<sup>152</sup> Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan also owns a sectarian outfit named Sipah-e-Mohammad.<sup>153</sup> Involvement of Jaish-e-Mohammad in sectarian militancy came to fore after the attack on a religious gathering in village Mallohwal, Pindi Gheb.<sup>154</sup>
- **Jihadis Let Loose:** After Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the jihadis now poses a serious threat to the internal security of Pakistan. Firstly, because thousand of madrassah-trained students filled the ranks of Taliban leadership and military. Now that the Taliban and Afghanistan are no longer viable outlets for jihadi militancy, it is unclear in what form jihadi ideology will be propagated. Islamist/jihadi aggression could indeed be internally focused or changing the sociopolitical dynamic of Pakistan. These jihadi elements strongly feel that it is their principle responsibility to liberate Kashmir and play a dominant role in other neighboring regions, i.e., Afghanistan, etc. The jihadis perceive that the Pakistan government has caved in due to the pressure of U.S. and India, against cross-border terrorism. The Pakistani government is now forced to

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<sup>151</sup> Hassan N. Gardezi, *The Politics of Religion in Pakistan: Islamic State or Sharia Rule*, April 14, 2003, p. 3. See: [www.secw.net/new/Gardezi140403.html](http://www.secw.net/new/Gardezi140403.html). 15 February 2004.

<sup>152</sup> Zaigham Khan, "Losing Control," *The Herald*, May 2003, p. 56.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid.

<sup>154</sup> Azmat Abbas, "Tightening the Noose," *The Herald*, February 2002, p. 36.

deal with the internal pressure that have compounded since 9/11.<sup>155</sup> Secondly, these radical groups follow the successful model (used in revolutions from China to Cuba) of replacing government institutions with ones linked to their own groups.

- **Talibanization of Pakistan:** Concern about the possible Talibanization of Pakistan is now so deep among certain elite sections of society, that it has led to a new genre of religious threat perceptions.<sup>156</sup> Talibanization is a term that highlights the prospects and chances of taking over the control of Pakistan by jihadis. In an observation, the US Assistant Secretary of State, Karl Inderfurth, expressed concern over a “possible Talibanization of Pakistan”.<sup>157</sup> However, appreciation of the masses in response to the latest stance of the government to support United States in war against terrorism and clamping down of the prominent jihadi organizations, is an indicator that this concept was being blown out of proportion. Another aspect, which has been very much inter-linked with the emergence of the jihadi culture, is that most of militant cadres from various groups have come home from Indian held Kashmir or Afghanistan or from other parts of the world. Growing trends of jihadi culture coupled with strong anti Western sentiments in the society have created a dilemma for internal security planners trying to evolve a strategy, which strikes balance between Western demands and population aspiration. The remarks of a jihadi operative were: “we won’t stop-even if India give us Kashmir, we will also bring jihad here in Pakistan. There is already a movement here to make Pakistan a pure Islamic state. Many preach Islam, but most of them don’t know what it means. We want to see a Taliban-style regime here in Pakistan”.<sup>158</sup> This mind set can have devastating affect on Pakistan’s internal security problems and its integrity within the comity of nations.
- **Kashmir Issue:** The Kashmir cause is the primary motivation of most of jihadi organizations. The continued illegal occupation of Kashmir by India, its refusal to honor the solemn pledges for a plebiscite, the UN’s failure to implement its resolutions, and the indifference of world powers to the sufferings of the Kashmiri people, served as an incentive for jihad in Kashmir. Another dimension to the same problem is that even a most viable solution to Kashmir problem is not acceptable to these jihadi organizations. No peaceful solution falls in their grand philosophy of jihad. The only plausible way to address the Kashmir, as per jihadi perception, is to wage jihad. It is imperative for the United Nations in general, and the United States in particular, to play an active role in the solution to Kashmir problem

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<sup>155</sup> Jessica Stern, *Pakistan’s Jihad Culture*, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, pp. 8-10.

<sup>156</sup> “What Chance Talibanization,” The Dawn, February 18, 2001.

<sup>157</sup> “What Price Jihad Culture,” The Dawn, January 15, 2001.

<sup>158</sup> Jessica Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, Vol. 79 No. 6, p. 121.

- **Law and Order:** The jihadi groups have also contributed to the rise of militarist and chauvinistic tendencies in the country. Regardless of how sacred is the cause for which they have been raising funds and procuring arms, their emergence on country's political scene amounts to having all manners of private armies coming up to pose a challenge to civil society.<sup>159</sup> The rise in the power of these jihadi groups can be well understood from the fact that they do not feel any hesitation in entering into an armed conflict with the government if their interests are threatened. Without going into the past, the recent decision of the present government to support United States in war against terrorism was vehemently opposed by most of the religious political parties which have number of madrassahs all across the country and also preaching jihad. In a number of demonstrations, spread over weeks, have seriously affected the law and order situation, and has resulted in the loss of lives of innocent men as well as government and civil property. This, and many other examples, spread over the past two decades, gives us an ample insight of the deteriorating internal security situation resulted due to the emergence of jihadi culture.
- **Tribal Districts:** The majority of tribal organizations in the government administered Mohammed and Bajor Agencies declared that they would not allow any anti-Taliban elements, military or civilian, to enter their areas. Some tribes blocked a part of historic Silk Route used by traders carrying goods between Pakistan and China in protest against President Musharraf's pro-US policies.<sup>160</sup> South Waziristan came to international attention in January 2003 following clashes between the U.S. and Pakistani armed forces. Although technically under Pakistani's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), it has in practice been controlled by the ISI in contradiction to the wishes of successive presidents, including Musharaff. No regular government has been able to control the feuding Waziris, who believe in the primacy of small arms and receive modern American-made weapons from the CIA during operations against the Soviet in the 1980s.<sup>161</sup>

## E. CHALLENGES AND STEPS TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT

An International Crisis Group paper on "Unfilled Promises: Pakistan's Failure to Tackle Extremism" recommends<sup>162</sup> that Pakistan government take effective action against all extremism groups and parties, in particular:

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<sup>159</sup> "Culture of Violence," "The Dawn," June 17, 2001.

<sup>160</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments- Search Results, January 24, 2004, p. 28 Available at <http://www4.janes.com>. 13 February 2004

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., p-29. Available at <http://www4.janes.com>. 13 February 2004

<sup>162</sup> *Unfilled Promises: Pakistan's Failure to Tackle extremism*, January 16, 2004, ICG, Report No. 73, pp. ii-iii.

- dismantle the infrastructure of groups banned under the Anti terrorism Law and prevent members from regrouping and reorganizing under new identities.
- close all jihadi Madrassahs, including those linked to religious parties.
- and sign immediately the International Convention for the suppression of the financing of terrorism.

Apparently, all these recommendations are logical, but international community does not realize the likely repercussion of such a tough stance. Such a policy will result into public disorder and may take shape of civil war. Application of force to that extent may prove to be counter productive. This resistance may spillover to Afghanistan and other part of region. Such a strategy warrants reconsideration. The carrot and stick approach is needed to handle such cases. The mind-set cannot be changed overnight. The evil of religious intolerance and fanaticism is the outcome of two decades of interaction between international, regional and internal stimuli and cannot be wished away within such limited time, at the disposal of present government of Musharraf. It is sincerely believed that a short, medium, and long-term policy package may be the only answer. Present Government has taken certain administrative, legal, and consultative measures thereby displaying political will to free Pakistani society from sectarianism and religious extremism. Enforcement of weaponization ordinance and proposed amendment to anti terrorist act is a step in the right direction.

The recent stance of government to support the United States in war against terrorism and banning of jihadi organizations are steps towards arresting and checking the growth of jihadi organizations and jihadi culture as well. Unconditional support rendered by Pakistani government to the United States despite a strong opposition from jihadi organizations and their parent political parties is a clear indicator of government's pledge to curb the jihadi groups.<sup>163</sup> The dilemma is that these banned organizations re-emerge with different names. For example when Harkat-ul-Ansar was declared a terrorist

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<sup>163</sup> The majority of religious scholars Musharaff said are very enlightened people. But the extremist carrying out the protests (against US bombing in Afghanistan) think that they are the sole custodians of Islam. They looked at Taliban as if they were the renaissance of Islam and at those were against the Taliban as, God forbid not Muslims. But those people have no respect for human rights and Pakistani people were let down by these so-called religious scholars. Musharaff then went on to announce the banning of militant organizations. From now on, he said, No organization would be able to carry out terrorism on the pretext of Kashmir. See Musharaff's speech 12 January 2002 highlights available [http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/southasia/newsid\\_1757000/1757251](http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/southasia/newsid_1757000/1757251). 15 October 2003.

organization and banned in 1997, but it was recast as the Harkat ul-Mujahiddin in 1998.<sup>164</sup> In 2002, the government banned a few militant organizations but they re-surfaced with new identification. Previously, Talibanization of Pakistan renamed itself as Jamaat-ad Dawa.<sup>165</sup> Jash-e-Mohammed and Sipah-e-Sihaba became Khuddam-I-Islam and Millat-e-Islamia, respectively.<sup>166</sup> But the Pakistani government, consistent in its plans, announced a series of moves to tighten the grip on banned political parties and militant groups. These plans included ban on six parties: Millat-I-Islamia(formerly SSP), Khudam-I-Islam(Jesh-e-Mohammadi), Islami Tehrik-I-Pakistan (Tehrik-I-Jafria), Jamiat-ul-Ansar (Harkat-ul-Ansar), Hizb-ut-Tehrir (part of the foreign-based Kilafat Movement), Jamaat-ul Farqan (a sister organization of the Jesh-I-Mohammadi).<sup>167</sup> There is still a danger of re-emergence of these militant organizations. Tracking of all the militant organization is extremely important to arrest the extremism. This warrants a well placed intelligence system and workable strategy to crack down the militants.

Actions taken by present government in tribal areas, especially in Waziristan, are highly criticized by religious parties and masses.<sup>168</sup> The military operations in Wana have cost many innocent lives and still it is nowhere near its goal.<sup>169</sup> The battles between Pakistani troops and militants of South Waziristan served to exacerbate already volatile

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<sup>164</sup> Santhanam Sreedhar, *Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir*, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis New Delhi, SAGE publications, India, 2003, p. 29. Also see: Rodney W. Jones, *The Prospects of State Failure in Pakistan: Ethnic, Regional and Sectarian Fissure Summary*, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Policy Architect International, May 1, 2001, p. 12.

<sup>165</sup> Rodney W. Jones, *The Prospects of State Failure in Pakistan: Ethnic, Regional and Sectarian Fissure Summary*, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Policy Architect International, May 1, 2001, p. 13.

<sup>166</sup> Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments, *Internal Affairs: Pakistan*, January 26, 2004, p. 10. See: [www4.janes.com](http://www4.janes.com). 15 February 2004

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., p.11.

<sup>168</sup> "Government action in Wana and Balochistan is highly criticized and protested by religious political parties including MMA," The Dawn, Pakistan, September 12, 2004.

<sup>169</sup> "A three-day clashes have left more than 72 people, including 14 security personnel, dead whereas the number of wounded people is yet to confirm." Dawn-Top Stories, Pakistan, September 12, 2004. "The situation in Wana does not seem to be showing any signs of improvement," *Tackling Wana Sensibly*, Dawn Pakistan, September 21, 2004.

anti-Musharraf and anti-US sentiments held by many Pakistani Pashtuns.<sup>170</sup> Therefore, along with the use of force, a diplomatic channel has to be introduced to bring like minded on the side of government. .

## **F. CONCLUSION**

The Jihadi culture is a legacy of the Zia era as the first “international jihad” was conceived, promoted and patronized by the Americans to fight the Soviet Union during the Afghan War. Trained and motivated militants, having experience of Afghan and Kashmir jihad, are available to various groups/sects. These fanatic groups with considerable access to unaccounted arms/ammunition are also exploited by opposing political parties. Iranian and Saudi Arabia, whose financial/material support to these organizations have been recorded, allegedly support some of these groups. Hostile neighboring countries have also exploited sectarianism in the last two decades for their own interests.

During the Afghan war, numbers of madrassahs mushroomed into the Pakistan with the aim to recruit and prepare the men, to wage the holy war against the infidels. The end of the Afghan war did not signal the end to the activities of jihadis, who turned to look different postures where they could wage jihad. The jihadi organizations over the years have been instrumental in fighting against the infidels’ especially in Afghanistan and more recently in Kashmir. However, they do not hesitate to pickup arms against the government if they feel their interests are threatened.

The reasons behind the growing political and religious influence of Islamist and jihadi groups in Pakistan are complex mixtures of internal and external pressures. The first of these is the eternally insufficient government sponsored education system. This has allowed jihadi organizations to educate the poor and dispossessed in an increasingly militant and fundamentalist manner out the controlling oversight of the central government.

The proliferation of armed religious fundamentalists, jihadi groups created a countervailing military force that challenged and undermined the unique role of armed forces and the law enforcement agencies. Its internal dynamics are the rise of

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<sup>170</sup> K. Alan Kronstadt, *Pakistan-US Relations*, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, The Library of Congress, Updated August 11, 2004, p. 5.



sectarianism, deteriorating law and order situation and poor economy. At the external front this has painted a picture of Pakistan as a country, which is exporting terrorism all around the globe and has resulted into strained relations with the West in general and neighboring countries in particular. It is against this backdrop that President Musharaff in his historic speech of 12 January 2002 has banned most of the jihadi organizations with the sole aim to curb down the activities of these organizations in order to arrest the above highlighted spin-off of the jihadi culture.

Another important matter of serious concern is that if these jihadi organizations retain their militant jihadi principles, then the future of Afghanistan, Kashmir and Pakistan could be under serious threat. The reaction of religious parties against the government's decision to support the U.S. in war against terrorism, poses a serious threat to the future of Pakistan. It needs to be tackled diplomatically without antagonizing religious sentiments of any faction. While use of force in tribal areas is a necessity, it is not a sufficient condition. Excessively relying upon military force alone is not answer to all the threats. Being an ideological Muslim state, Pakistan must allow sufficient freedom to religio-political parties without allowing them to use violent means or indulge in practices contrary to the policy of state. Any extremist group that uses violent means must be confronted with a strong application of force with clear ends in sight. Leadership must convey resolve and use of all appropriate state instruments to eliminate all such threats.

The study concludes proves that religious intolerance, sectarian problems and rise of religious extremism and militant groups are significant factors responsible for increased unrest and law and order problems in Pakistan. Sectarian threats feed on the failed education system in Pakistan and allow religious clerics to interpret Islam in the manner that exploits unemployed and raw youth. The need of the hour, therefore, is for our national security planners, be they politicians, bureaucrats or those in the services, to take a holistic approach to the issue and set in motion the processes by which a long term and coherent solution to combat the dangers arising from anti-national activities under the garb of Islamic terrorism can be implemented.

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## **IV. IMPACT OF INTERNAL SECURITY ON ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The deteriorating law and order situation in the country has added to the economic malaise bringing Pakistan to the brink of economic collapse, therefore there is a need to analyze the impact of ethnicity and jihadi culture on the economy of Pakistan. Pakistan needs to address these national security threats and find a viable solution if it is to progress and find its rightful place in the community of nations. There is an element of interdependence between economy and internal security problems. The question is, can we find a solution to our internal security threats, i.e., rising jihadi culture and ethnicity problem without addressing our economic problems? The answer is “No”. My argument is that Pakistan’s economy and its future stability is dependent upon efficient handling of internal security problems. The internal security and economic stability are dependent upon each other. This causal relationship between instability and economic growth is the focus of my analysis.

This paper will critically analyze the impact of “Jihadi Culture and Ethnicity” on the economy of Pakistan. Part B of the paper will give an overview of economy through the lens of some renowned scholars. In section C, an effort will be made to study the concept of interdependence between economy and internal security. Section D will focus on Jihadi culture and its negative impact on economy. Section E will critically analyze few of national projects from the perspective of ethnicity and how economy is affected in this process. Section F will analyze fundamental variables, i.e., environmental scarcity, human development and poverty alleviation, which are interconnected to internal security and economy.

### **B. PAKISTAN’S ECONOMY THROUGH THE LENS OF ECONOMIST**

Prof. Looney tried to analyze the economy of Pakistan on the eve of its golden jubilee. His main argument was that there is growing dissatisfaction with the country’s economic performance. Among many shortcomings, he considers that inadequate human resource development, population explosion and rising unemployment as the important

factors for deteriorating economy.<sup>171</sup> These factors have greatly neutralized some of the positive results achieved in Pakistan's economic management and resultantly the overall scenario on the economic front has become bleak and confused.

Looney's key question is what are the limitations associated with the country's development model, and he also focuses on whether and to what extent democracy can be sustained in the light of massive economic and social difficulties.<sup>172</sup> On the positive side, agriculture and industrial output marked the increase in GNP.<sup>173</sup> On the negative side, the country has achieved too little and whatever has been accomplished has been done at a very high cost. The gap between import and export, rising external debt, internal debt and defense budget are serious impediments in overall growth. Looney proposes that the government has to cut down its defense budget.<sup>174</sup> Despite economic advancement in certain fields, the lives of ordinary people have not changed. Poverty has jumped up to 42 million.<sup>175</sup> After making budget allocation for defense and debt-servicing country is left with hardly anything to spend on development of the physical and social infrastructure.

Zaidi argues that Pakistan's economic performance since its independence has been mixed. Initially, a subsistence economy in many respects, it developed a significant industrial sector in the 60's and made noticeable progress in agricultural sector. Pakistan was considered to be a model capitalist economy in the 1960s.<sup>176</sup> Periods of rapid growth alternated between stagnation; and macro-economic imbalances grew steadily more serious during the 1980s and early 1990's. The political management of the economy often served to limit the opportunity for growth while little has actually been done to ensure a more equitable distribution of wealth.

Ishrat, author of several books on Pakistan's economy, hypothesizes that failure of governance and consistent domination of political power and state apparatus by

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<sup>171</sup> Looney, Robert, *Pakistan's Economy: Achievements, Progress, Constraints, and Prospects*, Founders Aspiration and Today's Realities, Oxford University Press, p. 195.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid., p. 196.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid., p. 196.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., p. 198.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., p. 198.

<sup>176</sup> S. Akbar Zaidi. *Issues in Pakistan Economy*, Oxford University Press, Karachi Pakistan, 1990, p. 5.

narrowly based elites seeking to advance their private and family interest to the exclusion of majority of population lies at the root of problem.<sup>177</sup> In analyzing Pakistan economic development, he explains dichotomous roles of state vs. the market. The breakup of the Soviet Union was a wakeup, call that completed the ongoing revolution- decisively in favor of superiority of markets. Government failure was found to be greater than “market Failure”.<sup>178</sup> Ishrat argues that failure of successive governments to implement economic policies in last 50 years has been the main cause of negative aspect of economy. He regards this as a bad governance problem, which he considers the mother of all ills in the society.

The economic and social outcomes, as stated by Ishrat, in Pakistan over the last 50 years have turned out to be mixture of paradoxes.<sup>179</sup> The persistence of poverty, large income inequalities, severe rural –urban disparities, gender discrimination, endemic ethnic rivalries and political instability suggest that benefits of economic growth have not been spread evenly.<sup>180</sup> However, one of the findings of author is that it is extremely hard to quantify these variables.

Pakistan is blessed with critical natural resources: gas, irrigation water, and fertile land of Indus valley. 70% of the Pakistan economy is based on agricultural production. Ishrat emphasizes that resource utilization of these valuable commodities, i.e., natural resources, has however been less than optimal as efficiency considerations have been overtaken by claims of equitable and fair distribution of water between provinces.<sup>181</sup> Certain key issues of Pakistan economic development<sup>182</sup> are:

- The first issue is the overall state capacity of public institutions to deliver the goods and services to its citizens. Investing in health, education, nutrition, family planning services, water supply, and sanitation are some of the activities which state must perform to get positive social returns.

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<sup>177</sup> Hussain, Ishrat, *Pakistan The Economy of Elitist State*, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 353.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid., p. XII.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid., p. 339.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid., pp. 339 –341.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid., pp. 342-345.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., pp. 348-362.

- Human capital base of Pakistan is much weaker in relation to its economic growth performance.
- Distribution of infrastructure is uneven in the country. 45, 000 villages<sup>183</sup> have only access to trading centers. Uneven distribution of resources creates frustrations, political instability and results into serious law and problem within country apart from its economic loss.
- Deteriorating law and order situation in the country and the ineffective and protracted legal system have impaired the overall environment of economic activity for the majority of population.
- Pakistan economy is heavily dependent upon foreign saving and investments. Law and order issues are serious hurdles in meaningful foreign investment.

Ishrat's main conclusion is that ethnic diversity is an underlying cause of poor economic growth and that extraordinarily high levels of ethnic diversity in Africa help explains substantial amount of Africa's growth tragedy. Pakistan economic growth is dependent upon its success in handling ethnic problems. While he identifies 'ethnicity as the ultimate variable for macro and micro economic stability, however, he does not specifically addresses those fundamental variable, i.e., impact of ethnic issues which affect negatively on economy.

Looney refers to Shahid (2001) who bluntly has attributed the country's inability to sustain high growth to the following factors<sup>184</sup>:

- An increase in the role of the state has coincided with a decline in governance.
- Non-competitive regimes politically and economically have resulted in rampant corruption and stagnation – the subversion of competitiveness was the central feature of Pakistani governments.
- There has been a continuous redistribution of wealth in favor of privileged groups.
- A hard crust of economic monopoly has stifled new growth and creativity.
- An erosion in the provision of public services has resulted in a decline of the public's trust in government which is seen a predatory. This, in turn, is linked to non-payment of taxes, the corruption in tax administration, and the massive increase in borrowing.

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<sup>183</sup> Ibid., p. 350.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

- The quality of the civil bureaucracy is falling rapidly. A majority of civil servants are not even paid a living wage and this is tantamount to an incentive to corruption.
- The irrelevance of the state in the lives of the people is exemplified by the total breakdown of law and order.

Due to a lack of vision in the past, economic policies were not geared towards improving productivity of the economy, removing bottlenecks and making the economy more efficient in production of goods and services. Despite myriad government bodies, few serious analyses of the evolving structural constraints were conducted, and fewer still were ever implemented. Most distortions which now appear in the form of structural constraints stemmed from a basic thesis of free-ridership in Pakistan, i.e., the government is responsible for providing food, health, education, housing and more.<sup>185</sup> Agriculture sector (which contributes 25% of GDP), was totally neglected. As an example, until recently, despite input subsidies to farmers (largely siphoned off by big landlords), control on producer prices of major crops (wheat, cotton) remained far below the cost of production and what the farmer would have received in the open market or the international market. At the same time, large agriculturists refuse to accept the agricultural income tax. Similarly in industry, distortions arose over the years due to lack of policies to promote labor-intensive industry.<sup>186</sup> For instance, agro-industry has a large potential in Pakistan but this was never fully exploited. Controls, discretionary powers and a complex system of licensing and regulations ensured concentration of all large industry in a few hands with monopolistic trends.<sup>187</sup> Protection of industry under the garb of infant industry argument, afforded mark-ups of more than a 100% to industrialists producing inefficiencies in production, distortions and structural impediments in the economy. Today the same industrialists argue against liberalization and deregulation for fear of competition by losing out to more efficient industries. A by-product of the lack of coherent industrial policy in the past has been the lack of a diversified export base in Pakistan, which in today's climate of aggressive export competition is a serious detriment

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<sup>185</sup> Government of Pakistan, *Economic Survey of Pakistan*, 2000-2001.

<sup>186</sup> *The News*, December 14, 2001.

<sup>187</sup> S. Akbar Zaidi. *Issues in Pakistan Economy*, Oxford University Press, Karachi Pakistan 1990, p. 51.

to economic growth. Cumulative effect of stunted growth of agriculture sector and narrow industrial base has resulted in an annual trade deficit to the tune of approximately \$ 3.5 billion.

## **C. INTERDEPENDENCE - ECONOMY AND INTERNAL SECURITY**

### **1. Human Security**

The concept of “human security” is relatively new on the international scene but it is gaining more and more attention in view of third world security problems. The Commission on Human Security was created in 2001. The purpose of this commission was to study those internal and external factors, which affect human security in Central Asia.<sup>188</sup> The Commission on Human Security argues<sup>189</sup> that need for human security is universal; that people, both individuals and communities are central to its promotion; and, that all its components, whether they relate to conflict or development, are interdependent. Threats to the security of people in the region include potential or actual conflict, population displacement, economic deprivation, unemployment, deterioration of basic services, human rights violations, etc.

### **2. Linkage between Economic Development and Security**

Today, the multifarious threats to developing world stability, however, have proved far more complex in understanding the various dimension of internal security. There are two streams of thoughts on linkage between security and economy, i.e., the “security first” and the “development first”.<sup>190</sup>

- **Security First Approach:** Proponents of this approach argues that “security first” guarantees economic development. According to them, security is a precondition of development, and for achieving successful outcomes in the other reconstruction pillars. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. In the most pressing sense, it concerns securing the lives of civilians from immediate and large-scale violence and the restoration of territorial integrity.<sup>191</sup>

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<sup>188</sup> *Human Security in Central Asia, Challenges Posed by a Decade of Transition* (1991-2002), Report for the Commission on Human Security, March 2002. p. 1, See [http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/outreach/ashgabad\\_bgpaper.pdf](http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/outreach/ashgabad_bgpaper.pdf). June 11, 2004.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>190</sup> Mirza, M. Nasrullah, *External Security and the Issue of Development in Pakistan*, available on [www.acdis.uiuc.edu/homepage\\_docs/pubs\\_docs/S&P\\_docs/S7P](http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/homepage_docs/pubs_docs/S&P_docs/S7P). May 2004.

<sup>191</sup> *A Secure Europe In A Better World*, Security strategy paper presented at Thessaloniki summit.



- **Economy First Approach:** The idea of relying on economic development to ensure credible national security is a relatively recent one. According to this school of thought, it is erroneous to look at the security in terms of physical security, attainable through military means. Proponents of this approach argue that “economic development” is the most effective means to attain security.<sup>192</sup> Their point of view is that economic collapse is also frequently a precursor to and a warning of the potential for state failure and the possibility of internecine or conflicts. Some argue, for example, that the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement and the halving of coffee prices played a critical role in polarizing Rwanda before the genocide. Ethnic war, revolution, genocide and coups d’état often go hand in hand with economic crisis.<sup>193</sup>

Both arguments are important for understanding the interdependence between these two factors. These two variables cannot work in isolation and ultimately converge. In Eastern Europe, security and economic challenges are far greater and have a downward spiral effect on each other’s progress. Kosovo has seen the greatest level of destruction within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Army and paramilitary forces wreaked havoc in Kosovo on its housing and economic infrastructure, creating not only a humanitarian disaster but an immediate economic crisis. Undoubtedly the persistence of ethnic violence in Kosovo is adding to the climate of insecurity, and making it most difficult to restore a modicum of normality to daily life. Sorting out these very serious problems constitute a fundamental precondition for economic revitalization. The Marshall Plan was indeed instrumental in fostering the conditions that led to the economic revitalization of Europe. It explicitly linked Europe’s long-term security to its economic revitalization. The Marshall Plan has remained a kind of archetype and is often invoked in discussions exploring the links between importance of security and the need for economic revitalization.<sup>194</sup>

East Timor struggled for twenty-four years to gain independence. After gaining independence, East Timor never faced any serious internal security challenges. However, slow economic development had a downward spiral effect in creating serious law and

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<sup>192</sup> Mirza, M. Nasrullah, *External Security and the Issue of Development in Pakistan*, available on [www.acdis.uiuc.edu/homepage\\_docs/pubs\\_docs/S&P\\_docs/S7P](http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/homepage_docs/pubs_docs/S&P_docs/S7P). May 2004.

<sup>193</sup> Introduction – *Development As A Non-Traditional Strategic Resource*, Rapporteur General, International Secretariat, Document of Economic and Security committee, September 19, 2003, pp. 9-11. Related documents available on its website <http://www.nato-pa.int>. May 2004.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

order problems. In Dec 2002, riots all over the East Timor created an alarming security challenge due to UN failure to deliver on the economic front. Violence and law problems were so severe that ultimately UN had to bring major changes its exit strategy of military forces.<sup>195</sup> Failure to accord top priority to economic development changed the whole security scene in East Timor.

McNab states that demilitarization of Afghan society cannot be achieved unless suitable reintegration opportunities are available to former militias. If the economy remains stagnant and no employment is forthcoming the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration will collapse.<sup>196</sup> Understanding of this interconnection between security and economy is vital for the overall success of handling deep-rooted conflict. Barnett Rubin, Director of Studies at New York University's, states that "The lack of security has hindered reconstruction and sapped the legitimacy of the Government in Afghanistan". Bernard Frahi, of the Office on Drugs and Crime, said that the elimination of opium would only occur when political and social stability was provided in a broader economic context. What was needed was the commitment of international community for long-term strategies for poverty reduction.<sup>197</sup>

McNab argues that food, water, and shelter are basic human need.<sup>198</sup> In the post conflict scenario or during the conflicts, one has to address the basic needs of people. He recommends that one must concentrate on the basic need of the population to address the root causes of conflict. Mayer substantiates McNab argument by explaining his theory on "Wheels of Conflict". He places "Needs" at the center of all conflicts.<sup>199</sup> People engage

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<sup>195</sup> Pinto, Julio Tomas. *Report: Attitudes Regarding Defense and Security of East Timor*, Accessment, November 23, 2003. Available on [http://iasnt.leidenuniv.nl:8080/DR/2003/02/DR\\_2003\\_02\\_25/11](http://iasnt.leidenuniv.nl:8080/DR/2003/02/DR_2003_02_25/11). and also see UN General assembly documents dated March 3, 2003, March 10, 2003, July 11, 2003, January 2004.

<sup>196</sup> McNab Robert, Naval Postgraduate School, *Economics of Development for Security Building*, Lecture notes on Economic of Security building, April 17, 2004.

<sup>197</sup> Stefanie Elbern, Conrad Schetter Afghanistan: *From Economy of Violence towards Economic Reconstruction*, Bonn, January 21, 2003.

<sup>198</sup> McNab, Robert, Naval Postgraduate School, Lecture notes taken on 1 April: *Economics of Development for Security Building*.

<sup>199</sup> Mayer, Bernard, *The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution*, Jossey-Bass A Wiley Company, p. 8. Mayer argues that conflict has many roots and there are many theories that try to explain their origin. Conflict is seen as arising from basic human instincts, from the competition for resources and power, from the structure of societies and institutions people create from the inevitable struggle between classes.

in conflict either because their needs that are not met by the conflict process itself or because they have needs that are inconsistent with those of others.<sup>200</sup>




Figure 1. Wheels of Conflict

### 3. Importance of Economic Development

In Pakistan there has been a useful tool for external focus in the form of an Indian threat, which has to a large degree managed to divert attention from internal, social and political problems. In future pressing issues related to over population, provision of basic civic facilities, education and internal security, would pose a more serious threat than any external security threat. Inter provincial grievances could easily identify with this, and given the distinct ethnic identity of each could be potentially seriously damaging to the federation. The ethnic and regional polarization has emerged as major motivation for potential terrorism. The absence of genuine economic development and political instability has provided ethnic and regional forces to exploit the situation. This is particularly relevant to Sind and Balochistan.

During the last decade, Pakistan's domestic environments have become increasingly degraded in terms of economic, social and internal security. A vast majority of people in Pakistan have no access to quality-oriented education, health facilities, clean drinking water, and other basic necessities of life. The nuclear or conventional weapons

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<sup>200</sup> Mayer, Bernard, *The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution*, Jossey-Bass A. Wiley Company, p. 8.

do guarantee relative security from external threats, however, the investment in external security cannot take care of deep-rooted internal insecurity issues emanating from poor investment in human development. General Musharraf recently stated that economic development is fundamental element of national security. Internal security is an important pillar of national security. Most of the countries in the third world are struggling to maintain peace internally. An economically bankrupt, loan ridden and dependent country is susceptible to economic and political exploitation and military aggression. Feroz states that assured deterrence and defense capability is impossible without economic growth.<sup>201</sup> He further argues that all-important institutions of the state must develop together in harmony. And this is possible only if the nation state follows a strategy of sustained economic development.<sup>202</sup>

Defense against external threat is of vital importance, however, present state of affairs warrants a balanced approach to deal with internal and external threats. High level of defense expenditure in Pakistan has resulted in an adverse impact on Pakistan's economy. Looney states that Pakistan is not left with enough money after making budget allocation for defense and debt servicing so as to spend on the development of the physical social infrastructure.<sup>203</sup> He further states that Pakistan's economic growth is a puzzle because there is scant evidence that this economic advance has affected the lives of ordinary people. The country has failed to develop its human capital.<sup>204</sup> From the time of the creation of Pakistan, 40-50 percent of the revenue has been spent on defense, totaling more than Rs. 10,000 billion until now.<sup>205</sup> Pakistan ranks 9th among 117 market economies in terms of the government's expenditure on defense as a percentage of total

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<sup>201</sup> Khan, Feroz, *Naval Postgraduate School*, Lecture notes taken during class on February 24.

<sup>202</sup> Khan, Feroz, notes taken during interview with him on *Pakistan Security Dilemmas* May 25.

<sup>203</sup> Looney Robert, *Pakistan's Economy: Achievements, Progress, Constraints and Prospects*, Chapter 8 of *Founders Aspirations and Today's Realities*, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 199.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid., p. 198.

<sup>205</sup> Bokhari Farhan, *Pakistan's Security lock goes for a toss with Karachi Unrest*, The Dawn, March 6, 2004.

expenditure. On the other hand, it ranks 2nd among the 34 poorest economies. It ranks 17th in education and 34th in health per capita expenditure in these 34 poorest economies.<sup>206</sup>

#### **D. JIHADI CULTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON ECONOMY**

##### **1. Threat Posed by Jihadi Culture to Economy of Pakistan**

Sectarian threats are looming large on the entire country. Karachi, being the economic nerve centre of the country, remained in the grip of various acts of terrorism in last two decades. Sectarian killings and subsequent strikes during the month of May 2004<sup>207</sup> had restricted the actual working days of business to only 17-18. Being the port city of Pakistan, it handles almost the entire foreign trade. The recent wave of assassinations and killings has claimed around 61 lives, leaving 195 wounded.<sup>208</sup>

Strikes in view of sectarian killing have hurt Pakistan immensely in terms of economic losses. According to a study by the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a single day's strike results in losses amounting to Rs1.18 billion in terms of GDP, besides Rs154 million indirect tax revenue loss to the national kitty.<sup>209</sup>

Country's revenue collection in May 2004 declined by 28 per cent to Rs37.4 billion against the target of Rs51.9 billion. What about the social costs of this deteriorating internal security problems? In the mid-eighties, riots started in Karachi as a result of lack of civic services, but soon they assumed sectarian color as well. The loss of human life including target killing<sup>210</sup>, damage to transport and property and the loss of businesses as a result of long spells of curfews are hard to calculate.<sup>211</sup>

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<sup>206</sup> Chawla, Shalini, *Pakistan's Military Spending: Socio-Economic Dimensions, Strategic Analysis*, IDSA, Vol. XXV No 5, August 2001, p. 1.

<sup>207</sup> Karachi has seen a number of violent incidents occurring in May. A suicide bombing attack on a city mosque on May 7, 2004, claimed 22 lives; violence following by-elections on May 12 killed 11 people; subsequent protests by aggrieved parties as well as other acts of lawlessness have seen vehicles and petrol pumps torched, roads blocked and public and private property destroyed. *The Dawn*, May 25, 2004.

<sup>208</sup> Khan, Aamir Shafaat, *Karachi suffers Rs1bn loss in a Day: Law and order*, *The Dawn*, June 3, 2004.

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*, *The Dawn*, June 3, 2004.

<sup>210</sup> Towards the mid-nineties, in Karachi as result of spillover effect of infighting between Shia and Sunni, target killing started. Mostly medical practitioners rendering yeoman service to their communities were killed in cold blood. According to rough estimates, over 80 doctors lost their lives in target shootings. Hundreds of professional doctors left the country for good.

<sup>211</sup> Tasneem Siddiqui, *The Cost of Lawlessness*, *The Dawn*, May 22, 2004.

## 2. Impact on Foreign Investment

The rise of the jihadi culture has created an unenviable image of Pakistan in the eyes of the rest of the world and has affected the country adversely in terms of the absence of direct foreign investment. It is in this backdrop that the investors are losing trust in the system and are dropping millions to invest in India “especially in IT sector” rather than Pakistan. On international front, it is strongly felt that the atmosphere is not conducive for the investors in Pakistan. The crime rate has also gone up in the last couple of years. Armed robberies, thefts, kidnappings, assaults, and petty crime have all marked a visible increase. In addition, politically inspired violence as well as acts of terrorism has also dented the country's image abroad.<sup>212</sup> This has served as a big blow to our ever-shrinking economy and to a great extent has crippled it.

The net foreign investment to Pakistan has dropped by 12 percent<sup>213</sup> to \$586.8 million during nine months (July-March) of the current fiscal year (2003-2004) compared with \$664.7 million of the same period last year.<sup>214</sup> The foreign investment of \$77.2 million flew out of Pakistan in nine months due the deteriorating law and order situation in the country. The decline in foreign investment by 12 per cent is a wake-up call for Pakistan to heed. Paul Chabrier, advisor to the Managing Director of the World Bank, says:<sup>215</sup>

foreign investors are not attracted solely by debt relief or the foreign exchange reserves. There are certain factors like the regional peace and internal security situation, which are beyond the economic sphere but influence their decision to invest in any particular country.

How can foreign investors come when embassies are recalling wives of their diplomats, shedding the non-essential staff and closing their visa offices in Karachi and Islamabad? How can foreign investors come when the travel advisory of foreign

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<sup>212</sup> *The Dawn*, May 1, 2004.

<sup>213</sup> Kiani, Khaleeq, *Foreign Investment falls by 12pc*, *The Dawn*, April 20, 2004.

<sup>214</sup> The Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the United Kingdom declined by a mammoth 65 per cent to \$75.7 million against \$202.7 million of the same period last year. The FDI from the UAE, which is Pakistan's third largest investment partners after the US and the UK, also reduced by 52 per cent to \$54.1 million against \$112.7 million of the corresponding period last year. FDI from Saudi Arabia came down by more than 90 per cent to \$3.2 million compared with \$32.6 million of the same period last year. Investment from other countries also dropped to \$77 million against last year's \$114.5 million. FDI from France, Hong Kong, Japan, Canada, and Australia reduced during the same period.

<sup>215</sup> Sultan Ahmed, *Security Threat Deters Investment*, *The Dawn*, September 2, 2002.

countries to their nationals ask them not to visit Pakistan? This is not the climate for foreign investors.<sup>216</sup> Pakistan has to view this aspect critically in the larger economic interest and prosperity.

As a result of deteriorating law and order, our productive base is not expanding. We are caught in a vicious cycle. Because of increasing lawlessness, investment is not coming either from foreign or local sources, and when investment is not taking place, unemployment is bound to increase, giving rise to further lawlessness.<sup>217</sup>

A country that has a foreign debt of more than \$36 billion cannot afford such events, as these cause the economy to nose dive. The blunt truth must be recognized that the country can wage jihad either against poverty and inequity at home or for nebulous, controversial causes abroad, not both.<sup>218</sup> Looney has offered realistic options and suggested role of International Community on “Reforming Pakistan’s Educational System the challenge of madrassahs.” These options will serve the basis for planning viable strategy to root out jihadi culture from Pakistani society and promote education in Pakistan.

#### **E. IMPACT OF ETHNICITY ON ECONOMY**

Ethnic diversity and its consequences have created an anarchic situation in Pakistan. The provinces have been fighting amongst themselves over the distribution of financial resources, over the share of water, and over the claim of natural resources. This ethnic polarization has serious negative impact on Pakistan’s economy. The key projects of national importance are not either materializing or facing innumerable security challenges that put country’s future prosperity in question. Some of these threatened projects are;

- Provision of natural gas from Balochistan to rest of the country.
- Constructions of dams to address the water problems.
- Construction of alternative port at Gwadar in view of persistent law and order problems.

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<sup>216</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>217</sup> Siddiqui, Tasneem, The Cost of Lawlessness, The Dawn, May 22, 2004.

<sup>218</sup> Economic Growth or Jihad, The Dawn, February 18, 2000.

- Likely benefits to be accrued from by giving access to Central Asian States and Iran to export natural resources and gas to India and East Asian countries.

The differences on these issues if not resolved at priority, Pakistan may find itself in deep trouble like some African countries. Succeeding paragraphs will throw some light on these key issues to examine the impact on economy and future threats to prosperity.

### **1. Natural Gas Reserves and Ethnic Problems of Balochistan**

The terrorists and saboteurs in Balochistan have declared war to cripple Pakistan's economy and society. The suspension of gas supply from Sui<sup>219</sup> to several areas of Punjab and NWFP has affected millions of households, industrial workers, industry, trade, restaurants, hotels, bakeries, business, transportation and electric power supply. Losses to the industry are running into billions.<sup>220</sup> Disruption of gas supplies in the cold winter has created serious health problems. Twenty-nine rocket attacks have taken place against the gas fields, installations and pipelines in Balochistan, i.e., areas of Dera Bugti, Goth Mazari, Kohlu and Marri, during the last two years. Tribes are still feuding and fighting each other with heavy weapons, prove that the provincial government has totally failed to impose its writ in these rebel-infested areas.<sup>221</sup> The tribesmen used rockets, automatic weapons, hand grenades and mortar in the latest clash with the security personnel. Feroz states that:<sup>222</sup>

The well-planned sabotage by hired and trained terrorists sends tremors of shock and disbelief across Pakistan and around the entire world. There are no security arrangements to stop the terrorists from striking at the pipeline. Emboldened by lack of security arrangements the terrorists and bandits have been regularly blasting the gas wells, installations and pipelines. Targeting gas installations in Balochistan should not merely be seen in local perspective of tribal clashes, it should be seen in a broader regional perspective of geo-strategic politics of laying trans-national gas pipelines.

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<sup>219</sup> Sui is a name of location in Balochistan which has largest gas reserves in Pakistan. The gas transmission and distribution system at Sui is considered to be one of the biggest systems in the world. It is efficiently working for the last 50 years. It meets approximately 44 per cent of Pakistan's current energy needs.

<sup>220</sup> *The Dawn*, May 25, 2004.

<sup>221</sup> *The Dawn*, January 31, 2003.

<sup>222</sup> Discussion with Khan Feroz, Naval Postgraduate School, on May 25, 2004.



The recurring rocket attacks<sup>223</sup> on main gas pipelines supplying gas from Sui in Balochistan to Punjab and the NWFP province betray complete absence of adequate security arrangements for the protection of such vital communications lines that serve the domestic, commercial, industrial and transport requirements of northern Pakistan. The area has become a battleground, and writ of the state and authority of the provincial and federal governments does not exist there. The petroleum and gas ministry, stated in May 2004, that Pakistan's oil and gas sector has the potential to attract investment worth \$1.5 billion over the next 18 months. The government must tackle all these problems on a priority basis if it wishes to attract more local and foreign investment to this otherwise promising sector.<sup>224</sup> It is hard to see how new investors can be persuaded to put their money in a project whose security situation remains as volatile. Recent statement<sup>225</sup> of main tribal chief, Nawab Akbar Bugti, is an indication of deep-rooted ethnic resentment. He stated: “Balochistan belongs to the Baloch people and not to outsiders. We own the natural resources, but these are being exploited for the benefit of others. We will not allow others to steal our wealth. Your sensitive installations will remain insecure, because you have pilfered, what belongs to our people.”

The provincial government is apparently helpless and unable to tackle the rebellious situation and hostile actions against state property and people's lives. For the last 10 years, Dera Bugti tribal area has been projected as “unsuitable” and “dangerous” to run any mega project, thus blocking the way of investment in Balochistan. An armed clash between local tribesmen and security personnel belonging to the Frontier Constabulary and the Rangers in Sui has resulted in enormous loss to lives and property. If the situation persists like this, the future threats to Pakistan’s mega projects can well be visualized.

## **2. Water Shortage and its Impact on Economy**

The country has regularly experienced critical water shortages both the irrigation and drinking water. This has serious repercussion for Pakistan, particularly hampering the

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<sup>223</sup> The 25 feet depth and fifty feet diameter of the crater under the destroyed pipes, and up to five hundred meter spread of the debris proves that a huge amount of explosive material was stored under the pipeline and then exploded by remote control or rocket fire. *The Dawn*, January 31, 2003.

<sup>224</sup> *The Dawn*, May 25, 2004.

<sup>225</sup> *The Dawn*, January 27, 2004.

confidence among provinces. Criticality of water issues warrants in depth analysis to understand the interconnected problems and potential threats emanating from this issue. Keeping in mind the scope of this paper only few major variables are being addressed here which fuels ethnicity and impacts negatively on economy.

Nature's endowment of water blessings upon Pakistan has always been envied by the world at large. At the time of independence, 5000 cu/m of water was available for each Pakistani, which has now reduced to 1000 cu/m because of uncontrolled population growth.<sup>226</sup> The situation would be much more worrisome after 15 years when the availability of water would go down to 600-cu/m water per person per annum.<sup>227</sup> This situation is depicted through following graph.<sup>228</sup>




Figure 2. Population Growth and Water Availability Per Person

The graph reveals that irrigation requirements for the year 2000 and 2013 would be 177 and 255 Bm<sup>3</sup>, respectively. Considering the non-irrigation used, the estimated

<sup>226</sup> Goindi, Sohail Farrukh, *Water Crisis in Pakistan*, [www.sanalist.org/kalabagh/a-18.htm](http://www.sanalist.org/kalabagh/a-18.htm). May 2004.

<sup>227</sup> M. H. Naqvi, S. M Alam, *Water Scenario and Pakistan*, March 19, 2003, p. 7. Available on internet site: [www.pakistaneconomist.com/database1/cover/c2003-25.asp](http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/database1/cover/c2003-25.asp). May 2004.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

overall water requirements would be 184 and 266 Bm<sup>3</sup> for the years 2000 and 2013 respectively. Water availability for these two target years would be 134.2 and 132.5 Bm<sup>3</sup> respectively.

For agriculture, water is a major source of development.<sup>229</sup> Agriculture sector contributes<sup>230</sup>:

- 24% of GDP
- 48% to employment
- 65% to total export earning
- 50% to total industrial value added and
- 70% of Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings come from the sale of agricultural products.

Therefore, what happens to agriculture is bound to have a substantial impact on the growth of overall GDP. Somehow, despite tall government claims, the sector is being neglected so far. For the first time in recent decade, the agriculture sector had registered a decline.<sup>231</sup> During 2000-2001, Pakistan's economic growth slowed down from the previous gross domestic product (GDP) grew at the rate of 2.7 percent against 4.8 percent during 2000. Agriculture contracted by 2.5 percent due to a 40 percent shortfall in for irrigation.<sup>232</sup> GOP states that around Rs 92 billion losses occurred due to the drought situation in year 2000-2001.<sup>233</sup> Given the size of Pakistan economy this is a substantial loss. Asad, director of the international irrigation Management Institute, states that:

to keep up the pace of agriculture growth comparable to population, we must conserve water by ensuring adequate water storage arrangement. Everyone knows we are running out of water, we need to build reservoir

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<sup>229</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>230</sup> Ghani, Ijaz, *Corporate Farming in Pakistan: Problems and Opportunities*, available on [www.ficci.com/ficci/media-room/](http://www.ficci.com/ficci/media-room/). May 2004.

<sup>231</sup> Sohail, Muhammad, *The Musharraf Regime and the Governance Crisis*, Nova Science Publishers, Inc, Huntington, New York, p. 77.

<sup>232</sup> US Department of State, 2001 *Country report on Economic Policy and Trade Practices*, February 2002, p. 2 [www.state.gov/documents/organization/](http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/). May 2004.

<sup>233</sup> *The News International*, April 3, 2001.

which will last us for 30 to 50 years. Only one dam has been built in last 27 years. Just take the example of Tarbela, If we had not built it, we'd be like Ethiopia right now.<sup>234</sup>

Man-made dams may become inoperative in 10-15 years time because of silting and worst is no new dams are being built.<sup>235</sup> At present, the storage capacity of our major reservoir has already declined to 12.6 million-acre feet (MAF), which is hardly 20 percent of our potential storage capacity of 65.4 MAF.<sup>236</sup> Storage capacity and life status of various dams is given at Appendix E. The surplus water is available in about 70-100 days of summer only, and can be stored by constructing additional reservoirs.<sup>237</sup> Future requirements of water are mentioned at Appendix F. Due to the reduction in the storage capacity of Tarbela, Mangla, and Chashma reservoirs, the shortfall by 133.7 MAF is assessed for the year 2013. This figure is certainly alarming. Continuous provision of sufficient water is therefore extremely essential for generation of hydroelectric power that plays a crucial role in Pakistan's economy.

### **3. Controversial Kalabagh Dam and Provincial Disharmony**

Planning for construction of huge multipurpose dam on Indus River at Kalabagh was started in 1953 and government approved this project in 1959.<sup>238</sup> During Zia regime, due to severe water scarcity problem, World Bank committed some US \$ 7.0 billion and kept this amount earmarked for three years. Then suddenly an intrigue based on dirty politics sealed the fate of Kalabagh dam forever. Governor NWFP, in retaliation to this project, started marking high flood level marks on the houses, graveyard, mosques, and other permanent structures, which set a wave of alarm among the public of fear of their drowning.<sup>239</sup> This disturbance was played so much that strong resistance started developing among the inhabitants of NWFP against the dam. This resentment has gone

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<sup>234</sup> *Pakistan: Averting Sindh and Punjab Water War*, available on [www.irinnews.org/report.asp](http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp). May 2004.

<sup>235</sup> Henning, Job, *Pakistan's Future and US Policy Options, Regional Issues-Energy and Water Crisis*, September, 24, 2002. Available on [www.csis.org/saprog/020924PKfutur](http://www.csis.org/saprog/020924PKfutur). May 2004.

<sup>236</sup> M. H. Naqvi, S. M. Alam, *Water Scenario and Pakistan*, March 19, 2003, p. 6. Available on internet site: [www.pakistaneconomist.com/database1/cover/c2003-25.asp](http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/database1/cover/c2003-25.asp). May 2004.

<sup>237</sup> Laiq, Juned, *Water Resources of Pakistan*, The Dawn special edition 1992.

<sup>238</sup> Goindi, Sohail Farrukh, *Water Crisis in Pakistan*, p. 2. Available on [www.sanalist.org/kalabagh/a-18.htm](http://www.sanalist.org/kalabagh/a-18.htm). May 2004.

<sup>239</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

deep into their memory and is a serious issue of confrontation between central government and provincial government. Before the government could settle the issue with NWFP, the Sindh province came out with entirely opposite objection to the Kalabagh dam building, i.e., drought and water scarcity. The controversy has reached to an extent that almost everyone in Pakistan has formed opinion either for or against the Kalabagh dam.<sup>240</sup>

The ongoing water shortage has jolted the very foundations of the national economy on the one hand and has eroded faith in the decision-making capacity of our institutions on the other hand. Pakistan's economy being an agricultural area has sustained an irremediable damage as ramification of the water shortage.<sup>241</sup> This crisis has to be resolved on war footing before it becomes unmanageable.

#### **4. Gwadar Port, Ethnicity and Future Impact on Economy**

Pakistan presently has two commercial ports, Karachi and Bin Qasim, in the Indian Ocean, catering largely the domestic needs. About 2,000 ships, 200 oil tankers visit Karachi coast every year.<sup>242</sup> Pakistan's sea-borne trade in year 2000 was 42 million tones. The future trade forecast is 51 million tones per annum by 2005 and 78 million tons per annum by the year 2015.<sup>243</sup> Karachi and Qasim ports are reaching their zenith in handling of cargo and were perceived to be deficient in meeting future demands. Law and order situation in Karachi has always been precarious and requirement of having an alternative port was realized in the 70s. Decision of building a deep-sea port at Gwadar came after over 25 years of initial proposal to build a port along the Makran Coast.<sup>244</sup>

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<sup>240</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>241</sup> M. H. Naqvi, S. M. Alam, *Water Scenario and Pakistan*, March 19, 2003, p. 6. Available on internet site: [www.pakistaneconomist.com/database1/cover/c2003-25.asp](http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/database1/cover/c2003-25.asp). May 2004.

<sup>242</sup> Asian Development Bank Report: ADB RETA 5974 at <http://www.iczm-sa.org/pakistan/intro.htm>. June 2004.

<sup>243</sup> *Brief on Gwadar Deep Water port project*, Board of Investment – Pakistan April 7, 2004, at <http://www.boi.org.pk>. May 2004.

<sup>244</sup> Prime Minister of Pakistan, Z A Bhutto raised the issue during his visit to United States on September 17-18, 1973. In Department of State memorandum s/s-7323703 6722 dated December 20, 1973 citing that "Congress has established low funding ceilings for classical capital projects – such as airports, seaports and steel mills." Memo is available online through Gerald R. Ford Library (State Department Declassified documents).

Deep-sea port at Gwadar is strategically<sup>245</sup> located at the mouth of Persian Gulf and has potential to act as hub port for natural resources of Central Asia States and for trade of the entire area. Another important fact is the US approval of over 1.4 billion US \$ for the economic recovery of Trans Afghan gas pipeline. This project carrying 30 billion cubic meters of gas per annum from Turkmenistan's gas fields to Gwadar will be the first step towards the perceived economic benefits. With almost 30 billion US \$ already invested by US oil companies in Central Asian region, the suggested Afghan route would cost only one-half the amount of the other alternative, which would run through Georgia to Turkey's Mediterranean coast. This 1500 Km pipeline project can yield significant revenues. It would be interesting to note, that road distance from Kushka in Turkmenistan to Gwadar is only twelve hundred KM whereas, the nearest Black Sea port of Odessa in Ukraine is approximately three thousand and four hundred KM away from Central Asian states. Therefore, Gwadar is the most viable option available with the Central Asian Republics.

The economic prosperity of Pakistan is linked to stability in Afghanistan and law and order situation in Balochistan and NWFP. The dilemma is that despite knowing the economic and strategic importance of construction of Gwadar Port, the central government has not been able to resolve the difference with Balochistan Province. The recent killing of three Chinese engineers at Gwadar port in an explosion indicates the attempt to sabotage the project.<sup>246</sup>

The government's decision<sup>247</sup> of declaring Gwadar as an industrial zone will attract investors, create job opportunities, and open up new vistas of economic and

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<sup>245</sup> Pakistan until recently never realized its potentials due to advantageous geo-strategic location in the Indian Ocean. Where Persian Gulf countries contain around 75 percent of world oil reserves and 35 percent of the world's total gas (Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Exports Fact Sheet 2004', at <http://www.eia.doe.gov>), an estimated 40 percent of the world's offshore oil production comes from the Indian Ocean (CIA - The World Fact book 2003 – Indian ocean at [www.cia.gov](http://www.cia.gov)). About 40 percent of the world's total trade, worth \$ 3 trillion, also transits through the Indian Ocean (Brahma Chellaney ed., Securing India's Future in the new millennium (New Delhi: Orient Longman Ltd., 1999). p. 126) Besides Persian Gulf resources Central Asia is emerging as a major energy source for 21<sup>st</sup> century (Anonymous, Caspian energy: Looking East, London: Energy Economist November 1998, available through ProQuest), however, the key issue so far is pipeline corridors. Geographic location in proximity of Persian Gulf and Central Asian Republics thus bestowed upon Pakistan, one of the vital export corridor in the region.

<sup>246</sup> *The Dawn*, May 11, 2004.

<sup>247</sup> President of Pakistan while addressing during the Ground breaking ceremony on March 22, 2002, available at [www.jang.com](http://www.jang.com). October 2003.

tourism development in the coastal region. The port comes as a much-needed national requirement in the wake of the rise in cargo traffic at existing ports and sectarian issues in Karachi.

The economic loss of foreign trade (imports and exports of over Rs1,158 billion annually, which almost exclusively passes through Karachi) in case of violence, strikes, terrorism, etc., is estimated at 10pc of daily exports value and 5pc for imports.<sup>248</sup>

However, the Gwadar port, which was likely to give some relief to the country, has added to the worries of Pakistan. Gwadar port has taken a shape of a serious ethnic issue between Balochistan province and Central government. A complete shutter-down strike was observed in Gwadar port and other areas of Balochistan in May 2004.<sup>249</sup> Dr Ishaq, Central Information Secretary of Balochistan National Movement states, “Land in and around Gwadar has already been allotted to outsiders, and added that the strike had proved that the people of Balochistan would not allow Islamabad and other elements to usurp their rights.”<sup>250</sup> The Balochistan based political parties<sup>251</sup> have rejected the Gwadar Master Plan and described it as anti-people plan, saying that with the implementation of this plan, the people of Gwadar would become minority. It appears that Pakistan’s future economic prosperity through Gwadar will result into chaos due to ethnic problems.

## **5. Gas Pipeline between Iran and India through Pakistan.**

The transfer of gas from Iran to India via Pakistan is considered the most economical project, which will accrue \$8 billion<sup>252</sup> to Pakistan as the transit fee for laying a 2672-km trans-Pakistan pipeline to India. This would entail an estimated income of \$14 billion to Pakistan in 30 years including \$8 billion transit fee, \$1 billion taxes and \$5 billion as savings.<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>248</sup> Khan, Aamir Shafaat, *Karachi Suffers Rs1bn Loss in a Day*: Law and order, The Dawn, June 3, 2004.

<sup>249</sup> *Allotment of land in Gwader denounced: Balochistan strike*, The Dawn, May 24, 2004.

<sup>250</sup> Ibid., See The Dawn, May 24, 2004.

<sup>251</sup> The Jamhoori Watan Party, Balochistan, National Movement and Balochistan National Party-Mengal had given a joint call for the strike against what they termed not taking the district government, political parties and people of the area into confidence regarding the master plan.

<sup>252</sup> Iran has offered \$8 billion to Pakistan as transit fee. The Dawn, May 09, 2004.

<sup>253</sup> Wasif, Syed Ali, *Making the Gas Pipeline Safer*, The Dawn, May 09, 2004.

This multi-billion dollar gas export project is economically viable for all the three states. Despite repeated Iranian assurance, India has expressed reservations over the passage of the proposed pipeline through Pakistan. Main concerns are law and order problems in Pakistan and assurance of Pakistan's government for safety of the project. India has asked for international assurances as well. In view of serious ethnic problems in Balochistan and NWFP, can Pakistan guarantee the envisaged security being asked? Apparently, it appears to be an uphill task.

## **F. FACTORS AFFECTING ECONOMY AND INTERNAL SECURITY**

Of the faultiness explained in the previous sections, it is concluded that there are fundamental variables that are, directly and indirectly, affecting economic prosperity and internal security. In view of the scope of this paper, I will analyze only two core variables, i.e., environmental degradation and its social impact and human resource development.

### **1. Environmental Scarcity and Social Conflicts**

Environment and security are becoming interlocked issues. The potential that environmental decline has to create social unrest and other impacts on national and regional security is being explored in number of areas around the world. Preliminary indications are that Pakistan is highly vulnerable at this time if environmental conditions continue to decline.<sup>254</sup> Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in its annual report stated that country was estimated to suffer from a loss of U.S. \$1.8 billion annually due to environmental degradation.

Natural resources and biodiversity are important consideration in poverty reduction, community development and ultimately, in more participatory approaches to management of land and water resources. Current curves are moving in the wrong directions. Many resources are declining while population and demand for rural livelihood are on the increase. This huge challenge is central to the future health of rural ecosystems as well as economic opportunities in Pakistan.<sup>255</sup>

Vertical pumping systems used for drainage are also proving unsustainable. In Punjab alone there are approximately 280,000 tube wells pumping 51 billion cubic

<sup>254</sup> Arthur, Hanson J., *Pakistan's National Conservation Strategy: Renewing Commitment to Action*, Report of the Mid-Term Review, p 6-7. Available on internet [www.nssd.net/pdf/mtrch1.pdf](http://www.nssd.net/pdf/mtrch1.pdf). June 2004.

<sup>255</sup> Ibid., p. 8.



meters of water. Salts have been pumped up in the process decreasing crop productivity in about 5 percent of agricultural land. Beyond the Indus Basin, sharp drops in the water tables are occurring from 15 to over 60 centimeters per year. In Quetta Valley it is falling at 200 cm per annum, while in Southern Basin it is 60 cm. In Central Lahore it is falling at a rate of 30 cm per year.<sup>256</sup> McNab term this tendency as a myopic approach, which can have devastating effects in many areas.<sup>257</sup> Using thousands of tube wells salty water has been pumped up which has resultantly decreased the crop productivity in about 5 percent of the total agricultural land in Pakistan. Beyond the Indus Basin, a sharp drop in the water tables of underground aquifers is occurring at alarming rates.

From macro-economic perspective, when human development and natural resources depletion are taken into account, the genuine domestic saving of the country is in reality much smaller than what is indicated by the traditional gross or net saving rates of the National Accounts.<sup>258</sup>

McNab states that environmental scarcity causes social effects, which in turn become the main source of violent conflicts, i.e., ethnic conflict and insurgency etc. Scarcity and social factor in combination produce violent conflict. Conflict further impacts negatively to scarcity.<sup>259</sup>




Figure 3. McNab Model on Violent Conflict, Social Effects and Scarcity

<sup>256</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>257</sup> McNab, Robert, *Naval Postgraduate School*, Economics of Development in Security building Lecture notes on Scarcity and its Impact on Security, April 19, 2004.

<sup>258</sup> Arthur, Hanson .J. *Pakistan's National Conservation Strategy: Renewing Commitment to Action*, Report of the Mid-Term Review, p. 5. Available on internet [www.nssd.net/pdf/mtrch1.pdf](http://www.nssd.net/pdf/mtrch1.pdf). June 2004.

<sup>259</sup> McNab, Robert, *Naval Postgraduate School*, Economics of Development in Security building Lecture notes on Scarcity and its Impact on Security, April 19, 2004.

McNab further stresses that the weakening of institutions takes place due to environmental scarcity and in turn it directly increases the chances of conflicts such as group identity conflict, i.e., ethnic conflicts/class wars.

Dixon states that environmental scarcity can generate severe social stresses within countries because societies are highly dependent on these resources in developing countries.<sup>260</sup> Dixon further states that Karachi grows by about 400,000 people per year. Many of these new residents are migrants from rural areas, and large proportions are escaping environmental scarcity in the countryside.<sup>261</sup> As Karachi population rises at around 5 percent per annum, the development authorities cannot provide residents with basic services. Acute shortage of water and electricity are pervasive.<sup>262</sup> Dixon conclusion on Karachi situation is that violence stems from a variety of factors that interact to magnify the problems. The inability of state institutions to address diverse demands accentuates latent ethnic and class tensions, which further erodes the social fabric and economy.<sup>263</sup> Dixon model<sup>264</sup> on casual link between environmental scarcity and violence is fully applicable to Pakistan's current internal security situations.

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<sup>260</sup> Dixon, Homer, *Environmental Scarcity and Violence*, Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 13.

<sup>261</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 164.

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 165.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 166.

<sup>264</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 135.




Figure 4. Dixon Model on Casual Link Between Environmental Scarcity and Violence

## 2. Lack of Human Resource Development

The most serious neglect in the past 57 years has been the lack of human resource development (HRD). Much of the insecurity is caused by extreme socio-economic injustice between rich and poor, among different regions and classes, which often leads to violence. Pakistan has one of the lowest social indicators on literacy, health, primary schooling etc in the world. It has now become abundantly clear that accelerated growth per-se is necessary but not sufficient condition for bringing about sustainable poverty reduction. There are other complementary factors, which have to accompany higher growth. The most important of these is investment in human development: education, training, literacy, health, drinking water, nutrition, and population planning. Countries, which have neglected human development, may achieve some spurt in growth and poverty reduction for a short period of time but these gains will not last long. Growth together with investment in human development offers a much better chance for alleviating poverty.<sup>265</sup>

<sup>265</sup> Ishrat Husain, *Concluding remarks at the World Bank Seminar on Pakistan Poverty Assessment*, p. 1, January 7, 2003.

HRD has a direct relationship with the economy in terms of raising the standard of living of the general populace through opportunities for higher earnings. Investment in human resources lead to a skilled labor force, better health and less man-days lost due to illness, lowering of fertility rates which curbs the burgeoning population and reduces pressure on resources, all of which contribute to greater economic growth. Pakistan has sadly neglected all these areas. The “economic miracle” of the East Asian economies today is as much due to correct policies as to large investments in their human resources. In the 21st century, with technological advancement being commonly shared, the countries, which are expected to grow, are the ones, which have the cutting edges in terms of the wealth of their human resources.<sup>266</sup> Statement published in ‘economic survey of Pakistan’ is alarming and warrants serious attention:

“Pakistan, with a literacy rate of 40% the pool of about 100 million illiterates, coupled with the inadequate capacity of the economy to produce adequate number of jobs, is a potential time bomb.”<sup>267</sup>

The priority given to human resource development is obvious from resource allocations. Currently, we are spending 2.5% of GDP on public education, i.e., approximately \$1.5 Billion.<sup>268</sup> This is the lowest amount committed for education in the developed world. Pakistan government has announced budget of financial year 2004-2005 and allocated Rs13 billion for education as compared to previous year allocation of Rs 6 billion.<sup>269</sup> This is a right step in the direction to invest in human development, however, not sufficient to address the growing internal security problems emanating from socio-economic diversity. Investment of Rs 194 billion<sup>270</sup> on defense for financial year 2005 as compared to Rs 13 billion on education and Rs 4 billion for water, gas and other social projects appears to be irrational given the priority laid on HRD.

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<sup>266</sup> P. W. Singer, and John M. Olin, *Pakistan's Madrassahs: Ensuring a system of Education not Jihad*, Analysis paper #14, p. 40, November 14, 2001.

<sup>267</sup> Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2000-2001.

<sup>268</sup> Budget of Pakistan, 2001-2002.

<sup>269</sup> Aziz, Shaukat, *Budget Speech 2004-2005*, available on [www.dawn.com/events/bud2004-2005/index.htm](http://www.dawn.com/events/bud2004-2005/index.htm). June 2004.

<sup>270</sup> Ibid.

The educational divide through government English and Urdu medium schools and colleges, the mediocre and high grade private educational institutions for the privileged class and the madrassahs in Pakistan is fostering a clash between those who have studied at very expensive private schools and those who have studied in the free board and lodging Madrassahs. The mere budget allocation of 2.06 % of GDP is insufficient to meet the future challenges. Ishrat states that lower the proportion of educated and literate people, the lower the probability that the ruling alliance could be displaced.<sup>271</sup> Among the more traditional tribal societies in Pakistan, i.e., tribal areas of NWFP, Balochistan, rural Sindh and Rural southern Punjab, the overall literacy rate and female literacy rate, in particular, are among the lowest in the world. The feudal lords who dominate these societies feel threatened by the spread of education and communication, as within their areas they fear that this will erode their monopoly over power.

The children can either go towards jihadi madrassas or would become part of child labor industry due to different system of education for rich and poor. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan estimates that there are some 11 million children ranging in age from 7 to 12 years working in this child labor industry.<sup>272</sup> These figures are likely to rise if we fail to accord correct priority to this important issue.

Pakistan witnessed significant poverty reduction from almost 40 percent to 18 percent in a period when GDP growth rate was averaging 6 percent. But in the 1990s when the growth rate slowed down to 3 to 4 percent there has been a resurgence of poverty to 34-35 percent.<sup>273</sup> Today 50 million Pakistani live below the poverty line, i.e., they earn less than a dollar per day. Reportedly, another 30 million people earn between one and two dollars a day. Widespread poverty is primarily due to unemployment, burgeoning population and iniquitous income distribution. Iniquitous income distribution has resulted in a highly polarized society. The poor blame the rich and the government

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<sup>271</sup> Hussain, Ishrat, *Pakistan The Economy of Elitist State*, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 359.

<sup>272</sup> Khan, Tariq Amin, *Economy, Society and the State in Pakistan, Contemporary South Asia*, Abingdon, Jul 2000, Vol. 9, Iss. 2, Available on internet site: [http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?ctx\\_ver=z39.88](http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88), May 2004.

<sup>273</sup> Ishrat Husain, *Concluding remarks at the World Bank Seminar on Pakistan Poverty Assessment*, p. 1, January 7, 2003.

for their problems, and are fast losing faith in the system, and join the files of jihadi organizations to take revenge from system, which contributed, to their miseries. With statistics like these, who can then blame our society, if it reports a sharp rise in the number of crimes committed each year? The poverty reduction strategy warrants strong political commitment, real devolution of powers to grass roots level, a vibrant private public- community partnerships for delivery of services, change in the bureaucratic values and norms and a focus on gender disparities. If these issues are resolved sooner than later, we can embark on a path of sustainable poverty reduction.<sup>274</sup>

Women in Pakistan are worse off among the poor compared to men. In a country where only 17 percent of female population participates in labor force, where female enrolment ratios are dismally low and where health indicators, as given in Appendix G, are worse for the female population poverty and vulnerability will remain a serious issue. Economic literature has amply documented that there is no other investment, which fetches higher rate of return than investment in female education. This return does not take into account all the externalities associated with female education in form of better health, nutrition outcomes, lower fertility rate and better citizenship. Bangladesh exemplifies the enormous benefits of female education and labor force participation. The results are simply astounding. Until we pay attention to uplift the status of 50 percent of our population, I am not convinced that we will be able to make a significant break through in moderating our society, in eliminating poverty, and in educating our population.

## **G. CONCLUSION**

In Pakistan, the provinces have been fighting over the distribution of financial resources, over the share of water, and over the claim of natural resources. This itself has led to sectarian and ethnic polarization with attendant negative impact on Pakistan's economy. Pakistan has embarked on major projects of national importance. However, province agendas and bitter differences have forced these mega projects into non-start and put country's future prosperity into question. Strikes in view of sectarian killing have hurt Pakistan immensely in terms of economic losses. How can we invest more in

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<sup>274</sup> Husain, Ishrat, *Concluding remarks at the World Bank Seminar on Pakistan Poverty Assessment*, p. 9, January 7, 2003.

education or improve the capacity of state institutions if economically these plans are unsustainable? This chapter concludes that economic development and internal security are interdependent on each other and should be addressed simultaneously for future stability of Pakistan.

Law and order situation, ethnic and sectarian strives have negative effects on the economy of Pakistan. Increasing threat of terrorism by religious militants is enough to drive foreign investors away. Without safe environments economic revival is not possible. Similarly, by addressing environmental scarcity and HRD will reduce social conflicts and result in peace.

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## **V. REASONS FOR FAILURE OF STATE INSTITUTIONS**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter researches into the flaws and weaknesses of the law enforcing agencies in Pakistan whose inability to enforce rule of law in the country has compounded the problems discussed in previous chapters. With ethnic conflicts, sectarian violence and crime rate on the rise, the failing law enforcing institutions, i.e., police and judiciary, have aggravated domestic problems. Sectarian killings, ethnic tensions between groups and provinces are on rise. This series of events points to the reality that state institutions of Pakistan have failed to play its vital role in dissolving these threats, and establishing the writ of the government. The police are the main law-enforcing agency in the country, which is supported by paramilitary troops to maintain the order. However, present law and order situation of the country is reflection of its performance and effectiveness. The sectarian and jihad militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are equipped with modern weapons and too highly trained for the ill-equipped police force to be able to counter them. The inefficiency and breakdown of civil institutions have dragged in the military in running these institutions. This direct intervention has a downward spiral effect on already sensitive civil-military relations in Pakistan. The answer to all the problem lies in strengthening state institutions that are capable of establishing writ of government.

Despite all the efforts by the successive governments for bringing peace and stability to this country, what are the factors that are contributing to lawlessness? Why the state institutions have failed to handle the internal security threats? How the inefficiency of law enforcing agencies and judiciary has contributed in aggravating the law and order situation?

These are all relevant and important questions, which warrant detailed analysis. However, given the scope of this thesis, only most pertinent flaws in the basic institution of state will be discussed that are responsible for deteriorating internal security situations. Internal security situation cannot be improved without enhancing the capacities of state institutions, i.e., police, paramilitary forces, judiciary, etc.

## B. POLICE

The police are the main law-enforcing agency in the country, which is supported by paramilitary troops to maintain the order. However, present law and order situation of the country is reflection of its performance and effectiveness. 882 murders, 925 cases of kidnapping/abduction, 8 explosions, 143 car-hijackings in a single month, May 2004, provides an indication of the pathetic state of law and order system.<sup>275</sup> The comparison of the crime rate between 2003 and 2004 is on Table 3.1. Despite a rise in budget for law and order, crime rate and violence, the graph on Table 3.1 is ascending every year. There are many incidents where police force fails and army is called out to take over internal security duties. For example, in a recent eruption of violence in Sialkot, the administration was forced to call the army for restoring peace in the area.<sup>276</sup> This reflects the poor crisis management and capacity of police force in law and order maintenance. Therefore, there is a need to analyze the weaknesses of police force before recommending remedies for it.

### 1. Institutional and Functional Weaknesses

- **Politicization of Police.** The more ambitious politicians had used their power and authority to induct thousands of their supporters and henchmen into the police force.<sup>277</sup> The number of police officials of the ranks ranging from constables to deputy superintendent thus recruited in Punjab alone over past fifteen years is estimated to be over 20,000.<sup>278</sup> This resulted in induction of a large number of corrupt people, some with criminal records, in police force. This is one of the reason of inefficiency and loss of credibility of police force in the eye of public.
- **Police and Civil Relations.** Misuse of power by officials, making police a tool of successive governments, violation of human rights, and implicating innocent into cases of heinous crimes are some of the factors which had eroded public confidence in police and led to the failure of the system. During 2003, 66 cases were registered against public for resisting against

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<sup>275</sup> Mohammad Asghar, *Crime rate shoots up with Punjab a Top List*, Dawn: Pakistan, July 18, 2004. Available at: <http://www.dawn.com/2004/07/18/nat13.htm>. October 2004.

<sup>276</sup> Abid Mehdi, *25 killed in Sialkot mosque blast: Army called out after violence*, Dawn-Pakistan, October 2, 2004.

<sup>277</sup> During the political governments, police high-ups face extraordinary pressures from different political quarters to post their candidates as SHO in various police stations. See: S. Raza Hassan, Dawn, Pakistan, December 1, 2003.

<sup>278</sup> Dr. Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, *Problems of Law and Order*, The Dawn-Pakistan, September 17, 2001.

police.<sup>279</sup> According to a documented study in 1991, there were 12198 children/minors waiting to be tried in the jails in Punjab alone. Of these, 2095 were finally tried and sentenced, 129 of them aged below 14.<sup>280</sup>

- **Torture against Prisoners:** Pakistan's Police and other law enforcing agencies are known to use torture against prisoners. During 2002, the Society for Human Rights and Prisoners Aid (SHARP) reported 38 deaths due to police torture, and Amnesty International estimates that at least 100 persons die from police torture each year.<sup>281</sup> Many officers of the police force, when interviewed held lack of training, man power, funds, time, and proper equipment responsible for use of torture as tool to extract confessions and making recoveries.<sup>282</sup>
- **Extra-judicial Killings:** Police have been involved in extra-judicial killings to circumvent or overcome insufficient evidence, to intimidate witnesses, judicial corruption and at times under political pressure. The charge that the police are involved in extra-judicial killings of suspected criminals is backed up by reports on human rights in Pakistan by both Amnesty International and US State Department. During the period of 1997-1999 the number of suspected criminals killed by police was more than 850 in Punjab province alone. Most of them were killed in the disguise of so-called police encounters.<sup>283</sup> According to the Interior Minister 548 persons were killed in police encounters in 2002, with 114 encounter deaths reported in first six months of the year.<sup>284</sup>
- **Police Involvement in Terrorizing Religious Minorities:** State has generally failed to provide protection to the religious minorities in the country. Low-level officials often use the Blasphemy Law to threaten or prosecute minority religious communities.<sup>285</sup> In February, police was reported involved in an attack by several hundred Muslims on a Christian community in Shantinagar (in Punjab province).<sup>286</sup>
- **Corruption:** Corruption is widespread in police force. Police and prison officials often use threat of abuse to extort money from prisoners and their families. Police has been reported to accept money for registering false

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<sup>279</sup> <http://www.dawn.com/2004/01/02/local43.htm>. October 2004.

<sup>280</sup> Iftikhar Haider Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan*, St Martin Press, Inc., 1997, p. 111.

<sup>281</sup> Pakistan, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2002 (Washington D.C.: US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 31 March 2003), 5. Also see Pakistan by Hussain Haqqani, p. 4.

<sup>282</sup> Asif Shahzad, *No Alternative to Police Torture*, The Dawn, October 8, 2001.

<sup>283</sup> BBC, *World: South Asia-Pakistan's Police Execute Hundreds*, BBC News July 27, 1999. Available at: [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south\\_asia/404273.htm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/404273.htm). January 30, 2004.

<sup>284</sup> Country Report on Human Right Practices (2003), February 25, 2004, p. 3.

<sup>285</sup> Also see Pakistan by Hussain Haqqani, p. 5.

<sup>286</sup> Amnesty International 1998 Annual Report on Pakistan, p. 2, available at <http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/airreport/ar98/asa33.htm>. October 2004.

charges or torturing innocent. Police corruption is most serious at the level of the Station House Officer (SHO), the official who runs each precinct. Some SHOs are widely believed to operate arrest-for-ransom operations and to have established unsanctioned police stations to collect illicit revenue.<sup>287</sup>

- **Funds:** Over the years provincial budget for law and order has continued to rise but with no tangible results to show for it. For example, in 2004 fiscal year, Rs 10 billion has been earmarked for law and order only in Sindh province, which is 12.5 percent increase over the previous year.<sup>288</sup> Out of this 81 percent is spent on distribution of salaries and 12 percent goes towards meeting utility expenses. The remaining seven- percent of the total budget is allocated for the purchase of new vehicles, weapons and other necessary apparatus. There is no allocation for police stations in the budget.<sup>289</sup>
- **Pay scales:** The police are highly underpaid and devoid of facilities like health and housing. The highest pay that is of Inspector General of Police is equivalent of \$400 to \$450 a month, whereas, a Police Chief of a district earns about \$300 a month. The pay of a middle level officer, \$120, is not enough to pay the utility bills. This low pay scale is one reason for the culture of corruption in police force. What are the other options for a constable, whose monthly wages is \$25-\$30, to win bread for his family?
- **Ill-equipped police:** Besides being ill-equipped in terms of weapons, Pakistani police has no automated system for checking finger prints, little DNA testing and an antiquated radio system that anyone with a scanner can hear. There are still some police stations without vehicles for patrolling duties.<sup>290</sup>

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<sup>287</sup> Pakistan, Country Report on Human Rights Practices-2003, Released on February 25, 2004.

<sup>288</sup> "Vehicle theft on the rise," The Dawn, Pakistan, August 02, 2004.

<sup>289</sup> "Karachi: New Police System Lacks Key Elements for Success," Arman Sabir, Dawn, Pakistan, October 08, 2001. Available at: <http://www.dawn.com>.

<sup>290</sup> The New York Times, *Pakistan's Police Force Struggles to Find the Resources It Needs to Combat Terrorism*, September 30, 2002.

Table 3.1 Comparison Between Crime Rate in May 2003 and May 2004

S/No	Type	May 2003	May 2004
1	Murders	835	882
2.	Death by Sectarian Violence	--	39
3.	Kidnapping for Ransom	11	23
4.	Kidnapping/abduction	660	925
5.	Gang rape	24	24
6.	Rape	188	212
7.	Rioting	208	277
8.	Robbery	937	1154
9.	Car Snatching	120	143
10.	Explosions	5	8

**Source:** Muhammad Asghar, The Dawn, Pakistan, 18 July 2004

## 2. Police Ordinance 2002 and Devolution Plan

Under Musharraf some steps have been taken to reform the police system, similarly to Japanese police system that was overhauled under General Macarthur and a new Police act (Police Order 2002) has been enforced instead of the 1861 Act.<sup>291</sup> Previously, the DC exercised operational oversight over the police. In a significant new police reform initiated under the devolution plan (and later enforced through Police Order 2002), the district police officer has been responsible for law and order function to the *nazim*. The Police order of 2002 envisages the setting up of Public Safety Commissions at the district, provincial and national levels to create a system of external checks on the police. This is based on the Japanese model of public accountability of police. In the majority of the districts, these commissions are yet to be formed. In the absence of effective external oversight, the police are answerable only to their institutional chain of command and in many districts are virtually running a parallel administration.<sup>292</sup>

<sup>291</sup> Hussan Abbas, a member of Pakistan Police Service, spoke on the topic: *Law Enforcement and Internal Security in Pakistan in Meeting VII, Pakistan's future and US Policy Options*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., December 9, 2002.

<sup>292</sup> Bushra Asif, *Local Government Reforms in Pakistan*, South Asia Program, CSIS, December 1, 2003, p .30.

Until 2004, many of the provisions of the Police Order of 2002, such as separation of the investigation branch from the rest of the policing functions and setting up of the public safety commissions, have remained unimplemented.<sup>293</sup>

### **3. Police vs. Terrorists**

In 1997, the Punjab Police chief told the Federal Cabinet that there were 160 hardened terrorists trained for target killings operating in the Punjab, whose lists and profiles are with relevant intelligence organizations. In Karachi police had records of 137 “freelance terrorists”, generally hired criminals who normally do “contract killings” for the right amount at the behest of anonymous clients.<sup>294</sup>

The sectarian and jihad militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are equipped with modern weapons and too highly trained for the ill-equipped police force to be able to counter them. The militants have had training by the US, Pakistani forces; flooded by excessive foreign funds; and have experience of fighting against highly trained armies of the world. In comparison not only the budget of police force is low; the instructors in police academies are those that have either failed in a field posting or have no contacts to get themselves one- generally, a frustrated lot.<sup>295</sup>

Hence enabling the police force, despite its numerical dominance, to control terrorist acts. For an idea of strength of police force see Table 3.2. Besides, most militants are armed with Kalshnikov assault rifles that fire six rounds a second. Most of the police are armed with World War II-era rifles that fire one round a second.<sup>296</sup>

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<sup>293</sup> Dawn-Editorial, *Rising crime wave*, Dawn, Pakistan, August 4, 2004.

<sup>294</sup> Mushahid Hussain, *Is There Any Way to Contain Pakistan's Sectarian Monster*, Opinion, July 2003. See: [www.aljazeera.com/opinion/2003/07/2003072003%20Opinion%20Editorials/July](http://www.aljazeera.com/opinion/2003/07/2003072003%20Opinion%20Editorials/July). October 2004.

<sup>295</sup> Hussan Abbas, a member of Pakistan Police Service, spoke on the topic: *Law Enforcement and Internal Security in Pakistan* in Meeting VII, *Pakistan's future and US Policy Options*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., December 9, 2002.

<sup>296</sup> The New York Times, *Pakistan's Police Force Struggles to Find the Resources It Needs to Combat Terrorism*, September 30, 2002.

Table 3.2 Strength of Police Force in the Provinces, Islamabad/Railways/AJK and Northern Areas

	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	Islamabad	Railways	AJK	Northern Areas
Police Force	97911	93555	31481	15954	7036	7715	6274	2857

**Source:** Justice Irshad Hassan Khan, *The Judicial System of Pakistan: Measures for Independence and Enforcing Accountability*, p.36.

In 1996, the commissioner of Sargodha, a Shia, was assassinated. In early 1997, a secretary to the Punjab provincial government, a Sunni, was killed. The Lashkar's agents killed Ashraf Marath, a senior police officer, even though he was a fellow Sunni, because he insisted upon pursuing the killers of 7 people at the Iranian cultural center in Multan.<sup>297</sup> Sindh police have reportedly sent written directives to many mosques and imambargahs in the province asking them to have their own private guards or armed volunteers posted on the premises to provide security.<sup>298</sup> Newspapers have published reports of police officers sending apologies to the militant sectarian captains for having dared to investigate them, with promises to leave them alone in the future.<sup>299</sup>

### C. PARAMILITARY FORCE

A recent report on the internal use of force in Asia between 1975 and 1996 found that the ratio of government forces to the population rose considerably.<sup>300</sup> Paramilitary

<sup>297</sup> Hafeez Malik, *Pakistan: Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities*, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 257.

<sup>298</sup> *Terrorism in Full swing*, Dawn-Editorial, Pakistan, October 12, 2004.

<sup>299</sup> Hafeez Malik, *Pakistan: Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities*, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.257.

<sup>300</sup> It rose 29 percent in Thailand, 42 percent in Burma, 63 percent in China, 64 percent in Pakistan, 71 percent in India, and 81 percent in Sri Lanka. See: Kit Collier, *The Armed Forces and Internal Security in South Asia: Preventing the Abuse of Power*, East-West Center Occasional Papers, Politics and Security series No. 2, Hawaii: East-West Center, December 1999, p. 8-9. Also see: Sunil Dasgupta, *Paramilitary Forces and Security Reorganization*, GSC Quarterly 12 (Spring 2004), Program on Global Security and Cooperation, Social Science Research Council, <http://www.ssrc.org>. 15 October 2004.

today make up between one-third and one half of the military manpower in major countries such as Russia, China, and India. China has the largest paramilitary with the strength of 1,100,000.<sup>301</sup>

In Pakistan, paramilitary forces are organized on the provincial level but are subordinated to the Ministry of Interior and are commanded by seconded army Generals.<sup>302</sup> The command echelon comes from the army whereas constabularies are locally recruited. Thus, the paramilitary is under the influence of the military along with Ministry of Interior and Chief Minister of the province. This command structure, with different set of priorities, results into complication of implementation and execution of orders.

Paramilitary forces in Pakistan includes: National Guard, Frontier Corps, Pakistan Rangers, Mehran Force, Coast Guard, and Maritime Security Agency, are little more than military strength - 300,000 compared to 520,000.<sup>303</sup> Paramilitary forces have played a critical role in maintaining law and order in major urban cities especially in Karachi. Although these forces have been more effective than the police, and despite the numerical strength, their efficiency was less than expected. Due to organization and structural weaknesses, at times paramilitary forces failed to control the situation. Losing faith in effectiveness of paramilitary means bringing the army into the scene, which is neither desirable nor generally liked by masses at national level.

In contrast to the military, the paramilitary is poorly trained, lightly equipped, highly fragmented, frequently reorganized, politically recruited, and operated. While the military protects some objective national interests of the state, the paramilitary serves the partisan interests of the regime. As internal security forces, their aim is to secure the regime, including in disputes over territorial integrity and national identity.<sup>304</sup>

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<sup>301</sup> Sunil Dasgupta, *Paramilitary Forces and Security Reorganization*, GSC Quarterly 12 (Spring 2004) Program on Global Security and Cooperation, Social Science Research Council, <http://www.ssrc.org>. 15 October 2004

<sup>302</sup> Country Study and Guide, *Pakistan-Army and Paramilitary Forces*. Available: <http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/pakistan/pakistan/pakistan150.html>. October 2004.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid.

<sup>304</sup> Sunil Dasgupta, *Paramilitary Forces and Security Reorganization*, GSC Quarterly 12 (Spring 2004).



The continued involvement of paramilitary in civil set-up has brought some kind of police mentality, most critical of which is brutality and corruption. This growing police, like the culture, are under serious criticism from public.

#### **D. MILITARY**

Military intervention in political affairs is not a new phenomenon in Third World countries.<sup>305</sup> At various stages during the 58 years of Pakistan's history, Pakistani military has been involved in national politics. The military leadership has taken over Pakistan on three occasions: October 1958 (followed by a "coup within coup" in July 1958), July 1977, and finally October 1999. On each occasion the army chief moved against the civilian government at a time when policy-making was drifting, political institutions were faltering, and army chief feared or was responding to decisions it believed harmed the country's interests.<sup>306</sup>

The inefficiency and breakdown of civil institutions have dragged down the military in running these institutions. For example, in November 1998, under the democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif, the entire management of the large Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) was suspended, and the military was inducted to run the utility.<sup>307</sup> But, due to the ethnic nature of Pakistan, handing the civil authorities to the militaries has important political consequences. Another serious effect of handing these lucrative appointments to military leads to resentment, which ultimately boils down to internal instability and erosion of institutional development.

The Pakistan army has been organized, equipped and trained for a conventional war. But it has been frequently called in to gain control of internal problems that has gone beyond the ability of police to cope. In the past, the military was extensively used on internal security duties in Balochistan (1973-77), during the Movement of Restoration of

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Program on Global Security and Cooperation, Social Science Research Council, <http://www.ssrc.org>. October 2004.

<sup>305</sup> Hafeez Malik, *Pakistan: Founders' Aspiration and Today's Realities*, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 101.

<sup>306</sup> Ambassador Teresita C. Schaffer and Mandavi Mehta, *Political Institutions and the Army*, A Report from the CSIS Project: Pakistan's Future and U.S. Policy Options, April 17, 2002, p. 7.

<sup>307</sup> Ameen Jan, *Pakistan on a Precipice*, Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 5, September–October 1999, p-707.

Democracy (1981-84), and during the MQM agitation in Sindh.<sup>308</sup> Besides restoring peace in the region these operations were the politico-military struggles to achieve political, social and psychological objectives. Today the army is again in action in Waziristan. While engaged in such operations (low intensity conflicts) the military faces following problems:

- The Pakistan Army is to generate maximum combat power and destruction of the opponent, whereas, the victory in such an operation is based on maximum intelligence and minimum violence. Lack of intelligence in a contested zone is probably emerging as a problem.
- In all such conflicts involving guerrillas, insurgents or terrorists, the enemy is invisible and tries his best to blend with the local population. There is no dedicated setup that can maintain area mosaic differentiating between a peaceful citizen and a terrorist.
- Psychological war is carried out to win the support of population and to demoralize the troops. Propaganda may be launched to depict the actions of military as inhuman and ruthless. Few encounters can be covered which can be exposed to constant adverse publicity. Indian television and radio are active and effective in this field. Sometimes, this press also helps the enemy propaganda innocently or willfully.
- Currently, troop's employment on security operations, needs to wrestle with lot of legal bottlenecks. Security forces need to be fully aware of legal aspects and its implications on their actions, the lapse of which will be magnified and exploited by hostile elements. No formal or informal training is imparted to troops on this account
- Weapon systems designed for high intensity war is by no means suitable under LIC environment. Present weaponry in the army is not ideally suited for LIC operations. Following short-falls need to be addressed.
- Lack of close quarter battle weapons
- Lack of non-lethal ammunition
- Inadequate wireless communication for built up area and areas such as closer to Afghanistan, i.e., Waziristan
- Absence of riot control equipment
- Lack of protective clothing like bulletproof jackets
- Lack of light and handy equipment more suitable for operations in built-up areas: ladders, grapnels, and ropes etc.
- Lack of wheeled APCs and lighter vehicles like Hilux etc.

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<sup>308</sup> Hafeez Malik, *Pakistan: Founders' Aspiration and Today's Realities*, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 119.

- Lack of knowledge of the area

In East Pakistan, the ethno-lingual factor combined with political follies committed by West Pakistan civil-military bureaucracy produced devastating results. Although the army had initial successes, however, the lack of intelligence, training of officers and men in counter insurgency operations, inadequate logistic infrastructure, insufficient knowledge of the area, and failure to execute relief/rest procedures, lead to a humiliating end. Due to populace support, Mukti Bahni tried a variety of techniques, which our troops failed to read. The dual attacks overtaxed the army's resources and mental energies. Despite of these apparent failures, the fact remains that we had been trying to solve a political problem with military instrument, which failed to keep the federation intact. Aspects of security buildings (in post conflict or during) requires introduction on an urgent basis.

#### **E. JUDICIARY**

As per the constitution, the judiciary is responsible for: enforcing the constitution, ensure the sustenance of system of "separation of powers" (based on checks and balances) and to safeguard the fundamental rights and freedom of individuals.<sup>309</sup> There are some problems in the system which needs to be addressed in order to have a strong, effective, and fair judicial system in Pakistan. These include:

- Politicized appointment of the mutilation of country's judicial system has caused serious erosion of civil liberties, giving police and other agencies a freer hand to violate basic rights with impunity. The tempering with national judicial institutions by manipulation of rules, appointments,<sup>310</sup> retirement and forcible transfer of judges has further resulted in taming of judiciary.<sup>311</sup>
- The independence of judiciary is a basic principle of constitution of Pakistan.<sup>312</sup> However, Pakistan's judiciary is far from independent. The lower judiciary starting from a Magistrate of the third class and to the court of the District and Sessions Judge is administratively under the

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<sup>309</sup> Justice Irshad Hassan Khan, *The Judicial System of Pakistan: Measures for Maintaining Independence and Enforcing Accountability*, p. 12.

<sup>310</sup> For example, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto during her second tenure appointed a number of judges, who in some cases, did not even qualify for the position. See Iftikhar Haider Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan*, St Martin Press, Inc., 1997, p. 295.

<sup>311</sup> Iftikhar Haider Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan*, St Martin Press, Inc., 1997, p. 110.

<sup>312</sup> Article 2-A states that "the independence of judiciary shall be fully secured." Article 175 says, "the judiciary shall be separated progressively from the executive." See: Justice Irshad Hassan Khan, *The Judicial System of Pakistan: Measures for Maintaining Independence and Enforcing Accountability*, p. 6.

direct control of the executive branch of the government formed by the major political party.<sup>313</sup> Judges are appointed by the executive on recommendations from the ministry of law, without any checks and balances. The ministry also drafts new laws and decrees, sometimes with retroactive effect. The superior judiciary, including the Supreme Court and Provincial High Courts has sometimes been reshuffled arbitrarily so that the courts do not rule against the existing executive in constitutional matters, especially under military rule.<sup>314</sup>

As it has been said, “justice delayed is justice denied.” This has had a negative impact on accountability of judicial system. The number of pending cases is increasing every year. For details see Table 3.3 to 3.6. The number of pending cases, which was 19,000 in 2003, exceeded over 25,000 until September 2004. According to Justice Nazim Hussain Siddiqui, the Chief Justice of Pakistan, after 2-3 years the number of pending cases will touch 45,000-50,000.<sup>315</sup> Delayed justice and pending cases only adds to frustrations and increases disorder in the society. There is a chronic shortage of judicial officers and administrative staff and this is one reason for the increasing number of pending cases. In some areas the strength has to be doubled or even tripled, so as to keep pace with the pending cases.<sup>316</sup>

The strength of the judges is shown in Table 3.3. Judges are legally trained before assuming the bench; the federal government also maintains a judicial training academy. Courts, especially at the lower levels, are poorly equipped, with limited access to resources such as books and computer databases.<sup>317</sup> The Court system and provision of criminal law do not extend into the tribal areas along the Afghan border. Political agents

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<sup>313</sup> “Article 115 of the constitution: Appointments of persons in the judicial service or as magistrates exercising judicial functions shall be made by the President in accordance with rules made by him in that behalf.” See: S. M. Matiur Rehman, *The Problems of Separation of Judiciary from the Executive*, Law Vision, Issue No. 159, September 26, 2004.

<sup>314</sup> Paula R. Newberg, *Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Also see: Pakistan by Hussain Haqqani, p. 5.

<sup>315</sup> “Last year we had about 19,000 cases and during less than one year the pending cases have crossed 25,000 despite disposal of more than 7,000 cases. If the increase continues like this, I apprehend, rather I am sure, after 2-3 years the number of pending cases will touch 45,000-50,000.” Waseem Ahmed, *Chief Justice Suggests Changes in Procedural Laws: Pending Cases*, The Dawn, Pakistan, September 12, 2004.

<sup>316</sup> Justice Irshad Hassan Khan, *The Judicial System of Pakistan: Measures for Independence and Enforcing Accountability*, p. 25. (Irshad Hassan Khan is Chief Justice of Pakistan).

<sup>317</sup> Pakistan by Hussain Haqqani, p. 7.

who work with tribal leaders to maintain law and order according to tribal standards administer these tribal areas.<sup>318</sup>

Table 3.3 Pendency, Institution and Disposal of Cases in the Supreme Court of Pakistan During Year 2000

No of Judges	Pendency as on 31 Dec 99		Institutions from 1.1.2000 to 31.12.2000		Total		Disposal from 1.1.2000 to 31.12.2000		Balance as on 31.12. 2000	
	Petitions	Appeals	Petitions	Appeals	Petitions	Appeals	Petitions	Appeals	Petitions	Appeals
17	4746	4088	8647	3055	13393	7143	7732	1806	5661	5337
	8834		11702		20536		9538		10998	

Source: Justice Irshad Hassan Khan, The Judicial System of Pakistan: Measures for Independence and Enforcing Accountability. For details also see: Publication of Supreme Court of Pakistan 2000.

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<sup>318</sup> *Courts and Criminal Procedures*, Country Study and Guide-Pakistan, p. 3. Available at: <http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/pakistan/pakistan164.html>. 10. November 2004.

Table 3.4 Pendency Institution and Disposal of Cases by High Courts During 2000

Name of the Court	No of Judges	Pendency as on 31.12.1999	Institutions from 1.1 2000 to 31. 12. 2000	Disposal from 1.1 2000 to 31. 12. 2000	Balance as on 31. 12. 2000
Lahore High Court	50	74077	91514	89990	75756
High Court of Sindh	28	71998	59116	52716	78398
Peshawar (NWFP) High Court	15	12995	8980	8374	13601
High Court of Balochistan	6	626	5600	4533	1693
Total	99	159696	165210	155613	169448

Source: Publication of Supreme Court of Pakistan 2000

Table 3.5 Pendency, Institution and Disposal of Cases by Subordinate Courts in Provinces During 2000

Name of the Court	No of Judges	Pendency as on 31.12.1999	Institutions from 1.1 2000 to 31. 12. 2000	Disposal from 1.1 2000 to 31. 12. 2000	Balance as on 31. 12. 2000
Sub Courts- Punjab	649	930707	558974	503263	986418
Sub Courts- Sindh	390	112971	87712	86291	114392
Sub Court (NWFP)	123	118460	184900	183539	119821
Sub Court- Balochistan	177	5827	21754	21942	5639
Total	1339	1167965	853340	795035	1226270

Source: Publication of Supreme Court of Pakistan 2000

Table 3.6 Pendency, Institution and Disposal of Cases by all Courts During 2000

Name of Court	No of judges	Pendency as on 31.12. 1999	Institutions from 1.1.2000 to 31.12. 2000	Disposal from 1.1.2000 to 31.12. 2000	Balance 31.12.2000	Difference
Supreme Court	17	8,834	11,702	9,538	10,998	+1164
All High Courts	99	159696	165210	155613	169448	+9597
All Sub Courts	1,339	1167965	853340	795035	1226270	+58305
Total	1,455	1,336,495	1,030,252	960,186	1,406,561	+70066

Source: Publication of Supreme Court of Pakistan 2000

## F. CORRUPTION AND NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU

Corruption is the biggest evil, common in almost all state institutions. In simple words it could be described as *misuse of entrusted state powers for personal gains*. Transparency international (TI) declared Pakistan as the second most corrupt nation out of 58 surveyed in 1996. For details see Table 3.7. Although there has been some

improvement, still as per a general estimate, in past years almost 20% of GDP have been lost through corruption and corrupt practices annually.<sup>319</sup> According to “Transparency international” (TI) survey the main causes of corruption is:<sup>320</sup>

- Lack of Accountability (31.68%)
- Low salaries (16.54%)
- Monopoly of power (16.43%)
- Discretionary powers (12.61%)
- Lack of transparency (9.97%)
- Power of influential people (4.59%)
- Red Tapism (4.28%)
- Others (4.9%)

Table 3.7 Pakistan’s Ranking in TI’s Corruption Perception Index

	Total number of Countries	Pakistan’s Rank	Pakistan’s Score (Out of 10)
CPI 1995	41	39	2.25
CPI 1996	54	53	1.0
CPI 1997	52	48	2.53
CPI 1998	85	71	2.7
CPI 1999	99	88	2.2
CPI 2000		NOT INCLUDED	
CPI 2001	91	79	2.3

**Source:** Transparency international, *Pakistan’s Anti-Corruption Program: Observations and Recommendations*, May 2002, p. 2.

In 1999, the military government formed the National Accountability Bureau and special accountability courts to try corruption cases. NAB performs two major functions of investigation and prosecuting cases of corruption, misuse of authority and white-collar crimes, under National Accountability Ordinance. According to news report published in an English daily, until June 2004, NAB was able to recover Rs. 115.276 billion from the

<sup>319</sup> Transparency international, *Pakistan’s Anti-Corruption Program: Observations and Recommendations*, May 2002, p. 2. Also stated in an address by the Chairman NAB on the occasion of Plenary session of the International workshop organized on the national Anti-corruption Strategy.

<sup>320</sup> *Pakistan’s Efforts Against Corruption*, a presentation by Mohammed Mohsin Khan, Deputy Auditor-general of Pakistan, ICGFM conference, 2004, Miami.

loan defaulters while NAB has affected indirect recoveries of 10.224 billion. The Director General NAB Sindh Maj. Gen. Sikandar in his remarks said public sector banks experienced serious deterioration in their loan portfolios due to political interference in lending and loan recovery decisions.<sup>321</sup>

Despite efforts rendered by NAB to unearth cases of corruption, misuse of power, political favoritism, and graft the bulk of the malpractice committed by various individuals in successive governments, remain untracked because of complications involved in baring them and tracing them to their perpetrators.<sup>322</sup> In general, the NAB is appreciated for its efficiency but there are some factors that have negative effect on the accountability of the NAB. Some of these are:

- It has been accused of victimizing selected targets and to malign the politicians.<sup>323</sup> A recent report appearing in online daily “Dawn” speaks of a US recovery company objecting to NAB’s “selective approach” and “political expediency”.<sup>324</sup>
- A petition has been filed in Lahore Court detailing “massive kickbacks and corruption” and accusing NAB of striking “various under the table deals with various individuals accused of high profile economic crimes in addition to arm twisting NAB defaulters, into joining the present government. These include at least one forth of all elected legislators.<sup>325</sup>
- There has been criticism over the powers given to NAB to detain individuals for 90 days without formally charging them. Whereas, under the existing Criminal law and direction of the Superior Pakistani Courts from time to time, police or investigative custody is not permitted beyond a normal 7 days, extendable under very special circumstances to 14 days.<sup>326</sup>

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<sup>321</sup> “NAB recovers Rs 110 Bln on State Bank of Pakistan’s request,” Pakistan Times. ‘Pakistan Times’ is Pakistan’s first independent Daily Newspaper. See: [info@pakistantimes.net](mailto:info@pakistantimes.net). Also see: “An Exclusive Interview with Chairman National Accountability Bureau,” Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Available at: <http://infopak.gov.pk/interview/NAB.htm>. 15 November 2004.

<sup>322</sup> “Time to Break the Ice,” Dawn, Pakistan, February 2, 2000.

<sup>323</sup> “Taking Stings Out,” Editorial, Dawn, Pakistan, April 26, 2001. Also see: M. Ziauddin, “Economics of Corruption,” Dawn, Pakistan, April 07, 2003.

<sup>324</sup> Masood Khan, Niaz A. Shah Kakakhel and Melvin J Dubnick, *Prosecuting Corruption: the Case of Pakistan*, 2004 Ethics Forum, American Society for Public Administration, March 26-27, 2004, Portland, OR, p. 11. Also see: <http://www.dawn.com/2003/11/03/>. October 2004.

<sup>325</sup> Masood Khan, Niaz A. Shah Kakakhel and Melvin J Dubnick, *Prosecuting Corruption: the Case of Pakistan*, 2004 Ethics Forum, American Society for Public Administration, March 26-27, 2004, Portland, OR, p. 11. Also: [www.hvk.org](http://www.hvk.org). Sep 2004.

<sup>326</sup> “Time to Break the Ice,” The Dawn, Pakistan, February 2, 2000.



- A serious flaw negating Human Rights is the creation of new offences that were not so defined, when those acts occurred in the past. In this connection Section 9(vii) of the NAB Ordinance can be cited.<sup>327</sup>
- Cases of maltreatment of detainees have raised continued concerns about conditions in NAB custody.<sup>328</sup>

## **G. POLITICAL FAILURE**

The absence of a strong parliamentary democracy and ever-changing political scenario has adversely affected the state institutions of Pakistan. Political instability has paved the way for successive military rules. Pakistan has had four martial laws, three imposed by the military dictators and fourth by a civilian dictator.<sup>329</sup> Of Pakistan's eleven heads of state, six were either soldiers or bureaucrats. For details see Appendix H. Their cumulative tenure of three dozen years are marked by dismissal of eight out of fifteen prime ministers; dissolution of seven out of ten national assemblies; and banning of five out of seven political parties.<sup>330</sup> Every government devised its own independent agenda shaking the very roots of the political system and ultimate mutilation of state institutions.

Four successive governments were dismissed mainly on the grounds of corruption before completing constitutional five-year term. The first government of Ms Benazir Bhutto was dismissed on 16 August 1990 and the Supreme Court upheld its dissolution. Then in 1993, the government of Mr. Mian Nawaz Sharif was dismissed. Ms. Benazir Bhutto then came into power; however, her second government was dismissed in October 1996 on the grounds of corruption of others. The Supreme Court upheld the dissolution order. Mian Nawaz Sharif came into power for the second time but was sacked in

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<sup>327</sup> *Military Rule in Pakistan*, World Sindhi Congress. Available at URL: <http://www.sindhlink.net>. For details contact: [world\\_sindhi\\_congress@yahoo.com](mailto:world_sindhi_congress@yahoo.com). October 2004.

<sup>328</sup> According to Sindh daily *Kawish*, Malik Allah Yar Khan, a former member of National Assembly died at Al Shifa trust hospital in Islamabad on June 27, fifteen days after having been brought there by "non-civilian" NAB officials. He had been reportedly been in NAB custody for several months. *Kawish*, June 28, 2000. Also see: *Abuses in Accountability Cases*, Human Right Watch available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/pakistan>. October 2004.

<sup>329</sup> Three military dictators were: General M. Ayub Khan, M. Yahya Khan and M. Zia-ul- Haq. The civilian dictator was Z. A. Bhutto.

<sup>330</sup> Hafeez Malik, *Pakistan: Founders' Aspiration and Today's Realities*, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 84.

October 1999. A strain of governmental incompetence and corruption remained a factor in all dismissal sagas of governments and legal battles.<sup>331</sup>

The politics of mutual hatred and vengeance have nurtured intolerance and enmity between political parties. These antagonisms in political parties have led them to create party militias to destabilize each other. Increasingly there is a tendency to resort to violence and armed confrontations to resolve political disputes and rivalries.<sup>332</sup>

## **H. CONCLUSION**

Political instability shadowing the politicization of institutions, lack of transparency leading to corruption and mismanagement of funds are common causes for the decay of all state institutions. A decaying political system, intermittent martial laws, unscrupulous politicians, culture of conspiracies, selfishness, corruption and greed, have all contributed towards a decaying political system. Over the years, people appear to have lost faith in our political system. This has led to the growth of feelings of regionalism and provincialism. Under the prevailing situation, there is a grave danger of a rise in demand for greater autonomy by smaller provinces and exploitation of general discontentment by our adversary by instigating and supporting the dissidents.

Lack of court management, deficient case processing, shortcomings in the judicial system, parallel judiciary, and inflexible procedures have contributed to deterioration in the law and order situation. Flaws in the judicial system, inefficiency of police force, lack of public trust in the state institutions and presence of evils in the society, have further aggravated the situation.

The general public when unprotected and insecure, with basic rights of protection and justice denied, feel highly discontented thus providing a fertile ground for subverts/saboteurs. Resultantly, when other law enforcing institutions fail to meet internal security threats army intervenes. A Low literacy rate, weak democratic institutions, state-

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<sup>331</sup> Masood Khan, Niaz A. Shah Kakakhel and Melvin J Dubnick, *Prosecuting Corruption: the Case of Pakistan*, 2004 Ethics Forum, American Society for Public Administration, March 26-27, 2004, Portland, OR, p. 7. Also see: PLD 1992 SC 416, PLD 1993 SC 473, PLD 1998 SC 388, PLD 2000 SC 869.

<sup>332</sup> "Despite improved security conditions under Governor Rule, there were 75 deaths that were presumed to be result of political violence in Karachi." Pakistan Country Report on Human Practices for 1999, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, US Department of State, February 2000.

sponsored repression, corruption, sustained political unrest, lack of accountability, and internal security problems are responsible for bringing the army out of the barracks into the lime lights of running the state institutions.

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## **VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. CONCLUSIONS**

For too long Pakistan has sacrificed its internal security in pursuit of meeting external threats. The intensity of internal security threats to Pakistan was further aggravated by vested interests of some foreign elements. These elements continue to exploit ethno-sectarian differences between factions. Pakistan's internal security problems, compounded by external security threats, have made security management highly complex, which is affecting larger goals of economic prosperity. Engagement in Afghanistan and unending conflicts with India has had a high cost on Pakistan internally. There is a dire need for reorientation of our strategic thinking on security issues. The labels of fundamentalism, religious extremism, and state sponsoring terrorism have created an unenviable image of Pakistan in the eyes of the rest of the world and have affected the country adversely in all regards. A deliberate effort has to be made to improve the image of Pakistan as a moderate, forward looking and internally stable country in the international community.

Pakistan security dynamics have changed drastically since 11 September 2001. Under the leadership of President Musharraf, Pakistan has made dramatic shift in its policies. Government decision to intervene in Federally Administered Tribal Areas to flush out Taliban and remnants of Al Qaeda has been viewed with great concern by majority of masses. These concerns have given a new impetus and motivation to militant organization to fulfill their unfinished agendas, creating a dangerous situation for future stability and integration of Pakistan. There are opportunities also and greater risks involved as well. Establishing writ of government in tribal areas, building long-term friendship with the U.S., Afghanistan, and the rest of the world, and cutting the roots of militants are few of the opportunities. However, there are some risks such as public disorder, political unrest, and inextricable engagement of the army in internal security duties. Pakistan should pursue a more balanced approach in handling the religious affairs. The military operation, in its effort to haunt terrorists, requires delicate management without overly agitating the tribes and the general public to the point of unified revolt.

These operations must be done surgically without any collateral damage. Pakistan security planners have to take a holistic view of all the present and future security threats.

Religious intolerance and ethnic disharmony are the outcome of at least two decades of interaction between regional and internal stimuli. Any notion that it could be wished away within a short span of time is myopic and flawed. Pakistan has to carefully balance between the demand of international community and local sentiments of Pakistani population. Pakistani leaders have to deal with ground realities and resist such pressures of the international community. This could lead to internal unrest and thus, become counter productive to a larger interest of Pakistan as an Islamic state.

The issue of Kashmir is highly sensitive and politically charged. There is an acute sense of gross injustice and unfair treatment to Muslims in Kashmir. This unrest serves as a primary motivation for insurgency also. Unless a positive outcome of Kashmir is sought, Pakistan will find many associated ills difficult to treat. Though the issue of Kashmir is unlikely to be resolved early, Pakistan has to manage its internal situation as it resonates deeply into domestic politics. The United States must play an important role to settle all the disputes between India and Pakistan. U.S. support in this direction would address a major cause taken up by radical Islamist and many moderate Pakistanis.<sup>333</sup> Mere lip service will not serve the purpose.

Inter-provincial and tribal feuds need to be resolved first. The government should try to keep inter-provincial and tribal harmony, playing a neutral and impartial role in this regard. The government and tribal forces stand-off in Balochistan provinces would plague the economic development process. The government should consider each aspect of the recent acts of sabotage in Sui and Gwadar and beef up security in the sensitive areas providing protection to vital installations in Pakistan. Pakistan must evolve a long-term political strategy to deal with ethnic issues.

For a peaceful Pakistan there is a need to eradicate any sense of alienation and obtain egalitarianism in the country as a whole, by rendering efforts towards achieving democratization, decentralization, accountability and a wider consensus at all levels.

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<sup>333</sup> Cohen, Philip Stephen, *The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan*, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2003, p. 24.

Pakistan did not care much about the sensitivity of diverse language and cultures, which eventually led to loss of East Pakistan. However, the case of separation of former East Pakistan is not the exact parallel to existing ethnic tension in Sindh and Balochistan. The later is not a secessionist movement but what Cohen calls, “instrument for competition over scarce resources”. The presence of such sentiments is divisive and a cause of provisional disharmony, which in turn affects the internal security and economic prosperity of the state. One glaring example is the case of Balochistan, having all the gas reserves in Pakistan. It’s people were the last to benefit from gas and yet there are many areas where gas has not been provided. Distribution of resources must ensure equal benefits to all rather than a few and the privileged class. Though equitable economic growth in all provinces is hard to achieve due to structural asymmetries in the respective provinces, government allocation of resources must redress the imbalances when allocating federal resources. The government should increase the development fund for Balochistan. Socio-economic packages to uplift deserving areas/communities would reduce political exploitation. Projects of national importance warrants open discussion and every effort should be made to achieve consensus on projects of national importance.

No matter how many reforms are passed and laws are made, peace cannot be attained in the state unless the hands of the government are strengthened by strong and effective law enforcing agencies. Political instability and failure of law enforcing agencies to maintain the writ of government have weakened the vital state institutions. This factor is responsible for internal unrest in Pakistan.

After analyzing all the factors responsible for ethno-sectarian threat to Pakistan’s internal security, I conclude that that economic prosperity and resolution of internal security are interdependent. The economic and social outcomes, as stated by Ishrat, in Pakistan have turned out to be mixture of paradoxes.<sup>334</sup> The persistence of poverty, large income inequalities, severe rural –urban disparities, gender discrimination, endemic ethnic rivalries and political instability suggest that benefits of economic growth have not been spread evenly.<sup>335</sup> Pakistan must address its internal problems since its future

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<sup>334</sup> Hussain, Ishrat, *Pakistan The Economy of Elitist State*, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 339.

<sup>335</sup> Ibid., pp. 339 –341.

viability depends on economic progress. All recommendations suggested in this paper point towards economic prosperity as an end point. At present, the state of economy does not allow enough spending on socio-economic development, the education and strengthening domestic law enforcing agencies. The international community and the U.S. in particular, can help Pakistan invest in these areas. A stable and prosperous Pakistan can be a role model for the regional stability and for the entire Islamic world.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **1. Recommended Strategy to Confront Sectarian Threats**

Jihadi culture has transformed into a movement that can cause immense damage to the state of Pakistan. Pakistan's political, economic and social institutions must revive and accelerate before the radical groups gain enough traction to emerge as an independent political force undoing the writ of government within state. There is a need to formulate a strategy to deal with the threat. Out-rightly confronting jihadi organizations could result in a backlash which could get out of control. A more referable strategy would be to keep a strong check on all illegitimate activities and distinguish between religious freedom and religious abuse. By bringing the frustrated youth into the main stream, providing an outlet through economic prosperity, Pakistan can turn the potentials towards positive goals. Pakistan's government cannot remain insensitive to the feeling of the majority of its population, which are Muslims.

A three-pronged strategy should be adopted to leash the sectarian/jihadi monster. The first prong must halt and then reverse the growing trend of religious intolerance. The second prong should enforce the rule of law, and the third prong should consolidate the gains by introducing incentives and by showing outlets through economic prosperity. The three prongs of this strategy should be activated simultaneously by formulating short-term and long-term goals. The success of the following proposed strategy depends on how it is implemented, subject directly related to "state capacity and economic development."

- **Engagement Strategy:** This involves three tasks. The first is mobilization of public opinion on fundamental issues including correct interpretation of Islam and public awareness of the repercussions of religious extremism. Campaigns through electronic media, print media, along with public participation in discussions through debates and nationwide seminars would help build consensus on the current issues. Secondly, Pakistan has



to give top priority to education and unemployment. This would help engage the frustrated youth of madrassahs and would direct their talents towards constructive activities rather than militant activities. This could be done by implementation of madrassah reforms, and bringing madrassahs into the folds of national education programs. The third is the formation of an anti-terrorist cell to collect data on militant organizations and foreign terrorists present in the country.

- **Enforcement Strategy:** This involves direct and indirect application of force. Any weakness in this strategy could turn around the whole effort made so far to eradicate jihadi element from our society. Guarding porous borders and operations launched to isolate and neutralize major jihadi organizations needs application of force. This strategy also involves monitoring of bank accounts and funding of jihadi madrassahs; keeping a check on activists with criminal records and taking necessary actions where necessary; and prevention of re-surfacing of banned sectarian/jihadi organizations. Strengthening law-enforcing agencies would enforce the writ of government.
- **Consolidation Strategy:** This part of the strategy proposes to bring the frustrated youth into the main stream by giving them incentives and by showing them outlets through economic prosperity. Consistent policies to bring a balanced approach in social structure, respecting the beliefs of different sectarian groups and giving equal opportunities to all sects will banish the social elements, responsible for religious intolerance.

## 2. **Recommendations to Reduce Ethnic Tension**

Despite political re-engineering and the devolution scheme by Musharraf's government, Pakistan maintains a highly centralized bureaucratic system. Center should transfer maximum powers to provinces and provinces should dissolve these powers to district and local governments. Provincial autonomy should cover two major areas: political and economic. Provincial and local government institutions should be given a chance to work and regulate the allocated funds subject to audit and accountability and through the normal judicial system. Devolution of powers at the lowest level will create a sense of involvement and sense of responsibility among the have-nots. A regular election would be the best source of accountability.

The existing provinces are highly multiethnic in nature, creating a tug-of-war situation among different ethnic groups within the regions. Besides, an increase in population growth has increased the struggle for survival, which has created administrative and social problems. Increasing the number of provinces by considering new provincial boundaries will remove dominance of any one federating unit. India has a

more diverse society than Pakistan and their increasing their number of provinces has been a successful experience. However, this topic is another vast study that could require it's own thesis.

Large number of provinces recognizes ethnic diversity and respects it as existential plurality within societies. A greater space for expression of ethnic identities should be allowed under the principle of “Unity in Diversity”.<sup>336</sup> A national policy of “one country, one language and one culture” works for national unity and coherence, but it must balance outlets, so that people take pride in their country and ethnic identity equally. Power sharing with minority groups by giving them legible representation in cabinet, civil service, military, and high party position will provide psychological security to these groups.

Misunderstandings between provinces and ethnic groups within regions, are dangerous to the solidarity of the state. The government should build bridges between confronting groups and should create grounds for negotiation and explore shared concerns. The issues of Kalabagh dam and Gwadar should addressed through mutual consensus. The ethnic leaders should not be allowed to exploit the issues for their political gains.

More than 50 percent share should be given to provinces through a divisible pool. Horizontal distribution among the provinces should be done through consensus. A state can obtain national integration by a consensus-based policy without allowing majorities to overrun the minority or the later vetoing the former. While allocating developmental funds, the state should consider the area, population density, needs of people, and position of developmental plans of every province.

### **3. Recommendations to Improve Economy**

Given the state of present economic base, foreign investment and domestic investment is key to achieve a higher growth rate. Sectarian wave and ethnic rivalries have eluded the confidence of investors. Improving law and order should be the primary objective to build confidence amongst investors.

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<sup>336</sup> Jamil Jalibi, *Pakistan: Identity of Culture*, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 1984, p. 55.

The Pakistani community faces enormous challenges brought about by the pressures of increasing population and environmental degradation. To meet these needs, it is critical that agricultural methods and practices become more sustainable and environmentally sound. The urbanization, erosion, and environmental degradation of arable agricultural land must be controlled better and, where possible, reversed. In addition water resources must be protected and enhanced.

Ineffective water management is not only creating provincial disharmony but also crippling the economy and posing formidable challenges to our future economic development. The rapidly burgeoning population postulates a 100% increase in the existing irrigated area and hence imply enhanced demand of water. If the grave problem of water mismanagement is not redressed and resolved now, it would spell unmitigated disaster for the national economy. This would render the attainment of the long-cherished national goal of self-sufficiency in food and energy sectors, an elusive dream. There is a need to construct small dams on the river Indus, Jhelum, and Chanab. The potential sites of these small reservoir/dams need to be surveyed. However, some of the sites are located at Sewan-Manchar lake, Hamal lake, Skardu, Bunji, Kohala, Rohtas, Neelum valley, and Thal reservoir etc.<sup>337</sup> The level of Mangla and Tarbela dams needs to be raised to increase the storage capacity.

The present government is following a comprehensive social sector development program. Nonetheless, some immediate poverty alleviation measures are essential:

- Relief to the common man through adequate health education and population control. This obviously requires funding. Zakat fund may be utilized in health sector.
- The government can contribute in reducing some miseries of the poor by minimizing impact of energy cost also.
- Universal women's education should be used as a catalyst for managing the population.
- Involve religious leaders and institutions for removing inhibitions against family planning controversies.
- Effective dissemination of the family planning program through utilization of educational syllabi and media with focus on rural areas.

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<sup>337</sup> M. H. Naqvi, S. M. Alam, *Water Scenario and Pakistan*, March 19, 2003, p. 8. Available on internet site: [www.pakistaneconomist.com/database1/cover/c2003-25.asp](http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/database1/cover/c2003-25.asp). November 2004.

- Decentralize the program to the local government for effective implementation. 6.4% growth rate<sup>338</sup> may be an achievement for the government, however, it becomes meaningless unless its effects are felt by population living below the poverty line.

#### **4. Recommendations on Education**

The Pakistan educational system must be reconstructed on war footing. Education has been a low priority of successive governments. Education seeks to satisfy a population's basic needs and, if educational standard are inadequate, then it can lead to irreparable consequences. A literacy rate of 40% is necessary but not sufficient for a sustained level of economic growth and thwarts all internal security threats discussed in this thesis. My recommendations are based on a Robert Looney paper "Reforming Pakistan's Education System, The Challenges of Madrassahs" There is a need to focus on all the issues raised by him. I want to stress on following in addition to what he recommends:

- Eradicate illiteracy on war footing through compulsory and universal primary education. Emphasis on vocational training to produce skilled manpower.
- Enhance education budget progressively to 4% of GDP.
- Decentralize education to local government involving local communities and creating public-private sector partnership.
- Improve the public sector educational institutions to narrow the gap between these and private sector schools and colleges.
- Standardize educational syllabi of various educational boards within the country.
- Bring madrassahs education into mainstream through integrated syllabi and linkages with Islamic universities with a view to inculcate moderation.
- It is an established fact that government alone cannot manage to provide quality education to all. Private sector has to have a role in this field. But at the same time it has to be ensured that education does not become an enterprise only and quality is not sacrificed for the sake of profit. Government should provide subsidy to those who want to invest in this field in rural areas because the role of private sector in education is restricted to urban mainland. Thus students of rural areas are left with no option other than either going to madrassahs or cities.

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<sup>338</sup> Aziz Shaukat, Budget Speech 2004-2005, available on [www.dawn.com/events/bud2004-2005/index.htm](http://www.dawn.com/events/bud2004-2005/index.htm). November 2004.

## **5. Recommendations to Improve Capacity of State Institution**

Governance of multi ethnic and economically unstable country like Pakistan is not an easy task, and it is not possible without strengthening state institutions. Unless or until the state institutions of police, judiciary, and paramilitary forces to overcome the existing shortcomings, the internal security threats will continue to persist.

Politicization of the government machinery/institutions for vested interests by the successive governments is the basic cause of their degeneration and wide spread corruption. De-politicization of police, judiciary, and other administrative machinery is also an important requirement. A wholesome package must be conceived and implemented in this regard. Law and order situation of the country will automatically get addressed.

A judiciary must be independent of the executive. There is a requirement of an independent judiciary for the society. There is a need for the government to refrain from stepping into judiciary domain. The system has to be purged of corrupt officials irrespective of political affiliation, in a transparent manner and the postings and promotions should be on merit. All pending cases must be settled at priority.

A sincere effort should be made to bridge the gap between the police and the community by implementing police reforms already in place. Following may be done to improve the police performance:

- To improve the police-civil relations a separate subject on “behavior improvement” should be included in police training institutional manual. Institutionalize intelligence agencies’ input to police and formation of Civil Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) at District level. This is being practiced in few districts of Karachi. Institutionalizing CPLC concept in all the provinces will improve the efficiency of police and will help bridging the gap between police and local population of the areas.
- Police should be equipped with better weapons, communication system and mobility. Police need to be equipped with computers, database, detection gear, and testing equipment.
- A massive purge of corrupt police officials is necessary, particularly SHOs.
- Pakistani police needs better training to meet the internal security threats. Their training in detection/investigation needs to be improved on scientific lines. Quality of already in-service police officers could improve by

regular refresher courses within the country and by acquiring foreign courses for police officers.

- Institutional stability and protection from politicization is required to be given to the police to free them from external influences of feudal and politicians. Fix tenure appointments need to be introduced ensuring that police officials stay long enough to do their job.
- All provisions of “Police Order 2002” need to be enforced in letter and spirit.
- Modify the pay structure of police along the lines of the armed forces of the country.

A regional paramilitary force should be organized, equipped, and trained in consonance with the threat perceived in the area and placed closer to the potential trouble spots. This shall save the army from taking the main brunt as army’s involvement in internal security adds fuel to an already fragile civil military relations with the country. The need of the hour is to enhance the capacity of paramilitary forces. The police will take time to evolve its capability to meet terrorism threats, however, with little investment on paramilitary forces, there can be substantial improvement in their organizational ability to fight terrorism. The following equipment should be provided immediately to enhance the capability:

- Wheeled APCs or bullet proof panels for vehicles carrying troops
- Radars for surveillance of infiltration routes specially along Afghanistan and Kashmir border
- Lightweight communication wireless apparatus suitable for built up areas
- Sniper rifles with laser designators
- Introduction of rubber bullets
- More number of close quarters battle weapons
- Bulletproof jackets and fiber glass helmets for at least 20% of troops
- Sufficient supply of riot controls gear including tear gas, smoke grenades and water shells, etc.
- Hand held metal detectors for speedy frisking of persons
- Portable baggage-ray machines for search of baggage of bus passengers

## APPENDIX A. DEENI MADARIS OF PUNJAB

A Sect and District-wise Survey of Deeni Madaris of Punjab

District	Deobandi	Barelvi	Ahle Hadith	Ahle Tashi	Total
Lahore	143	136	41	3	323
Gujranwala	36	87	36	13	140
Rawalpindi	83	64	6	16	169
Faisalabad	47	39	18	8	112
Sargodha	68	64	9	8	149
Multan	127	159	27	12	325
D G Khan	133	174	24	30	411
Bahawalpur	335	493	36	19	883
Total	972	1216	174	100	2512

**Source:** Lt Gen (R) Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon , (Karachi: Oxford, 1999). P.18.

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## APPENDIX B. STUDENTS IN DEENI MADARIS OF PUNJAB

A Sect and District-wise survey of students enrolled in the Deeni Madaris of Punjab

District	Deobandi	Barelvi	Ahle Hadith	Ahle Tashi	Total
Lahore	1792	18336	5524	350	42102
Gujranwala	3632	7400	1712	373	13117
Rawalpindi	8367	8307	417	442	17533
Faisalabad	11631	5027	3141	700	20499
Sargodha	6158	6427	1318	341	14244
Multan	11888	10798	2620	138	25966
D G Khan	8816	9593	1829	669	20907
Bahawalpur	3220	29302	2319	746	64571
Total	100588	95190	18880	4281	218939

**Source:** Lt Gen (R) Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon , (Karachi: Oxford, 1999). p. 18.

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## APPENDIX C. JIHADI LITERATURE

In order to reach out to the masses and spread their message of jihad, some of the Pakistani based jihadi organizations produce at least a dozen main publications. Four Jihadi outfits with media publications are:

### ***Lashkar-e-Tayaba:***

- Monthly “Voice of Islam” in English language
- Monthly “Majla Al-Dawa” in Urdu language
- Monthly “Majla Al-Dawa” in Urdu language (for women)
- Weekly “Jihad Times” in Urdu and Sindhi language
- Fortnightly “Zarb-e- Taiba” in Urdu language  
*Its web-based radio, Al-Jihad (Urdu/Arabic) is available at <http://www.markazdawa.org>*

### ***Harkat-ul-Mujahidin:***

- Monthly “Sada-e-Mujahid” in Urdu language
- Weekly “Al-Hilal” in Urdu language

### ***Jaish-e-Muhammad:***

- Monthly “Binnat-e-Ayesha” in Urdu language (for women)
- Fortnightly “Jaish Mohammad” in Urdu language  
*Jaish also offers electronic newsletter at its web-site <http://www.jaish-e-muhammad.org>*

### ***Al-Rasheed Trust (a charity organization):***

- Weekly “Zarb-e-Momin” in Urdu language
- Daily “Islam” in Urdu language

These magazines and periodicals include the latest news of all fronts around the globe where the Mujahideen are waging jihad against infidels. Day to day activities of the jihadis is listed highlighting their successes and amount of damage they have inflicted on the enemy. These also highlight the names of all the martyrs who have achieved their ultimate goal by embracing ‘Shahadat’ while doing jihad. Messages from the families of these martyrs, who are proud and happy over the ‘Shahadat’ of their beloved ones and offering rest of their sons and relatives for this noble cause of jihad, are also taken to

print. It would not be irrelevant to add that these magazines have produced innumerable mujahideens and many ‘martyrs’ over the years.

In addition the importance of jihad for all Muslims and different issues in the light of teachings of Islam, are discussed to educate the people on how to learn the essence of Islam, and to volunteer themselves for this noble cause.

The Markaz al-Dawa al-Irshad,<sup>339</sup> claims that its monthly publications, the *Majla Al-Dawa* that initially started with a circulation of about 5000 in 1989<sup>340</sup> has now a circulation of 400,000, and weekly print order of its *Jihad Times* is 200,000 exceeds a circulation of over 70,000. *Zarb-I-Momin* of Al-Rasheed Trust reportedly sells 250,000 copies a week.<sup>341</sup>

**Source:** International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: Madraashs, Extremism and the Military*, ICG Asia Report no. 36, Islamabad/Brussels, 29<sup>th</sup> July 2002, p.14. Also see: Shahzeb Jillani , “ Taking Jehad to Print”, The Herald, March 2001, P.57. Also see: Zafarullah Khan, *Medieval Mindset, Modern Media*” a research paper read at a media workshop organized by the Freidrich Naumann Stiftung, Islamabad, 28 November 2001.

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<sup>339</sup> It is an Ahle Hadith organization, established by three university teachers in 1987.

<sup>340</sup> Zaigham Khan, “Information Revolution,” The Herald Annual, January 1998, p. 128.

<sup>341</sup> International Crisis Group, *Pakistan: Madraashs, Extremism and the Military*, ICG Asia Report no. 36, Islamabad/Brussels, July 29, 2002, p. 14.

## APPENDIX D. MAP OF PAKISTANI ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS

### I. Islamist

JKLF – Kashmiri

Jama'at-e-Islami (JI), Kashmir

Hizb-ul-Mujahiddin

Al-Badr

Jama'at-e-Islami (JI), Pakistan

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### II. Wahabi

Ahl-e-Hadith (Wahabi)

Markaz-Dawat-ul-Irshad

Lashkar-e-Taiba (Tayyaba) (Army of the Pure)

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### III. Sunni Orthodox (Deoband)

Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam

**Deobandi A**

Maulvi Fazlur Rahman

Taliban?, fuzzy

Sipah-e-Sahaba

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi  
(underground)

**Deobandi B**

Maulana Sami-ul-Haq

Pakistani Taliban (Akul, Khattak)

**Afghan Taliban**

Harkat-ul-(Ansar) Mujahiddin

Harkat-ul-Jihad

Jaesh-e-Mohammad

Osama Bin Laden

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
#### IV. **Sunni Barelvi**

Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan: active in politics, but apparently not involved in external jihadi activity

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#### V. **Shia mainstream (not Ismailis)**

Allama Syed Jaafar Hussain Mujtahid



**Source:** Rodney W Jones, *The Prospects of State Failure in Pakistan: Ethnic, Regional and Sectarian Fissure summary*, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Policy Architect International, May 1, 2001

## APPENDIX E. STORAGE CAPACITY AND LIFE STATUS OF DAMS

Year of original capacity(MAF)				Year last survey	Remaining Storage Capacity (MAF)		Loss Per Year%	Total loss	Estimated life		Remaining life of the Project
Dams	Completion	Gross	Live		Gross	Live			Original	Present	
Mangla	1967	5.88	5.34	1993	4.95	4.68	34215	15.8	120	170	136
Terbela	1974	11.62	9.68	1995	9.30	8.21	110476	20.0	60	82	53
Chasma	1971	0.870	0.720	1987	0.497	0.435	23313	42.87	60	60	30
Hub	1981	0.857	0.760	-	-	-	-	-	75	75	55
Warsak	1960	0.133	0.025	1986	0.015	0.015	4538	88.7	10	10	-
Simly	1983	0.029	0.20	1994	0.025	0.019	283	13.8	60	65	57
Khanpur	1983	0.107	0.092	1993	0.094	0.088	1306	12.2	90	90	72

**Source:** Planning Commission and Water Sector investment Planning Study (WISPS-1990)

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## APPENDIX F. FUTURE WATER REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY

Year	2000	2013	2025
Population in millions	148	207	267
Water (Bm3) requirements (irrigational)	177MAF	255MAF	-
Water requirements non irrigational	7.3MAF	10.7MAF	-
Total requirements	184MAF	266MAF	324MAF
Availability as surface and ground water (water course head)	134.2MAF	132.5MAF	156MAF
Shortfall	49.7MAF	133.7MAF	186.2MAF

**Source:** Planning Commission and Water Sector investment Planning Study (WISPS-1990)

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## **APPENDIX G. DATA ON BASIC HEALTH FACILITIES**

### **Details of health Unit**

- Hospitals - 876
- Dispensaries - 4635
- Basic Health Unit - 5171
- Maternity and Child Care Unit - 856

### **In terms of population there is**

- One doctor for - 1529 persons
- One dentist for - 33,629 persons
- One nurse for - 3732 persons.
- One hospital bed for - 1495 persons

**Source: Highlight of Economic Survey 2000 – 2001, p 118-120**

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## APPENDIX H. HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT, 1947-99

Leader	Position <sup>1</sup>	Term of Office <sup>2</sup>
Mohammad Ali Jinnah	Governor General	August 1947-September 1948
Liaquat Ali Khan	Prime Minister	August 1947-October 1951
Khwaja Nazimuddin	Governor General	September 1948-October 1951
Ghulam Mohammad	Governor General	October 1951-August 1955
Khwaja Nazimuddin	Prime Minister	October 1951-April 1953
Mohammad Ali Bogra	Prime Minister	April 1953-August 1955
Iskander Mirza	Governor General/President	August 1955-October 1958
Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali	Prime Minister	August 1955-September 1956
H.S. Suhrawardy	Prime Minister	September 1956-October 1957
I.I. Chundrigar	Prime Minister	October-December 1957
Firoz Khan Noon	Prime Minister	December 1957-October 1958
Mohammad Ayub Khan	CMLA/President	October 1958-March 1969
Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan	CMLA/President	March 1969-December 1971
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto	CMLA/President/Prime Minister	December 1971-July 1977
Fazal Elahi Chaudhry	President	August 1973-September 1978
Mohammad Zia ul-Haq	CMLA/President	July 1977-August 1988
Mohammad Khan Junejo	Prime Minister	March 1985-May 1988
Ghulam Ishaq Khan	President	August 1988-July 1993
Benazir Bhutto	Prime Minister	December 1988-August 1990
Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi	Prime Minister (caretaker)	August-November 1990
Mian Nawaz Sharif	Prime Minister	November 1990-April 1993
Balakh Sher Mazari	Prime Minister (caretaker)	April-May 1993
Mian Nawaz Sharif	Prime Minister	May-July 1993
Wassim Sajjad	President (caretaker)	July-November 1993
Moeen Qureshi	Prime Minister (caretaker)	July-October 1993
Benazir Bhutto	Prime Minister	October 1993-
Farooq Leghari	President	November 1993-
Nawaz Sharif	Prime Minister	1997
Musharraf	Military coup	October 1999

<sup>1</sup> CMLA stands for "Chief Martial Law Administrator".

<sup>2</sup> When a head of state or government held more than one position, not all offices were for exactly the same term. Dates shown are for the longest period a leader was in power. The name of the head of State was changed from governor general to president under the 1956 constitution.

Source: [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/pakistan/pk\\_appen.html](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/pakistan/pk_appen.html). February/2004

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